Designing Visually Effective and Intuitive Modelling Notations for Security Risk Management by Cherednychenko, Oleksandr
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Institute of Computer Science 
Software Engineering Curriculum 
Oleksandr Cherednychenko 
Designing Visually Effective and Intuitive Model-
ling Notations for Security Risk Management 
Master’s Thesis (30 ECTS) 
Supervisor: Raimundas Matulevičius, PhD 
 
  
Tartu 2018 
2 
 
Designing Visually Effective and Intuitive Modelling Notations for 
Security Risk Management 
Abstract: 
Security risk management is a set of activities, aimed at identifying and mitigating security 
risks starting from the early stages of software development. A set of security risk-oriented 
modelling languages could be used by both end users and security analysts to perform mod-
elling activities. However, existing languages lack semantical transparency, which results 
in additional grasping barriers and steepness of learning curve. Moreover, presently availa-
ble modelling languages were developed with no explicit design rationale in mind and per-
form poorly in terms of effectiveness and intuitiveness. Since the vital characteristic of mod-
elling language is cognitive effectiveness, this research is focused on improving visual per-
ception of the available security risk-oriented modelling languages (Secure BPMN, Secure 
Tropos, Misuse Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams). This goal is fulfilled by proposing a set of 
icons, which could be incorporated into existing modelling languages. Unified set of icons 
would enhance the recognizability of domain-specific concepts, outlined in Information 
Systems Security Risk Management Domain Model, as well as reduce the learning curve 
and improve the overall cognitive efficiency of available notations. Proposed icon set is 
composed based on the outcomes of several empirical studies, performed in 3 distinct loca-
tions, belonging to various geographical areas and exhibiting a variety of cultural back-
grounds. Improved cognitive effectiveness of notations, augmented with proposed icon set, 
is validated by the conducted evaluation study, which demonstrated increased level of com-
prehension as compared with existing notations.    
Keywords: 
Security Risk Management, ISSRM, visual notation, semantic efficiency, icon set, percep-
tion. 
CERCS: T120 Systems engineering, computer technology 
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Visuaalselt efektiivsete ja intuitiivsete modelleerimisteadete 
disainimine turvariski juhtimiseks 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Turvariski juhtimine on toimingute kogum, mille eesmärk on tuvastada ja vähendada 
turvariske tarkvaraarenduse varastest etappidest alates. Modelleerimisel võivad nii 
lõppkasutajad kui ka turvaanalüütikud kasutada turvariskidele orienteeritud 
modelleerimiskeeli. Siiski puudub olemasolevatel keeltel semantiline läbipaistvus, mis 
tekitab õppimiskõverale täiendavaid takistavaid barjääre ja äkilisust. Veelgi enam, praegu 
saadaolevad modelleerimiskeeled töötati välja ilma mingit kindlat disaini arvestamata ja 
nende intuitiivsus on vilets. Kuna modelleerimiskeele oluline tunnusjoon on kognitiivne 
efektiivsus, keskendub see uuring saadaval olevate turvariskidele orienteeritud 
modelleerimiskeelte (Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams) 
mõistmise parandamisele. Sellel eesmärgil pakutakse ikoonide komplekti, mille võiks 
integreerida olemasolevatesse modelleerimiskeeltesse. Ikoonide ühtlustatud komplekt 
suurendaks domeenikohaste kontseptide äratuntavust, mis on toodud infosüsteemide 
turvariskide juhtimise domeenimudelis, lühendaks õppimiskõverat ning parandaks 
olemasolevate teadete üldist intuitiivsust. Soovitatav ikoonide komplekt on koostatud 
mitme empiirilise uuringu põhjal, mis on tehtud kolmes kohas, mis asuvad eri 
geograafilistes piirkondades ja esindavad erinevaid kultuurilisi taustu. Teadete parandatud 
kognitiivset efektiivsust, täiendatuna soovitatud ikoonide komplektiga, on kontrollitud 
hindamisuuringuga, mis näitas olemasolevate teadetega võrreldes paremat mõistmistaset.  
Võtmesõnad: 
Turvariski juhtimine, ISSRM, visuaalne teavitamine, semantiline tõhusus, ikoonide kom-
plekt, arusaamine.  
CERCS: T120 Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia 
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1 Introduction 
With the Fourth Industrial Revolution inevitably advancing on all fronts, humanity is cur-
rently standing on the verge of the new industrial era. Since information technologies are 
progressively disrupting existing business processes, it could be said that success of the 
enterprise steadily becomes inseparable from the flawless operation of complex technolog-
ical systems. As the importance of IT demonstrates escalating growth, integrity and security 
of information systems are crucial for any business that aspires to be even remotely success-
ful.  
As it was recently demonstrated by the recent Equifax breach, one cybersecurity incident 
could effectively destroy a major domain-dominating corporation (Fein, 2017). Thus, the 
importance of addressing security is essentially a question of corporate life and death.  While 
there are various approaches to address security, it is more effective to do so in initial stage, 
by construction, than by the fact (Dubois, Heymans, Mayer, & Matulevičius, 2010).  
Requirements Engineering field, focused on formalizing specifications for software sys-
tems, offers several modelling languages, namely Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse 
Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams, specifically extended to deal with security risk manage-
ment. However, despite the theoretical availability of tools for addressing security at con-
struction stage, this approach is still not widespread in the industry. Let us look at the pos-
sible reasons for unpopularity of security risk management.  
Successful management of security risks heavily depends on the fruitful interaction between 
interested parties, namely business stakeholders and security/requirements analysts. Secu-
rity-extended modelling languages are intended to serve as a means of communication, with 
visual diagrams conveying meaning to individuals with both technical and non-technical 
backgrounds. Thus, intuitiveness of selected modelling language is of paramount im-
portance. While security/requirements analysts are expected to be proficient users of secu-
rity-extended modelling languages, same could not be said about the business users. Con-
sidering the fact that existing modelling languages were not designed with human percep-
tion in mind and do not offer explicit design rationale, it could be said that currently avail-
able modelling languages do not facilitate intuitive interaction, but rather hinder it. Since 
this outcome is far from desired, it seems rational to develop refined modelling notations, 
which are expected to be semantically transparent and easy to grasp for all parties, involved 
in the dealing with security risks at early stages of software development. 
As it was already mentioned, Requirements Engineering field currently offers several mod-
elling languages. With the development of ISSRM (Dubois et al., 2010) and subsequent 
extension-related papers (Chowdhury, Matulevičius, Sindre, & Karpati, 2012), (Altuhhova, 
Matulevičius, & Ahmed, 2013), (Matulevicius, Mouratidis, Mayer, Dubois, & Heymans, 
2012) and (Soomro & Ahmed, 2012), available languages have been modified to support 
security risk management concepts, forming an interconnected modelling approach. How-
ever, papers introducing language extensions do not provide justification on selected repre-
sentations of ISSRM concepts, further contributing to difficulties with perception of con-
cepts. Thus, it was decided that focus should be placed on designing a set of icons which 
would depict ISSRM concepts in a clear and understandable way. Proposed set of icons 
could be later included into all 4 extended modelling notations, significantly contributing to 
the ease of perception and facilitating practice of managing security risks on the early stages 
of software development.  
14 
 
Since resulting notations should be immediately understandable for the participants of mod-
elling activities, it was decided to utilize so-called “crowdsourced design” instead of dele-
gating design of icons solely to the relevant experts. “Crowd” here is referring to the com-
munity of professionals, who are likely to participate in security risk management activities 
or have already taken part in managing risks.  
1.1 Research Questions 
Ergo, the main research question of this study could be formulated as: 
MRQ. How to improve visual effectiveness and intuitiveness of modelling notations for se-
curity risk management? 
The main research question could be further decomposed into 4 core questions, which are 
as follows:  
RQ1. What is the state of the art in the domains of security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages and visual notation analysis? 
The initial question aims to explore the domain of security risk-oriented languages and iden-
tify relevant notations. Additionally, it is also important to overview the trends in notation 
analysis and identify the framework that would be suitable for analysis. Overall, this re-
search question is investigating background which is to serve as foundation for notational 
improvements. 
RQ2. How are current security risk-oriented modelling notations evaluated? 
Second research question deals with the evaluation of existing notations, which is to be 
performed to understand the necessity of notation improvement. Evaluation is performed 
both in theory (notational analysis of conformance to PoN principles) and in practice (em-
pirical studies). Issues, identified as a result of evaluation, are to be tackled further in this 
research.   
RQ3. What visual icons could be introduced into available security risk-oriented modelling 
notations? 
Following research question covers the process of obtaining semantically transparent icons, 
which could be potentially introduced into the redesigned notations. Resulting icons should 
be semantically transparent for both experts and novice users. Efficiency of redesigned no-
tations, enhanced with resulting iconset, is also to be validated empirically.  
RQ4. How could the effectiveness of security risk-oriented modelling notations be evalu-
ated? 
Final question targets the efficiency of modelling notations, enhanced with proposed icon-
set. Original notations and notations, augmented with icons, are to be compared so that ef-
ficiency could be measured. As a result, the impact of introducing crowdsourced icons could 
be evaluated.  
1.2 Contribution 
Based on several empirical studies, performed in various European regions, this paper aims 
to develop a set of icons, depicting security risk management-related concepts. Proposed 
iconset, verified with validation survey, could be introduced into 4 security modelling lan-
guages (Secure Tropos, Secure BPMN, Misuse Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams) and is 
intended to enhance currently existing notational symbols. Implementation of unified icon-
15 
 
set throughout all languages, supporting ISSRM, should improve the semantical transpar-
ency of these languages and contribute to the further acceptance of good practices of man-
aging security risks during the early stages of software development. Wide acceptance of 
early security risk management approach is expected to ensure increased resilience to cy-
bersecurity incidents.  
1.3 Roadmap  
Let us look at the structure of this paper chapter-wise.  
Chapter 2 covers the background of the performed research and includes overview of Secu-
rity Risk Management, brief description of Physics of Notation framework and existing ap-
proaches in the domain of visual notation construction. Chapter 3 includes an overview of 
existing papers, covering the topic of analysing semantic transparency of various modelling 
languages via the Physics of Notation framework. Chapter 4 includes the comprehensive 
analysis of security risk-oriented modelling languages according to PoN principles. In 
Chapter 5, the first evaluation survey is described in detail. Chapter 6 coveys information 
on the symbolization survey, executed to obtain initial iconset from a crowdsourcing exper-
iment. In Chapter 7 selection of resulting icons from proposed iconset is performed. Chapter 
8 covers a validation of improvements in visual effectiveness for notations, augmented with 
proposed icon set. Finally, Chapter 9 is providing overall summarization of concluded work, 
as well as drawing broad outline of future activities to be performed. Chapter 10 includes a 
comprehensive list of references.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
This subchapter is dedicated to the research methodology and includes the detailed descrip-
tion of methodology which is to be used throughout the paper.  
Considering the specifics and magnitude of research questions, it was decided to define a 
research method as triangulation (Jick, 1979), combining qualitative and quantitative re-
search methods into a unified approach. Overall research methodology is designed accord-
ing to what could be called a de-facto standard procedure for the visual notation analysis 
and, with minor variations, is described in a number of highly relevant research papers - 
namely  (Caire, Genon, Heymans, & Moody, 2013), (El Kouhen, Gherbi, Dumoulin, & 
Khendek, 2015), (Leitner, Schefer-Wenzl, Rinderle-Ma, & Strembeck, 2013) and (Genon, 
2016). It should also be noted that out of abovementioned papers, work by Genon (2016) 
provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date description of visual notation research 
method and thus should be selected as a primary reference source. However, particularities 
of Security Risk Management process stipulate that a number of distinctions should be in-
troduced to the research methodology, offered in (Genon, 2016). Hereafter these distinctions 
are described in detail.  
First, it should be noted that unlike the abovementioned papers, which concentrate on the 
various security-extended modeling languages (Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Mal-activity 
Diagrams and Misuse Cases), this paper focuses on a set of icons, which could later be 
incorporated in the security-extended languages. Since the anticipated outcome includes de-
velopment of an iconset for ISSRM risk-based concepts, there should also be iconset aggre-
gation, not required in (Genon, 2016). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that Genon 
(2016) had access to a revised version of modeling language (i*), refined by (Moody, Hey-
mans, & Matulevičius, 2010). As for the Security Risk Management-related notations, this 
paper pioneers the visual notation research. Thus, analysis of existing notations from the 
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PoN standpoint should be performed prior to the subsequent experiment studies. Further-
more, since enhancing notation with icons is one of the approaches to improve notation, as 
defined in PoN (Semantic Transparency principle), resulting iconset would be incorporated 
into the refined notations and compared against the existing versions. Based on the above-
mentioned aspects, it was decided to augment the approach of Genon (2016) with several 
additional ideas, taken from papers by El Kouhen et al. (2015),  Leitner et al. (2013) and 
Caire et al. (2013),  and obtain a revised version of the methodology, tailored to the goals 
and intentions of this paper.  
Research questions, presented in Subchapter 1.1, are to be followed via the developed re-
search methodology, which is described below. Overview of the research methodology is 
represented on Figure 1.  
1. Background Overview. Initial step includes brief review of ISSRM domain model. 
This is followed by a review of available security-oriented modelling languages. Fi-
nally, description of existing visual analysis frameworks is also provided and com-
plemented with rationale for framework selection. This step is aimed to provide con-
text for the research as well as to justify the choice of analytical framework.  
Input: ISSRM domain model, visual notation analysis frameworks  
Process: Overview 
Output: Synthesized background data, details on framework choice  
 
2. Related Work Overview. The second step contains overview of papers, describing 
efforts to evaluate and improve security-oriented modelling notations. Papers are 
ranging from overviews of various modelling notations to the descriptions of im-
provement efforts, achieved via language redesign. Based on the overview, effective 
improvement and analysis techniques could be identified and afterwards applied on 
subsequent research stages.  
Input: Available research on security-oriented modelling languages 
Process: Overview 
Output: State of the art in security modelling domain, information on visual notation 
analysis trends, available techniques of obtaining iconic symbols  
 
3. Language Analysis. Subsequent step covers thorough analysis of existing security-
extended modeling languages from the PoN perspective. Performed analysis is ex-
pected to provide materials and guidelines for modification of available notations, 
so that four notations in question would adhere to the 9 principles of PoN. Further-
more, this step is included to provide a background on the extensive usage of icons, 
which are to be designed and refined in the subsequent steps.               
Input: Available notations of 4 SRM-extended modeling languages – BMPN, Secure 
Tropos, Misuse Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams 
Process: Analysis 
Output: Redesign recommendations for the abovementioned languages 
 
4. Evaluation Survey. This fourth experiment focuses on obtaining users’ opinion re-
garding best representation of ISSRM concepts as presented in four security-ex-
tended languages – Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases and Mal-activity 
Diagrams. Participants would be offered 13 questions with representations of secu-
rity concepts from all 4 above mentioned languages, and they are expected to select 
the most representative depiction for each of 13 concepts.  
Input: Representations of 13 ISSRM concepts from 4 extended modeling languages  
17 
 
Process: Survey 
Output: Evaluation of ISSRM concept representation, perception feedback 
 
5. Symbolization Survey. During this stage, target audience participates in the sym-
bolization experiment. Participants are asked to sketch representations of 13 ISSRM-
related concepts, so that resulting icons would be clear and understandable. It should 
also be noted that symbolization is to be performed by participants with hands-on 
experience in security modeling, being a part of the professional community.   
Input: ISSRM domain model concepts 
Process: Survey 
Output: Candidate iconset 
 
6. Symbol Identification Survey. Symbol Identification experiment aims to provide 
information on which icons out of a candidate set (combination of prototype and 
stereotype sets) should be selected for incorporation into the revised notation. Over-
all idea of the experiment is somewhat similar to the initial evaluation experiment, 
since participants would be offered 5 icons for each of 13 ISSRM concepts and 
would be required to choose one, the most representative, which could be a candidate 
to be included in icon-enhanced notations.  
Input: Candidate iconset 
Process: Survey 
Output: Resulting iconset 
 
7. Validation Survey. This experiment deals with perception metrics, namely hit rate 
and semantic transparency coefficient. Hit rate here refers to the ability of symbols 
to be recognized without errors. As for the transparency, it is focused on immediate-
ness of symbol cognition and is describes the connection between design and symbol 
definition.   
Input: Icon-enhanced notations, existing notations 
Process: Survey 
Output: Perception metrics (hit rate and semantic transparency coefficient) 
 
.  
Figure 1. Research Methodology 
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2 Background 
This chapter covers the background of performed research and includes the motivation be-
hind the analysis framework selection, overview of Security Risk Management and brief 
description of SRM-extended modelling languages. The chapter is intended to provide an 
answer to the first part of the initial research question, which is as follows:  
RQ1. What is the state of the art in the domains of security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages and visual notation analysis? 
2.1 Information System Security Risk Management  
The present-day reality of information systems could be characterised as being overflooded 
with various security-related risks. The numerosity of risks places constraints on the possi-
ble risk treatments, invoking the need for enterprises to manage potential treats in a cost-
effective manner, with a possibility to contrast mitigation activities against costs of potential 
breaches. Since available security-extended languages, namely Secure Tropos, Mal-activity 
Diagrams, Misuse Cases and Secure BPMN lacked dedicated risk-oriented tools, it was de-
cided by Dubois et al. (2010) to develop a set of concepts, specifically oriented towards 
dealing with risk representation on the early stages of information systems development. 
Authors acknowledge that while one valid course of action would be to design a brand-new 
modeling language with a pre-built support of security risk management concepts, it might 
not be optimal due to the substantial number of languages already available, as well as au-
thor’s adherence to evolutionary and not revolutionary approaches. Thus, ISSRM domain 
model is intended to cover key risk-oriented concepts and is designed to be used as a basis 
to extend existing modeling languages. After being extended with SRM concepts, languages 
are expected to be fully complaint with the proposed domain model and could be used for 
the risk representation purposes in software development process.   
Let us now look at the domain model structure, as specified in (Dubois et al., 2010). Overall, 
ISSRM domain model consists of three categories, namely asset-related concepts, risk-re-
lated concepts and risk treatment-related concepts.  
Asset-related concepts are illustrating resources, crucial for the business model of enterprise 
to succeed, and are comprised of business asset, information system asset and security cri-
terion. While business asset is quite self-explanatory, information system asset requires ad-
ditional clarification and is defined as a resource, directly related to information technology, 
such as CRM system or intranet portal. As for the security criterion, is a characteristics of 
business asset’s security needs, with possible options including integrity and confidentiality.  
Risk-related concepts are the most numerous category, incorporating risk, impact, event, 
vulnerability, threat, threat agent and attack method. Threat agent is a person that intends to 
abuse the information system asset. Method of abuse, employed by threat agent, is called 
attack method. A combination of attack method and treat agent is defined as threat. A vul-
nerability is a potential security weakness, that could be exploited. Mix of threat and vul-
nerability constitute an event. Impact is the potential outcomes of the threat being executed. 
Risk, in its turn, is a combination of threat with one or several vulnerabilities, resulting in a 
negative impact and mistreatment of assets.  
Finally, risk treatment-related concepts include risk treatment, security requirement and 
control. Risk treatment is an approach regarding how to deal with the recognized risks, and 
it could be expressed in terms of avoiding, reducing, transferring and retaining. Security 
requirements are employed to minimize identified risks. As for the control, it is defined as 
a practical realization of security requirement, aimed at diminishing potential risks.  
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It should also be noted that Mayer, Heymans, & Matulevicius (2007) specify a dedicated 
six-step risk management process, which is to be utilized at the early stages of information 
system development.  
2.2 Security Risk Management-Oriented Modelling Languages 
As it was mentioned above, ISSRM model was designed with the emphasis on security-
related modelling language extension. While language-extending activities were out of the 
scope in (Dubois et al., 2010), several papers covering the specifics of ISSRM extension 
have emerged in years after the work by Dubois et al. (2010) had been published. As of 
2017, all major security-oriented modeling languages were extended and adjusted to support 
the ISSRM concepts, with Chowdhury et al. (2012) extending Mal-activity Diagrams, Al-
tuhhova et al. (2013) dealing with Secure BPMN, Matulevicius et al. (2012) adjusting the 
Secure Tropos and Soomro & Ahmed (2012) refining Misuse Cases.  
The detailed description of the language extensions is out of this paper’s scope. Overview 
of notations, utilized in ISSRM-extended modelling languages, could be found in Appendix 
I.  
2.3 Rationale for Framework Selection 
Currently, visual notation researchers are offered a choice of three established frameworks, 
namely Cognitive Dimensions (T. R. G. Green & Petre, 1996), SEQUAL (Krogstie, Sindre, 
& Jørgensen, 2006) and Physics of Notation (Moody, 2009a). Prior to conducting the sub-
sequent work, it is of paramount importance to analyze the advantages and shortcomings of 
the abovementioned frameworks in order to identify the most appropriate one. Needless to 
say, the suboptimal choice would significantly hamper the expected contribution and out-
comes of this paper.  
It could be said that the most well-established out of the frameworks under review is Cog-
nitive Dimensions. Published  by T. R. Green (1989) in what could be considered a classic 
paper, CDs was envisioned as a practical tool, suitable for solving real-world problems (T. 
R. Green, Blandford, Church, Roast, & Clarke, 2006) and providing a broad-brush assis-
tance in making design decisions (Dagit et al., 2006). While the initial version of the frame-
work was developed with the idea of being suitable for information-based artifacts irregard-
less of domain, subsequent paper by T. R. G. Green & Petre (1996) was tailored to be uti-
lized specifically in conjunction with visual notation artifacts. However, in what could be 
considered a concluding paper (T. R. Green et al., 2006), authors acknowledge that CDs still 
lacks a well-established procedure or methodology. Since the absence of methodology leads 
to the problems with comprehension and vague dimensions (T. R. Green et al., 2006), au-
thors propose two approaches that could address the underdevelopment of methodology, but 
do not provide selection guidelines. Additionally, T. R. Green et al. (2006) acknowledge 
that they are aware of the existing list of dimensions being vague and overlapping. While it 
is stated that improvements are being explored (T. R. Green et al., 2006), no practical infor-
mation on the improvements is provided. Furthermore, in the paper, devoted to CDs evalu-
ation, D. Moody (2009b) indicates that according to Gregor’s taxonomy (Gregor, 2006), 
CDs could be considered a Type I theory,  and thus should be treated as a prescientific 
theory, suitable for analyzing and describing but not appropriate as evaluation criteria or 
design guidelines (Moody, 2009b). Overall, it could be said that while CDs framework has 
been widely accepted by visual language researchers (Blackwell, 2006), a number of iden-
tified issues prevents it from being an effective tool for designing visually effective model-
ling notations.  
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SEQUAL, in its turn, is a framework, based on semiotic principles and  tailored to evaluating 
conceptual models (Krogstie et al., 2006). It could be said that SEQUAL suffers from the 
similar limitations as CDs, namely high-level generic nature and lack of empirical research, 
related to the visual notations domain (Granada, Vara, Brambilla, Bollati, & Marcos, 2017). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that in a paper by D. Moody (2009a), CDs framework is 
considered as closest theory, resembling visual notation theory, while  information regard-
ing SEQUAL is not presented at all. Thus, it could be said that SEQUAL framework is not 
directly related to the visual notations domain and could not be considered as a better alter-
native to CDs.  
Finally, Physics of Notations was developed by D. Moody (2009a) as a direct successor to 
CDs, evolving a scientific theory from Gregor’s Type I (CDs) to Type IV (PoN). Thus, 
Physics of Notation was designed as a superior version of CDs, tailored to be applied in the 
visual notations domain.  While PoN possesses certain problems, specifically lack of estab-
lished design process (da Silva Teixeira et al., 2016) and lack of empirical grounding (Van 
Der Linden & Hadar, 2015), it is widely accepted by researchers and is extensively utilized 
for visual notation analysis. Considering the abovementioned aspects and limitations, it 
could be said that Physics of Notation is the most sophisticated framework, currently avail-
able to a notations researcher, and therefore should be used in this research. The following 
subsection will give a high-level overview of main PoN principles.  
2.4 Physics of Notation Overview  
As mentioned above, Physics of Notation is a theory for designing and evaluation visual 
notations. It was proposed by Moody, (2009a) and focuses on the visual notation effective-
ness, which is frequently neglected in the Software Engineering-related researches (Moody, 
2009a). PoN is based on the renowned work by Bertin (1983) and constitutes a prescriptive 
theory for visual notations, consisting of nine principles. It should be mentioned that prin-
ciples are extracted from theoretical and practical studies and offer approaches to both ana-
lyse existing notations and design brand-new ones.  
According to the principle of semiotic clarity, a one-to-one correspondence between sym-
bols and their respective concepts is expected. Unlike natural languages, having accumu-
lated synonyms and homonyms as a result of language evolution over the years, visual no-
tation languages should showcase explicitness and preciseness. When one-on-one corre-
spondence is not the case, several issues, including symbol redundancy, symbol overload, 
symbol excess and symbol deficit could occur.  
Principle of Perceptual Discriminability implies that it should be possible to easily discrim-
inate between the symbols, with visual distance being a metrics of discriminability. Out of 
available visual variables, shape is a key characteristic (Moody, 2009a), and a diverse range 
of shapes is to be used to model effective notations. As a means to improve visual distance, 
it is possible to utilize redundant coding and use a number of visual variables to clearly 
distinguish the concepts (Lohse, 1997).  If visual elements have a unique value for at least 
one variable, they a tend to have a perceptual pop out effect. Thus, for the notation to become 
effective, each symbol is expected to have a unique value on at least one visual variable and 
be easily distinguishable.   
Third principle of Sematic Transparency suggests using visual representations with inbuilt 
meaning, so that the essence could be obtained by perception. Overall, transparency ranges 
on a scale from inferring immediate meaning to inferring a false (perverse) explanation, 
with the latter option to be avoided. Since icons, unlike symbolic signs, reduce the learning 
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curve and improve visual appearance, they are recommended to be utilized instead of ab-
stract symbols for the modelling purposes. It should also be mentioned that transparency 
could be applied not only to the representation of concepts, but to the depiction of relation-
ships between concepts as well.  
Complexity Management principle refers to the ability of notation to depict information 
without overwhelming human perception. Complexity of diagrams could be measured as a 
number of elements, represented on a diagram, and it is of paramount importance to have a 
complexity within the limits. Two types of limits, namely perceptual and cognitive, are in-
voked by human perception constraints and should be not breached. When cognitive limits 
are exceeded, cognitive overload occurs. Perceptual breach, in its turn, leads to the inability 
to discriminate diagrams elements, caused by the overwhelming diagram size.  
 Principle of Cognitive Integration is relevant for the situations when several diagrams are 
representing a single information system. For the mutli-diagrams to be efficient, two fea-
tures, namely conceptual integration and perceptual integration, are to be supported. Con-
ceptual integration could be supported by a summary diagram, providing an overall picture 
of the system. Contextual information could also be included in each of sub diagrams, show-
ing their relationships and place in the system.  Perceptual integration, in its turn, is to be 
supported by positioning data, with wayfinding technique being universal for any physical 
space and including four stages of orientation, route choice, route monitoring and destina-
tion recognition being supported by identification, level numbering, navigational cues and 
navigational map.  
Sixth principle of Visual Expressiveness encourages to apply the complete set of visual var-
iables, ranging from position to shape. While the majority of visual notation are encompass-
ing only one variable – shape, it recommended to draw inspiration from cartography and 
utilize an extensive set of visual variables. While colour is one of the most effective varia-
bles, which could be used to dramatically improve discriminability, it is recommended to 
limit its usage to redundant coding due to the possible loss of information (black-and-white 
printers, colour blindness).   
Principle of Dual Coding offers a redefined approach to the usage of text in visual languages. 
According to (Moody, 2009a), text encoding is most effective when employed in a support-
ive role, complementing graphical symbols and not substituting them. As already men-
tioned, text should not be used as a sole means of symbol discriminability. However, text is 
immensely helpful when utilized as supportive coding, aimed at supporting and clarifying 
conveyed meaning.  
Eighth principle of Graphic Economy specifies that the amount of chosen graphical symbols 
is expected to be cognitively manageable, and cognitive overload should be avoided.  
Graphic complexity is especially relevant for the novice users, since they have to maintain 
the meaning of symbols in their memory until they reach proficiency. There are three estab-
lished techniques for dealing with graphical overcomplexity: reduce semantic complexity, 
increase symbol deficit and increase visual expressiveness (Moody, 2009a).  
The final principle of Cognitive Fit encourages to use different dialects of visual languages 
for different target groups and various tasks. While the majority of Software Engineering 
notations operate single visual representation for all purposes (Moody, 2009a), this ap-
proach might not always be optimal. At least two reasons, namely difference between nov-
ices and experts and variety of representational mediums encourage designers to produce 
language dialects, tailored according to the specifics of situation.  
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2.5 Summary  
In this chapter, Security Risk Management-oriented modelling languages were reviewed to 
provide answers to the formulated research sub questions, which are: 
RQ1.1. What is the Information System Security Risk Management domain model?  
ISSRM domain model is introduced by  Dubois et al. (2010) and includes a set of concepts, 
specifically oriented towards dealing with risk representation on the early stages of IS de-
velopment. 
RQ1.2. What security risk-oriented modelling languages are currently available? 
Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams were introduced 
in papers by Altuhhova et al. (2013), Matulevicius et al. (2012), Soomro & Ahmed (2012), 
and Chowdhury et al. (2012).  
RQ1.3. What frameworks for the visual notation analysis are currently available? 
Visual notation researchers could choose between Cognitive Dimensions (T. R. G. Green & 
Petre, 1996), SEQUAL (Krogstie et al., 2006) and Physics of Notation (Moody, 2009a). It 
should also be noted that while having some limitations, Physics of Notation currently the 
is the most sophisticated visual analysis framework, widely adopted in the academia.  
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3 Related Work 
This chapter includes an overview of available papers, covering the topic of analysing mod-
elling language semantics via the available visual notation-oriented frameworks, and com-
pletes the answer to the following research question: 
RQ1. What is the state of the art in the domains of security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages and visual notation analysis? 
3.1 Semantical Analysis of BPMN 
It should be noted that visual notation of BPMN was thoroughly analysed in the paper by 
Genon, Heymans, and Amyot (2010). Authors start from providing a reasoning behind the 
selection of analysis framework, motivating their choice between Physics of Notation and 
SEQUAL. This is followed by a brief overview of Physics of Notation components, namely 
9 principles which are to be used for evaluation and improving a visual notation. Subse-
quently, Genon et al. (2010) provide a detailed analysis of BMPN 2.0 according to 9 prin-
ciples. Proposed analysis is also complimented with suggestions of visual symbols, which 
would potentially be a better alternative to existing ones in terms of cognitive effectiveness. 
However, authors acknowledge that proposed graphical elements are given only for illus-
trative purposes, are not validated with potential BPMN users, and no effort to provide a 
comprehensive redefined notation for BPMN 2.0 is made. Thus, the paper is intended to 
raise awareness and pave the way for discussion among BPMN community, not to act like 
a redesign guide. 
Brief overview of 5 BPMN security extensions could be found in (Maines, Zhou, Tang, & 
Shi, 2017). While the primarily contribution of the paper is introduction of security-related 
modelling language extension framework, aspects of notational compliance with PoN prin-
ciples are also covered. Maines, Zhou, Tang, & Shi (2017) evaluate extensions based on 
number of PoN principles, which are fulfilled by the extensions. It should be noted that 
while all the reviewed extensions incorporate iconic symbols, they are able to satisfy only 
two to four of PoN principles, with one notation even failing to be perceptually discrimina-
ble. Thus, it could be concluded that sole presence of icons does not correspond to notational 
success, and poor design choices can render even iconic-based notation into a poorly per-
ceptible one. Another issue, found in one of the five notations is perverse icon design, mak-
ing utilization of icons harmful for effective cognition. While Moody (2009a) states that 
there should be a balance in adhering to the principles since conforming to one may cause a 
negative effect on the other, certain crucial principles have a priority to be satisfied. Overall, 
it could be concluded that performed analysis indicates that icons are a powerful tool which 
is to be handled with consideration, as poor design choices and perverse icons could make 
a negative impact on the perception, hampering it instead of facilitating.   
As for the empirically-based analysis, it is represented in the paper by Leitner et al. (2013). 
Abovementioned work should also be noted for its focus on cognitive analysis of security 
concepts, despite those concepts being not identical to ISSRM-specified ones. Since the 
authors, motivated by unavailability of existing security-related icons, limit the scope to the 
development of visual elements and not to the analysis of existing graphical symbols, exist-
ence of Physics of Notation framework is acknowledged, but its 9 principles are not taken 
into consideration. Leitner et al. (2013) propose to obtain graphical symbols via a series of 
experiments, starting from production of drawings. In the first experiment, 43 students of 
Business Informatics were employed in drawing the best symbol to represent a name and 
the definition of security concept. As an outcome, researchers were provided with 473 draw-
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ings. Subsequently, judges ranking method was applied to those 473 drawings, and stereo-
typical images of 11 concepts were obtained. Finally, stereotypical images were validated 
in a series of semi-structured interviews with 6 experts from security, process modeling and 
visualization domains. As a result, authors suggest that after a minor refinement, resulting 
set of stereotypical images is suitable to be a basis for icons, which could form a foundation 
of security-oriented extension to BPMN and/or UML. It should also be mentioned that even 
though experts agreed on stereotype symbol set’s suitability for integration, they also high-
lighted several symbols which are to be redesigned to avoid redundancy. The summary of 
BPMN analysis, based on (Genon et al., 2010), could be seen in Appendix II.  
3.2 Semantical Analysis of UML 
Thorough theoretical analysis of UML visual syntax and its cognitive effectiveness is pre-
sented in (Moody & van Hillegersberg, 2008). This paper’s approach could be compared to 
the viewpoint of Genon et al. (2010), with the idea of language being analysed via a set of 
framework’s principles. However, one significant difference of the work by D. Moody and 
van Hillegersberg (2008) is a selection of framework for analysis, since authors use initial 
version of Physics of Notation, described in (Moody, 2008). Initial version of the frame-
works deviates from defined by Moody (2009a) in the number of principles, with initial 5 
principles being extended to 9 in subsequent work. Thus, paper by Moody & van Hillegers-
berg (2008) is based on the outdated framework and does not provide a complete evaluation 
of language. Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that even though authors complement 
evaluation of UML according to each of 5 principles with improvement recommendations, 
those recommendations are more of the theoretical nature and only a handful of redesigned 
graphical constructs is offered. Additionally, no end user evaluation is performed, and anal-
ysis is based solely on the input by experts. So, paper by D. Moody and van Hillegersberg 
(2008) aims at initiating the discussion about ways to improve cognitive perception of UML, 
and is the first step to make UML semantically transparent. Furthermore, it should also be 
noted that this discussion should be especially promising in the light of creating UML 3.0, 
with version 2.5 being up-to-date as of now.  
Another study, tackling the empirical research on UML perception, is the work by El Kou-
hen, Gherbi, Dumoulin, and Khendek (2015). Authors decided to start the research with a 
brief overview of 9 principles, encompassing the Physics of Notation, and evaluation of 
UML in terms of adherence to the principles. Subsequently, paper describes 3 experiments, 
which were performed to test the hypothesis of crowd-sourced notation design being supe-
rior to expert-developed notation in terms of semantic transparency. Since the aim of the 
research is to test not the visual notation itself but rather approaches to redesigning notations 
(specifically, end-user involvement), only several elements of UML were utilized, and the 
majority of performed empirical experiments, namely Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 were re-
used from (Caire et al., 2013). The key difference in paper by El Kouhen et al. (2015) is the 
presence of comparison between crowdsourced notation and notation, produced by the ex-
perts (in accordance with Physics of Notation principles). Let us now look at the performed 
sequence of experiments. During the first symbolization experiment, naïve participants pro-
duced graphical representations of UML concepts. This experiment was followed by anal-
ysis via the judges ranking method, with set of stereotype symbols outlined as a result.  Fol-
lowing prototyping experiment was characterized by selection of best representation from 
stereotype sets by another group of naïve users (undergraduate computer science students 
with various backgrounds). Final experiment, crucial for semantic transparency, included 
another group of naïve users, who were asked to infer the meaning of 3 sets of symbols from 
their visual representation. Among those 3 sets one was crowdsourced (created by naïve 
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users in Experiments 1-3), and two were designed by experts (standard UML notation; no-
tation, based on Physics of Notation principles).  
As a result, the initial hypothesis was confirmed. Crowdsourced set of graphical symbols is 
more semantically transparent than design, made by experts, and outperforms classical 
UML notation by 300%. It should also be noted that cultural bias, resulting in differences 
in perception between individuals with various cultural backgrounds, is overcome by em-
ploying naïve users from several distinctive geographical regions. The overview of UML 
adherence to PoN guidelines, based on  (Moody & van Hillegersberg, 2008), could be seen 
in Appendix III.  
3.3 Semantical Analysis of i* 
Visual notations in the field of requirements engineering were analysed in the paper by D. 
L. Moody, Heymans, and Matulevičius (2010). Similar to the majority of abovementioned 
researches, authors utilize Physics of Notation framework to analyse the current version of 
i* visual notation. However, apart from the focus on i* notation, main difference between 
(Genon et al., 2010) and (Moody & van Hillegersberg, 2008) is in the systematic and de-
tailed analysis of i* according to each of the 9 principles, with analysis being complemented 
by detailed improvement recommendations, which could in fact sever as a guide to redesign 
i* notation. Furthermore, most of improvements are also including suggestions of visual 
symbols, which could contribute to the i* being cognitively effective. However, while sug-
gested symbols were designed based on Physics of Notation principles and are expected to 
be visually efficient, empirical studies were not performed, meaning that proposed graphical 
elements were not validated by end users. Thus, while the paper’s primary aims are high-
lighting importance of visual notation’s cognitive effectiveness and suggesting ways to im-
prove i* notation, presence of detailed improvement suggestions and high concentration of 
graphical constructs allow it to serve not only as awareness call, but as a first of its kind 
redesign guide to i* visual notation.  
In what could be considered a follow-up paper, Caire et al. (2013) utilize graphical con-
structs, proposed in (Moody et al., 2010) and perform several empirical studies, aimed at 
comparing notation, designed by experts, with notation produced by community (naïve us-
ers). Undergraduate students in Economics and Management were employed as target audi-
ence (community) in performed experiments. First experiment, focused on symbolisation, 
empowered participants to generate symbols for i* concepts. Follow-up stereotype-based 
experiment included identification of stereotype symbol set, obtained after applying judges’ 
ranking method to the symbols, produced on Stage 1. Subsequently, prototyping experiment 
was performed by naïve participants, different from Experiment 1 audience, and best draw-
ings for each of 9 i* concepts were selected from the initial Stage 1 symbols. Afterwards, 
65 naïve participants were offered to rate 4 sets of symbols (Standard i*, Physics of Nota-
tion-based i*, developed by Caire et al. (2013), stereotype i* (most common symbols by 
naïve users), prototype i* (best symbols by naïve users, as judged by other naïve users). 
These 4 sets of symbols were evaluated in terms of hit rate and semantic transparency, and 
obtained results were slightly unexpected by authors. It was proven that graphical sets, gen-
erated by naïve users, outperform concepts, created by experts, with semantic transparency 
being more than 5 times higher. As for the application of Physics of Notation, it has been 
proven effective, with the hit rate of Physics of Notation-based symbols being twice as 
higher than for classical i* notation. Furthermore, the most remarkable outcome is the su-
periority of prototype symbol set, meaning that most frequently occurring constructs, drawn 
by naïve users, are superior to the stereotype set, consisting of symbols selected by naïve 
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users as best. Finally, Caire et al. (2013) performed recognition experiment, where the abil-
ity of yet another naïve users to learn and remember symbols from 4 sets has been evaluated. 
Results of recognition experiment were in line with previous findings, validating the idea 
that design rationale has significant influence on the recognition error rates. Ergo, the paper 
is focused on redefining approaches to designing cognitively effective notations, verifying 
the superiority of crowd-designed notations over expert-produced design. The summary of 
i* analysis according to the PoN principles, based on (Moody et al., 2010),  could be seen 
in Appendix IV.  
3.4 Semantical Analysis of Misuse Cases 
Visual notation of Misuse Cases, derived from UML’s Use Cases, is analyzed in the paper 
by Saleh & El-Attar (2015). As in the previously reviewed papers, authors analyze existing 
Misuse case notation, proposed in (Sindre & Opdahl, 2005) from the perspective of compli-
ance with 9 Physics of Notation principles. For the evaluation purposes, PoN was chosen 
over CDs due to a number of limitations of the latter, with lack of evaluation metrics being 
one of the most crucial CDs shortfalls. The detailed evaluation, topped with a number of 
specific improvement suggestions, is followed by a description of new notation design, 
aimed at mitigating the identified issues and discrepancies within the notation and balancing 
between complexity and improved visual perception. Proposed notation is also empirically 
evaluated through two surveys. First survey is focused on the semantic transparency, and 
was distributed in a form of questionnaire, delivered via email. Authors received 55 results 
(out of 111 invitations), including response from the creator of original Misuse Cases. Based 
on the responses, Saleh & El-Attar concluded that symbols from revised notation were 
strongly preferred over the original ones, with misuse case symbol being the only exception. 
Since the semantic transparency survey covered only individual symbols, not touching the 
diagrams, a diagram-oriented experiment was also performed across the audience of under-
graduate software engineering students. Students were provided with diagrams in both orig-
inal and refined notation and were asked to fill in the questionnaire. Two variables, namely 
response time and number of committed errors, were considered as evaluation metrics, and 
experiment outcomes show that redesigned notation indeed could be read and perceived in 
a more rapid manner. As for the reading errors, experiment result has not proved the hy-
pothesis that new notation is less error-prone. Furthermore, it should be also noted that in 
addition to diagram-based questions, students were asked free-from feedback on positive 
and negative sides of refined notations, and extensive utilization of colour, allowing sym-
bols to be more distinct, was named as a main contributor to positive perception of new 
notations.  
Overall, it could be said that the paper by Saleh & El-Attar (2015) targets notational issues 
of Misuse Cases, identified with the assistance of PoN analysis, and proposes a redefined 
notation design, heavily utilizing colour and iconic symbols. Empirical studies have vali-
dated the improved semantical transparency and proved that new notation has improved 
response time.  
3.5 Gaps Overview 
The most significant gap, related to the analysis of modelling notations for Security Risk 
Management, is the lack of papers, explicitly targeting the abovementioned domain. Fur-
thermore, a combination of omissions could also be found in papers, relating to the adjacent 
domains, and since those issues are in fact applicable to the notation-related aspect of all 
modelling languages, irrelevant of specific domain, they are intended to be addressed in this 
paper as well.  
27 
 
Firstly, it should be mentioned that clear majority of reviewed papers are focused on either 
evaluation of existing notation constructs or on development of new graphical concepts set. 
It could be argued that in the paper by Leitner et al. (2013) it is impossible to perform anal-
ysis since initially there is no notation to analyse. However, this is not applicable for other 
cases due to the presence of initial notations. Furthermore, if to get back to the defined scope 
there already are several notations developed for security-extended modelling languages. 
Thus, in this paper it would be crucial to perform analysis of existing visual constructs prior 
to designing a set of new graphical symbols.  
Subsequently, several frameworks could be used for analysing effectiveness of the visual 
notations, namely Physics of Notation and SEQUAL. Since Physics of Notation is clearly a 
superior framework, being tailored for analysing visual notations, it is also chosen to be 
used in this research for analysis.  
Moreover, reviewed papers offer miscellaneous approaches to the process of visual notation 
design. They could be conceptually divided into two categories: expert-based and crowd-
based (crowdsourced). Since studies by Caire et al. (2013) and El Kouhen et al. (2015) es-
tablish crowdsourced design approach as vastly superior, it seems reasonable that this re-
search is to utilize crowdsourced approach as well.  
Finally, the significance of cultural differences in the perception of graphical symbols is 
explicitly mentioned in (Moody et al., 2010). To diminish cultural factor and ensure uniform 
perception of visual constructs throughout distinct cultures, it is of paramount importance 
to perform empirical studies across culturally diverse audience, originating from various 
regions.  
3.6 Summary  
In this chapter, existing papers on the analysis of semantic transparency were studied to 
provide an answer to the following sub question:  
RQ1.4. What approach is efficient for designing improved visual notation? 
Physics of Notation theory, proposed by Moody (2009a), is specifically suited for the pro-
cess of refining modeling notations and is superior to other available analysis frameworks. 
It should be also said that performed overview revealed a couple of requirements, needed 
for the approach to be effective. First, it would be crucial to perform analysis of existing 
visual constructs prior to designing a set of new graphical symbols. Furthermore, notation 
should be designed via crowdsourcing, not designed by experts. Finally, it is of paramount 
importance to perform empirical studies among culturally diverse audience, originating 
from various regions. 
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4 Language Analysis 
Analysis of 4 ISSRM-extended modelling languages is performed to partially answer the 
following research question:   
RQ2. How are current security risk-oriented modelling notations evaluated? 
Since the no studies, researching the adherence of 4 extended modelling languages to Phys-
ics of Notations are currently available, it was decided to perform a systematic analysis, 
based on nine PoN principles (Moody, 2009a). Since in the paper by Moody (2009a) anal-
ysis metrics are not explicitly defined, prior to conducting the analysis it was decided to 
extract metrics from the paper contents. Resulting metrics, which were used for the analysis, 
are represented in the Table 1.  
Table 1. PoN analysis metrics 
PoN Principle Metrics Measure 
Semiotic Clarity Categories of: symbol redundancy, sym-
bol overload, symbol excess, symbol defi-
cit, unique symbols, combined symbols, 
not represented symbols, symbols with 
one-to-one-correspondence.  
Number of symbols falling under each cat-
egory 
Perceptual Discriminability Visual variables: size, colour, shape, 
brightness, texture 
Overview of utilization for each variable 
Semantic Transparency Categories of: immediate symbols, opaque 
symbols, perverse symbols, iconic sym-
bol, symbolic symbols 
Percentage of symbols falling under each 
category 
Complexity Management Elements on the diagram Number of elements 
Cognitive Integration Cognitive integration principles Adherence to principles 
Visual Expressiveness  Visual expressiveness, visual freedom; 
Visual variables: horizontal position, ver-
tical position, size, colour, texture, shape, 
brightness, orientation 
Expressiveness degree, freedom degree; 
utilization of visual variables 
Dual Coding Hybrid symbols Number of symbols 
Graphic Economy Best practices Adherence to best practices 
Cognitive Fit Best practices Adherence to best practices 
4.1 Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
According to the theory of symbols, defined by Goodman (1968), for a notation to satisfy 
the requirements of notational system there should be a 1:1 correspondence between sym-
bols and the relevant concepts. Thus, prior to performing the analysis it is essential to define 
both the symbol set and concept set as used in ISSRM-extended modelling languages. As 
for the concept set, definition is relatively straightforward, and 13 ISSRM concepts covered 
in (Dubois et al., 2010) could be characterized as language concepts. Symbol sets for the 
extended modeling notations could be found in pioneering papers by Altuhhova et al. 
(2013), Matulevicius et al. (2012), Soomro & Ahmed (2012) and Chowdhury et al. (2012). 
Based on the provided symbols, analysis of the extended modelling languages could be per-
formed from the Semiotic Clarity perspective. For the purposes of analysis, four anomalies, 
as defined in (Moody, 2009a), are to be considered: symbol redundancy, symbol overload, 
symbol excess and symbol deficit. These anomalies could be defined as follows:  
• symbol redundancy: 1 construct – several symbols; 
• symbol overload: 1 symbol – several constructs; 
• symbol excess: 1 symbol – no constructs;  
• symbol deficit: 1 construct – no symbols. 
Outcomes of the semiotic clarity analysis, adopted from (Matulevičius, 2017) are repre-
sented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of security risk-oriented modelling languages, adopted from (Mat-
ulevičius, 2017) 
Since the detailed analysis in terms of semiotic clarity is already performed in (Matulevičius, 
2017), this work offers a comparative overview according to the semiotic clarity anomalies. 
The overview is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Comparative semiotic clarity 
Language Unique 
Symbols 
Combined 
Symbols 
Not rep-
resented 
One-to-one 
correspon-
dense 
Redun-
dancy 
Overload Deficit Excess 
BPMN 8 3 2 1 1 1 8 3 
Secure 
Tropos 
9 1 2 1 1 1 6 4 
Misuse 
Cases 
8 3 2 4 1 1 5 3 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
7 2 3 3 2 1 6 2 
 
As indicated in the table above, the overall number of symbols with one-on-one correspon-
dense is relatively low, with the highest percentage of all represented symbols being 36% 
for Misuse Cases. At the same time, deficit could be characterized as the biggest issue, with 
over 70% (8 out of 11) symbols suffering from it. Excess is also notable, with number of 
affected symbols varying from 2 to 4 among 10-11 symbols in total. Finally, overload and 
redundancy could be called non-significant as only 1 to 2 symbols across all the notations 
are targeted by these anomalies. 
Overall, the situation with the semiotic clarity across extended modelling languages yields 
no revelations, as those languages were not tailored to be applied in security risk modelling 
domain (Matulevičius, 2017). It should also be noted that further refinement along the Phys-
ics of Notations guidelines may reduce the number of clarity anomalies.  
4.2 Principle of Perceptual Discriminability 
Perceptual discriminability could be broadly defined as simplicity and accuracy for the 
graphical symbols to be discriminated between one another (Moody, 2009a). As such, dis-
criminability is determined by visual distance between symbols, characterized as a number 
of differentiating visual variables and number of perceptible steps. Overall, perceptual dis-
criminability is a crucial characteristic, as according to Winn it determines the speed and 
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accuracy of symbol recognition (as cited in Moody et al., 2010). Since perceptual discrimi-
nability is directly connected to visual variables, defined by Bertin (1983), it was decided to 
analyze the utilization of five key planar variables (shape, colour, brightness, size, texture) 
across the four ISSRM-extended notations. The results of analysis are represented in Table 
3.  
Table 3. Visual variable properties  
Lan-
guage 
Shape Colour Brightness Size  Texture 
BPMN Several concepts are 
represented with identi-
cal shapes, existing 
range of shapes is not 
sufficient for reliable 
discrimination 
For a number of con-
cepts colour serves as 
the only means of dis-
crimination, 3 ISSRM 
concepts groups are 
represented with cor-
responding colours – 
sufficient visual 
popout 
Not utilized Sufficient, several 
“add-on” symbols 
which are to be ap-
plied on top are no-
ticeably smaller 
Limited, only two 
border styles (sin-
gle and bold) are 
employed 
Secure 
Tropos 
Suboptimal, range of 
shapes is extensive but 
distinction within sev-
eral concept groups is 
complicated due to sim-
ilar shape appearance 
Ineffective, variety of 
colours is overwhelm-
ing, certain concepts 
are depicted with mul-
ticolored concepts 
which makes the ap-
pearance overly 
patchy, colour scheme 
is not appealing 
Not utilized Rather effective, ini-
tiation of actions is 
depicted via spatial 
enclosure and size 
variations.  
Underused, single 
border style is ex-
ploited  
Misuse 
Cases 
Only three shapes are 
used across the notation, 
distinction is hampered 
by the shape similarity 
Not utilized Three shades of grey 
are exploited, uti-
lized shades are 
hardly discriminable 
between each other, 
visual popout is 
non-existent 
Not utilized, ele-
ments are of single 
size  
Underused, single 
border style 
Mal-ac-
tivity Dia-
grams 
Only two shapes are ex-
ploited, shape-based 
distinction can’t be per-
formed. 
Not utilized Shades of single 
grey colour are uti-
lized, differentiation 
between colours is 
hindered by similar 
appearance, no vis-
ual pop-out 
Efficient, visual dis-
crimination is facili-
tated via spatial en-
closure and size var-
iations.  
Underused, single 
border style 
As it could be seen on the table above, extended modeling languages employ visual varia-
bles in a suboptimal manner. Colour, that according to Winn is one of the most cognitively 
effective variables (as cited in Moody, 2009a), is used inefficiently in two out of four re-
viewed notations. While Secure Tropos possesses relatively minor issue of overwhelming 
color variety, extended BPMN notation violates PoN principle of robust design, as colour 
should be utilized only for redundant coding and not as a sole basis for symbol differentia-
tion (Moody, 2009a). As for the two remaining languages, namely Mal-activity Diagrams 
and Misuse Cases, they do not exploit colour at all and replace it with brightness. Despite 
several advantages, including printer friendliness, this design choice radically declines vis-
ual popout and could be perceived as ineffective. At the same time, proposed in (Altuhhova 
et al., 2013) usage of colour to mark 3 distinctive groups of ISSRM concepts is an sample 
of good design, with the similar approach in ArchiMate being described as “an example of 
graphic excellence” (Moody, 2009a).  
Shape, as a primary basis for object identification (Moody, 2009a), is also not used effec-
tively across the notations. Secure Tropos is the only language with a sufficient range of 
shapes, while span of shapes for all other languages is quite limited. Problem is especially 
evidential in case of Mal-activity Diagrams, as only two shapes are exploited across the 
whole notation of 10 (3 are not represented) ISSRM concepts, depicted in (Matulevičius, 
2017). According to (Moody, 2009a), discriminability could be achieved via the utilization 
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of non-resembling shapes from different shape families. It could be clearly seen that this is 
not the case for extended SRM notations, as existing range of shapes is sufficient only in 
one (Secure Tropos) of four analyzed notations. While this situation most probably stems 
from the legacy of non-extended modeling languages, resulting notations do not ensure easy 
detection of concepts and thus are far from the visual excellence, characterized by Moody 
(2009a) as utilization of clearly discriminable shapes from various shape families.  
Texture here is another example of underused variable, with 1-2 visual options being em-
ployed in SRM-extended modeling languages. While texture would not provide sufficient 
visual popout if used as standalone, it could complement one of main visual variables, be it 
shape or colour. However, this is not the case as only BPMN exploits two different border 
styles, while three other notations are content with a single option.  
Finally, it could be concluded that while number of used visual variables is expected to 
ensure sufficient discriminability between symbols, number of poor design choices hamper 
the visual distance between symbols and affect discriminability in a negative way.  
4.3 Principle of Semantic Transparency 
Semantic transparency characterizes how well the meaning of the symbol can be deduced 
from its visual appearance. Semantic transparency, defining how well the symbol provide 
cues to its denotation, could be described by one of three states (Moody, 2009a), which are 
semantically immediate, semantically opaque or semantically perverse. Overview of nota-
tions in terms of the symbol transparency could be seen in Table 4.  
Table 4. Semantic transparency characteristics 
Language Total 
unique 
symbols 
Immediate 
Symbols 
Opaque Symbols Perverse 
Symbols 
Iconic ele-
ments 
Symbolic ele-
ments 
BPMN 8 3/8   37.5% 4/8   50% 1/8  12.5% 4/8  50% 4/8 50% 
Secure Tropos 9 0/9   0% 9/9  100% 0/9  0% 0/9  0% 9/9 100% 
Misuse Cases 8 2/8   25% 6/8  75% 0/8  0% 2/8  25% 6/8 75% 
Mal-activity 
Diagrams 
7 0/7   0% 7/7  100% 0/7  0% 0/7   0% 7/7 100% 
As depicted on the table above, overall situation with intuitiveness has space for improve-
ment. First, it should be noted that semantically perverse symbols, which are to be avoided, 
are not an issue since only BPMN (one out of four languages) has one perverse symbol.  
At the same time, iconic symbols, that according to Pierce resemble the concepts they depict 
(as cited in Moody, 2009a), are underrepresented and included only in two notations out of 
four total. Since there exists a direct connection between iconic and semantically immediate 
symbols, lack of icons directly leads to the reduction of immediate symbols, leading to the 
situations when majority of symbols are semantically opaque. As stated in (Moody, 2009a), 
utilization of icons could improve the perceptual resemblance, while at the same time mak-
ing the notation more accessible and appealing to the novice users.  Unfortunately, over half 
of symbols (100% for Secure Tropos and Mal-activity Diagrams) are represented with ab-
stract shapes, providing novice users with absolutely no clue about their meaning and in-
creasing the learning curve as no visual aid to remember the symbol meanings is provided.   
It could be concluded that in order to achieve semantic transparency and increase the number 
of semantically immediate symbols, replacement of abstract shapes with meaningful icons 
should be performed. As indicated by Saleh & El-Attar (2015), icons are also effective when 
they not replace but complement existing abstract shapes, increasing overall semantic trans-
parency.  
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4.4  Principle of Complexity Management 
Complexity management is defined as the ability of visual notation to depict information 
while not overflooding human mind (Moody, 2009a). While complexity here sounds some-
what broad, it could be further defined as number of elements on a diagram. As such, com-
plexity impacts key metrics, which are perceptual limits and cognitive limits. According to 
(Moody, 2009a), the most effective way to represent complex situations and diagrams is to 
allow diagrams to be divided into cognitively manageable chunks. De Marco states that it 
could be achieved by recursive decomposition, so that diagram elements would be defined 
by complete diagrams at the next level of abstraction (as cited in Moody, 2009a).  
While several complexity management issues were identified in the analysis of non-ex-
tended modelling languages, same evaluation could not be applied to the extended versions 
as in the relevant works by  Altuhhova et al. (2013), Matulevicius et al. (2012), Chowdhury 
et al. (2012), Soomro & Ahmed (2012) and Matulevičius (2017) diagrams are not parti-
tioned and a single unified diagram is utilized. Thus, it could be said that extended versions 
of the SRM-oriented modelling languages include one single diagram. While the decompo-
sition, made on hierarchical basis, might indeed be beneficial in terms of effective complex-
ity management, lack of related research means that proposing decomposition strategies is 
out of scope for this work. Overall, it could be concluded that on the current stage evaluation 
of complexity management strategies is non-viable due to the limited body of available di-
agrams and lack of complexity-oriented research.  
4.5 Principle of Cognitive Integration 
Cognitive integration should be applied when system is represented by more than one dia-
gram. The idea is that since relevant information is spread across a number of diagrams, 
diagram readers often struggle with keeping the current position and comprehending the 
complete picture (Siau, 2004). For the multiple diagrams to be cognitively effective, they 
are to include integration mechanisms, supporting both conceptual integration and percep-
tual integration (Hahn & Kim, 1999).   
As it was already mentioned in the subchapter on Complexity Management (4.4), due to the 
absence of diagram variety it is reasonable to believe that ISSRM-extended modelling lan-
guages currently support only single unified diagram. Thus, analysis of cognitive integration 
could not be performed as it can only be applicable when multiple diagrams are used to 
represent the system (Moody, 2009a). 
4.6 Principle of Visual Expressiveness 
Visual expressiveness could be defined as a number of visual variables, used in a notation 
and evaluating overall exploitation of available design space (Moody, 2009a). Based on the 
visual expressiveness metrics, visual variables of the notation could be divided between two 
subsets, which are information-carrying variables and free variables.  
According to the distribution between visual expressiveness and degrees of visual freedom, 
notations could range from nonvisual (expressiveness = 0, 8 degrees of freedom) to visually 
saturated (expressiveness = 8, 0 degrees of freedom). Table 5. characterizes the visual vari-
ables as employed in extended modelling languages. Information regarding capacity of vis-
ual variables is adopted from (Moody, 2009a), while the overall representation is taken from 
(Genon et al., 2010).  
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Table 5. Visual variables  
Visual Varia-
ble 
Capacity BPMN  Secure Tropos  Misuse Cases Mal-activity Dia-
grams 
Horizontal po-
sition (x) 
10-15 Enclosure Enclosure Enclosure Enclosure 
Vertical posi-
tion (y) 
10-15 Enclosure Enclosure Enclosure Enclosure 
Size  20 2 2  2 2 
Colour 7-10 8  11 Not utilized Not utilized 
Texture 2-5 2 1 1 1 
Shape Unlimited 7   7    3  3   
Brightness  6-7 Not utilized Not utilized 3 3 
Orientation 4 Not utilized Not utilized Not utilized Not utilized 
As it is shown in the table above, all the extended notations have visual expressiveness of 
6, and are characterized by 2 degrees of visual freedom. While it could be said that 6 visual 
variables should in theory be enough to ensure the effective discriminability of notations, 
suboptimal design choices have negative effect on the discriminability, which is further re-
duced by a limited range of values for majority of visual variables.  
Colour, as one of most cognitively effective variables, is underused in half of languages, as 
Misuse Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams exploit brightness instead. Furthermore, Secure 
Tropos has a colour overload, as it utilizes 11 colour options while colour has the maximum 
capacity of 10. Thus, only one of four notations utilizes full range of colour while remaining 
within capacity. As for the shape, employing unlimited capacity, it should be said that both 
Misuse Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams do not exploit full range as only 3 possible shape 
options are operated across the notations. BPMN and Secure Tropos, in their turn, include 
7 possible shapes. However, while this number should be sufficient to ensure effective dis-
crimination between symbols, this is not the case since utilized shapes are from similar 
shape families. Texture variable is also clearly underused, as only one modelling language 
has two possible options, with remaining three languages are using only one texture availa-
ble. While texture could not be called a primary variable, it could be utilized as an additional 
one, further aiding the discriminability. Finally, despite the big potential of size with a ca-
pacity of 20, just two possible options are exploited across all the reviewed languages. Sim-
ilarly to the texture, size is not a primary distinction variable but could be helpful in assisting 
role.  
4.7 Principle of Dual Coding 
Dual coding theory (Paivio as cited by Moody, 2009a) states that text and graphics together 
transmit information better than either one of them by itself. Text encoding is especially 
efficient not when it replaces graphics but rather when it complements visual representa-
tions. It should also be said that there are several ways to encapsulate textual information, 
namely annotations and hybrid symbols (Moody, 2009a). Overview of the situation with 
hybrid symbols could be seen in Table 6.  
Table 6. Hybrid symbols overview 
Language Total symbols Hybrid Symbols 
BPMN 8 0/8 0% 
Secure Tropos 9 0/9 0% 
Misuse Cases 8 3/8 37.5% 
Mal-activity Diagrams 7 0/7 0% 
As it could be seen from the table above, only one extended modelling language, namely 
Misuse Cases, employs hybrid symbols. All the other ones don’t make use of this technique. 
Moody (2009a) indicates that dual coding does not affect discriminability. However, sup-
plementary text encoding assists interpretations by offering clues to the meaning of symbols 
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and improves retention through interlinked visual and verbal encoding. (Moody 2009a). 
Since both interpretation and retention are important for the notation to be attractive to nov-
ice users, it might be justified to convert non-hybrid symbols into hybrid ones. However, it 
should be noted that not only hybrid symbols, but also iconic ones provide clues to the 
symbol meanings. Thus, transformation of iconic symbols into hybrid ones would not be 
that much viable. 
4.8 Principle of Graphic Economy 
Graphic complexity is overall characterized by a number of graphical symbols in the nota-
tion, which could be also called size of visual vocabulary. Graphic complexity is especially 
problematic for novice users, as they need to keep the meanings of symbols in their working 
memory. As it was shown by empiric studies, graphic complexity has a significant negative 
effect on novice users (Nordbotten & Crosby, 1999). Moody (2009a) offers three ap-
proaches to reduce graphic complexity, which are: reduce semantic complexity, increase 
symbol deficit and increase visual expressiveness. While in the paper by Moody (2009a) it 
is indicated that limit of human ability to discriminate between perceptually distinct alter-
natives, introduced by Miller, is six symbols, it is also said that the limit applies only when 
single visual variable is used (as cited in Moody, 2009a). As it was noted in the subchapter 
4.6, all of the ISSRM-extended modelling languages employ 6 visual variables and thus do 
not pose challenges to the human cognition. Furthermore, proposed alterations of existing 
notations, which are to include introduction of semantically immediate icons, are expected 
to embrace visual popout and additionally improve symbol discriminability.   
4.9 Principle of Cognitive Fit 
Cognitive fit theory states that non-resembling representations of information are acceptable 
for various tasks as well as audiences. In connection with visual notation design, cognitive 
fit implies that for different audiences (especially for experts and novices) development of 
different subdialects might be required to facilitate complete understanding of visual repre-
sentation. Additionally, it might be required to develop a variety of dialects for different 
representational mediums, including black-and-white printer and hand-drawn sketches 
(Moody, 2009a).  
First, it should be noted that all four extended modelling languages are visually monolin-
gual, proposing one all-rounder visual dialect for all possible utilizations. However, these 
single dialects do not account for differences between novice and experienced users. Fur-
thermore, current versions of extended notations have a high degree of similarity with non-
extended ones, so that minimal number of brand new symbols has been introduced. While 
this similarity is beneficial for the experienced users who have knowledge of non-extended 
Secure Tropos, BPMN, and UML, it is not so helpful for novices and only increases the 
learning curve. Since domain of SRM places heavy emphasis on fruitful collaboration be-
tween business novice users and industry professionals, needs of naïve users should be given 
more priority.   
As for the representation mediums, only two out of four languages, namely Mal-activity 
Diagrams and Misuse Cases, could be represented in black-and-white format without infor-
mation loss. This is achieved via redundant coding and exploitation of brightness (visual 
variable) instead of colour. At the same time, underutilization of colour, which is one of the 
most effective visual variables, could not be called an optimal design choice, especially for 
notations comprising over 10 symbols. Current extended BPMN notation prevents diagrams 
from being utilized in non-colour version, since colour is exploited not for redundant coding 
but rather as sole basis of discrimination between certain symbols. While Secure Tropos 
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does not solely rely on colour for symbol discrimination, colour coding is also important 
due to the high degree of similarity between symbol shapes. As for the symbol sketching, 
situation is somewhat identical since only two notations (Mal-activity Diagrams and Misuse 
Cases) are straightforward enough to be drawn by hand. Complicated shapes and colour 
varieties of both Secure Tropos and BPMN would be too big a challenge for limited drawing 
abilities of software engineers.  
Finally, adherence to cultural differences could not be evaluated since the majority of sym-
bols across ISSRM-extended modelling languages are abstract shapes and not icons. How-
ever, cultural aspects should be taken into consideration during the development of proposed 
icons, as reliance on culture-specific associations, commonly utilized to increase semantic 
transparency, is a potential problem (Moody et al., 2010).  
4.10 Redesign Ideas 
Based on the performed analysis of 4 security-extended modeling languages, certain pat-
terns could be spotted. Several issues, common for all notations, could be described as in-
correct (limited or non-redundant) usage of colours and lack of visually immediate symbols. 
Since icons could be used as both additional visual variable and as a replacement for opaque 
symbols, it could be concluded that implementation of icons would improve visual effec-
tiveness. However, it should also be remembered that 4 security-extended languages for the 
purposes of Security Risk Management are to be considered as not standalone but rather as 
multiple perspectives of secure software system model (Matulevičius, 2017). Considering 
the fact that 4 abovementioned languages were specifically extended to support ISSRM 
concepts, it seems logical to conclude that set of icons, depicting those concepts, should be 
unified in 4 languages as well. Apart from increasing visual efficiency and intuitiveness, 
unified set of icons would also streamline transformation between various modeling per-
spectives and respectively, modeling languages. However, it becomes unclear on the proper 
procedure for such a set of icons. Based on approaches, outlined in (Genon, 2016), (Caire 
et al., 2013), (El Kouhen et al., 2015) and (Leitner et al., 2013), it could be concluded that 
notation crowdsourcing has proven itself to be a reliable and efficient approach. 
Crowdsourcing here denotes the practice of requesting potential and actual users of antici-
pated notations to design symbols by themselves, according to their preferences. Since this 
paper tackles the similar issue, it was decided to use crowdsourcing as a tool to obtain po-
tential set of icons for ISSRM concepts. Following chapter covers the process of obtaining 
user sketches as well as performing initial evaluation.  
4.11 Summary 
Four ISSRM-extended modelling languages were analysed for their adherence to PoN prin-
ciples to answer the sub question: 
RQ2.1. Do available security risk-oriented modelling languages comply with PoN princi-
ples? 
Performed theoretical analysis has revealed a number of inconsistencies with 9 PoN Princi-
ples. Incorrect (limited or non-redundant) usage of colours and lack of visually immediate 
symbols are issues, common for all 4 notations.  As icons could be used as both additional 
visual variable and as a replacement for opaque symbols, augmentation of existing notations 
with icons would have a positive effect on intuitiveness and visual effectiveness.   
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5 Evaluation Survey 
In this chapter initial evaluation survey, which is performed to obtain information on naïve 
user’s perception of existing visual notations, is covered in detail. Evaluation survey is pre-
formed to conclude an answer to the following research question: 
RQ2. How are current security risk-oriented modelling notations evaluated? 
5.1.1 Audience 
Due to the similarities with anticipated potential users of improved ISSRM notations (busi-
ness background, no previous knowledge of Security Risk Modeling domain), business stu-
dents were selected as a primary audience for the evaluation experiment. Taking into con-
sideration cognitive fit requirement (suitability of proposed iconset for users with varied 
cultural backgrounds), experiment was performed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with business 
majors from International University of Sarajevo constituting the survey audience. 53 par-
ticipants from both undergraduate and graduate programs of business domain (37 bachelor 
students, 14 master students, 2 doctoral students) have filled in the designed questionnaire. 
Additionally, 6 faculty members also provided their answers, bringing the total count to 59. 
As for the gender distribution, survey audience was comprised of 22 females and 37 males. 
All participants possessed certain degree of business information technology knowledge 
while being previously not exposed to requirements engineering or security modelling. It 
should be said that skillset of participants is of crucial importance, since they are supposed 
to possess perception perspective, similar to that of naïve business users.   
5.1.2 Design 
First of all, it should be noted that not all concepts have a visual depiction in all security-
extended languages. For the purposes of consistence, missing visual symbols for Control (2 
symbols) and Risk Treatment (3 symbols) were designed based on the conventions of the 
languages and best practices of PoN. Thus, at least 3 variants of representations are available 
for each ISSRM concept and participants have several options to choose from.  
Students would be requested to fill in a designed questionnaire, containing visual depictions 
(3 to 4) of ISSRM concepts from four security-extended modelling languages (Secure 
BPMN, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams), as well as to recognize 
above mentioned concepts on 4 diagrams (one for each language). Additionally, question-
naire included 3 free-form questions so that participants could express their opinion regard-
ing the overall representation of ISSRM concept groups.  
Questionnaire was designed in a printable black-and-white version and was comprised of 
12 one-sided pages, covering the total of 26 questions, divided into 3 parts. First 5 questions 
were intended to collect background data, while subsequent 16 are to capture the particular-
ities of ISSRM concept perception across four modelling languages.  Finally, last 5 ques-
tions were designed to test symbol recognition on the diagrams and collect survey feedback. 
It should also be mentioned that none of the questions was mandatory, and in order to ac-
commodate possible selection issues NA options were also provided for every question from 
2nd part.   
Students were expected to read the definition of the concept, look at the available represen-
tations and select the most appealing one by putting X or V in the selection box below the 
relevant image. Estimated time of completion is 20 minutes. Detailed questionnaire design 
could be found in Appendix IX.  
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5.1.3 Process 
Considering the specifics of the Bosnian study process, paper questionnaires were distrib-
uted to the students during their classes. Students were afterwards requested to fill in the 
questionnaire and bring back in one week. Afterwards, papers were manually collected from 
students and further analysed. It should also be noted that while analysis of web-based ques-
tionnaire would be less time-consuming, it was decided that since there was a significant 
risk of survey having unacceptably low completion rate, paper questionnaire was designed 
and distributed.  
5.2 Analysis 
59 filled questionnaires were collected from the survey participants. The statistics of per-
formed survey could be seen in the Table 7. Details on pivot tables, utilized for analysis, 
could be found in Appendix X. As a result, for each ISSRM symbol participants identified 
one visually appealing symbol from 3-4 options, taken from notations of 4 extended mod-
elling languages.  It should be also noted that this chapter provides analysis only of the first 
two evaluation survey parts. As for the third part, covering symbol recognition in models, it 
is further analysed in the Chapter 8 as it’s intended to provide initial data for the comparison 
of current modelling notations with icon-enhanced ones.   
Table 7. Evaluation survey outcomes 
    
Business Asset 46% 
27/59 
IS Asset 49% 
29/59 
Criterion 64% 
38/59 
Threat 49% 
29/59 
    
Control 56% 
33/59 
Vulnerability 37% 
22/59 
Threat Agent 49% 
29/59 
Attack Method 30% 
18/59 
    
Impact 47% 
28/59 
Security Event 34% 
20/59 
Risk 32% 
19/59 
Risk 32% 
19/59 
  
 
Risk treatment 42% 
25/59 
Security Re-
quirement 
59% 
35/59 
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Since theoretical analysis of 4 SRM-extended visual notations has been already performed 
in Section 4, it would now be interesting to compare PoN-based analysis with empirical 
results.  
While certain PoN principles could not be utilized due to their applicability to models rather 
than standalone symbols, principles of Perceptual Discriminability and Semantic Transpar-
ency could be further explored and compared. Overall, it should be said that outcomes of 
the Evaluation survey correspond to the theoretical analysis. As it could be seen in the Table 
7, vast majority of chosen symbols incorporate icons and are semantically immediate. While 
utilization of colour could not be evaluated due to the survey questionnaire being distributed 
in black-and-white version, other visual variables as well as semantic transparency charac-
teristics could be easily assessed. Out of symbols for 12 ISSRM concepts (Risk Treatment 
is not represented in any of 4 languages), only 4 chosen symbols are not comprised of icons 
(33%). Considering that symbols for three of the concepts (Control, Vulnerability, and At-
tack Method) do not provide iconic-based options, it could be said that only for 1 concept 
out of 12 abstract-shaped symbols was chosen over iconic one. This situation occurred with 
Information System symbol and could be at least partially attributed to the ambiguous ap-
pearance of database icon in BPMN, which was seemingly unrecognized by the survey au-
dience. Overall, it should be said that whenever possible, in all cases but one survey audi-
ence clearly preferred symbols comprised of icons. This is the case even for situations when 
corresponding abstract symbols were less visually overloading, as the visual representation 
of Risk. While symbol form Secure Tropos notation looks less crowded, it was rejected in 
favour of icon-based representations. At the same time example of Risk illustrates difficul-
ties in choosing between iconic symbols, as drawings from both BPMN and Misuse Cases 
obtained identical amount of support.  
As for the descriptive statistics, only three symbols (Criterion, Security Requirement and 
Control) have approval of more than half of survey audience, while six more symbols ac-
quired support in the range of 40%-50%. Finally, four last concepts are characterized by 
quite low level of consensus, between 30% and 40%. Concepts could be characterized not 
only by support, but also by number of NA answers, indicating difficulties with the selection 
of visual representation. Only two of all concepts, namely Vulnerability and Security Event, 
have a high rate of NA (above 10%), with all the others keeping the figure in the range of 
5%-10%.  
 It is also possible to draw direct connections between semantic transparency, as outlined in 
Table 4, and popularity of languages among participants based on the origins of chosen 
symbols. As it could be seen, BPMN and Misuse Cases are leaders among symbol occur-
rences while at the same time being only two languages with iconic symbols already incor-
porated. While Secure Tropos currently has no symbols, selection of symbols from its no-
tation could be explained by a wide range of shapes as compared to counterparts. As for the 
Mal-activity Diagrams, it’s result is no clearly representing symbols and no icons. Details 
on pivot table analysis for all 13 concepts could be found in Appendix X.  
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Table 8. Evaluation survey statistics 
ISSRM Concept Top-scoring symbol Not Applicable 
Business Asset 46% | 27/59 8% | 5/59 
IS Asset 49% | 29/59 7% | 4/59 
Criterion 64% | 38/59 7% | 4/59 
Threat 49% | 29/59 7% | 4/59 
Vulnerability 37% | 22/59 14% | 8/59 
Threat Agent 49% | 29/59 8% | 5/59 
Attack method 31% | 18/59 10% | 6/59 
Impact 47% | 28/59 5% | 3/59 
Security Event 34% | 20/59 15% | 9/59 
Risk 32% | 19/59 8% | 5/59 
Risk treatment 42% | 25/59 5% | 3/59 
Security Requirement 59% | 35/59 8% | 5/59 
Control 56% | 33/59 10% | 6/59 
 
Table 9. Popularity of languages 
Modeling language Occurrences Iconic elements Symbolic elements 
BPMN 5 4/8 | 50% 4/8 | 50% 
Secure Tropos 2 0/9 | 0% 9/9 | 100% 
Misuse Cases 5 2/8 | 25% 6/8 | 75% 
Mal-activity Diagrams 0 0/7 | 0% 7/7 | 100% 
Custom designed 2 NA NA 
As mentioned in subchapter 5.1.2, the questionnaire included two parts, regarding evalua-
tion of individual concepts and diagram concept matching. The detailed results of model 
perception and concept-matching are represented in Appendix XI.  
The results were analysed aaccording to two metrics, taken from the paper by Caire et al. 
(2013) - hit rate (percentage of correct symbols for model-matching) and semantic transpar-
ency coefficient (which is describing connection between symbol design and symbol defi-
nition). Authors also highlight that according to the ISO 9168 standard, symbol comprehen-
sibility threshold is set at 67% hit rate.  Aggregated data on the ISSRM concepts could be 
found in Table 10. As it could be seen from the table below, none of the represented concepts 
has actually achieved the sufficient hit rate level. Thus, it could be said that existing model-
ling notations are not especially intuitive, and business users require extensive training be-
fore they could correctly perceive information, depicted on the SRM-related diagrams.   
Table 10. Evaluation survey - aggregation over concepts 
Concepts Mean (hit rate) Mean (semant. transp. coefficient) Occurrences 
Attack Method 29.66% 0.19 4 
Business Asset 28.39% 0.17 4 
Control 20.34% 0.07 1 
Impact 29.66% 0.19 2 
Information System Asset 28.81% 0.18 4 
Security Criterion 23.73% 0.12 3 
Security Requirement 25.85% 0.14 4 
Threat 20.34% 0.09 1 
Threat Agent 41.53% 0.32 4 
Vulnerability 29.38% 0.19 3 
Based on the data, shown in table, it is seen that mean hit rate for individual concepts varies 
dramatically, from 20% for Threat and Control to 41% for Threat Agent. However, this 
difference should be attributed not only to the visual depiction of the symbols, but to the 
overall perception of ISSRM concepts by the target audience as well.  
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Finally, data on the performance of notations is shown in Table 11. It could be concluded 
that while BPMN could be called a most well-percieved notation, there is no clear leader 
and all four notations are below established comprehensibility threshold. Thus, improve-
ment of four notations is clearly needed.  
Table 11. Evaluation survey - aggregation over languages 
Languages Mean (hit rate) SD (hit rate) Mean (semant. transp. 
coeff.) 
SD (semant. transp. coeff) 
BPMN 33.41% 10.30 0.22 0.12 
Mal-activity Dia-
grams 
27.60% 9.11 0.16 0.11 
Misuse Cases 29.03% 6.75 0.19 0.08 
Secure Tropos 27.12% 8.74 0.17 0.10 
5.3 Threats to Validity 
It might be the case that survey design is not quite optimal, and users could have been con-
fused with the presence of NA option since they were instructed to choose the clearest rep-
resentation among proposed symbols.  
As the survey was performed in the end of December, it is possible that participants were 
overloaded with other academic obligations and have not allocated sufficient time for the 
symbol selection process.  
Considering that no reward was available, and participants were motivated only by their 
good will and the authority of Associate Professor who assisted with distribution of ques-
tionnaires among his students and chair colleagues, some participants might have just se-
lected random symbols and did not effectively participate. It should be also noted that sev-
eral questionnaires with identical answers for all questions were found on the data prepara-
tion stage. As a mitigation strategy, those answers were converted into NA.  
An issue also might arise from the visual appearance of questionnaire, which was distributed 
to students in black-and-white version. While significant discriminability of symbols was 
ensured by visual variables of brightness, texture, shape, and size, colour was excluded from 
the symbol recognition process. 
Unfamiliarity of target audience with security risk modelling and modelling languages in 
general was established based on the study program, with modeling-related courses being 
absent from the curriculum. At the same time, this might not be the case especially for cer-
tain master students since master’s program could be described as MBA-like, open for stu-
dents with a variety of pervious professional experience. Same could also be applicable to 
faculty stuff, since their knowledge of modelling notations was not explicitly evaluated. 
While to best knowledge previous exposure to modelling could be characterized as minimal, 
possibility of certain survey participants having substantial modeling experience could not 
be completely ruled out.  
Since all survey participants are from the same university, similar cultural background may 
have influenced the final choice of symbols. This was partially mitigated by the fact that 
survey was performed in the internationally-oriented university, with students and faculty 
coming from different cultures and having experience of intercultural interaction.  
5.4 Results Comparison 
Based on the analysis, perfomed in Subchapter 5.2, it could be said that theoretical findings, 
presented in Chapter 4, were confirmed by the results of empirical research. As stated in 
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Chapter 4, performed analysis has revealed that existing ISSRM-extended modelling nota-
tions do not satisfy the majority of PoN principles. While several PoN principles, including 
Graphic Economy and Complexity Management, could not be evaluated due to their orien-
tation on models’ level rather than o individual symbols, remaining ones could be further 
explored.  
Following the principle of Perceptual Discriminability, it could be said that existing nota-
tions are characterized by a high degree of symbol similarity, especially evidential in Misuse 
Cases and Mal-activity Diagrams. Similarity between representations of different concepts, 
combined with underrepresentation of other visual variables, means that users of the nota-
tion have hard time telling the symbols apart. While the introduction of icons is not the only 
possible way of improving discriminability, augmentation of existing symbols with icons 
should improve visual pop-out and contribute to symbol distinctiveness. 
Semantic transparency analysis has revealed a high share of abstract shapes and opaque 
symbols across the for notations. Secure Tropos, employing only abstract shapes, performs 
especially bad in terms of transparency. While outcomes of survey indicate that symbols for 
two concepts, originating from Secure Tropos, were preferred over other 3 notations, all 
possible options for Attack Method did not include icon-based symbol. As for the second 
symbol (Information System Asset), it’s choice was likely driven by the semantic perverse-
ness of the symbol from BPMN. Thus, two notations (Mal-activity Diagrams and Secure 
Tropos), that were least popular among survey participants, are also characterized by 0 se-
mantically immediate symbols. So, it could be concluded that naïve users prefer notations 
with high degree of semantic transparency, and its improvement could be achieved via in-
troducing immediate (and not perverse) icons.  
Visual Expressiveness, in its turn, could not be fully evaluated through the performed em-
pirical study since survey questionnaire was provided to participants in black-and-white 
form. Thus colour, being one of most effective visual variables, was unavailable for symbol 
representation, and it could be assumed that symbol distinction was perfomed only with 
shape and brightness. As already mentioned, results of the theoretical analysis revealed that 
existing range of shapes is limited and based on the empirical study it could be said that end 
users overall prefer iconic-based immediate symbols over abstract ones.  
According to the Cognitive Fit principle, modelling language could be utilized on various 
representation mediums and exploited by users with different backgrounds and knowledge 
levels. While suitability to various mediums was not tested by users, graphic complexity of 
chosen symbols allows to assume that they would be unsuitable for hand drawing. As for 
the background and knowledge level, iconic symbols should be universally understandable 
and accessible for novice and experienced users alike.  
Overall, it could be said that theoretical findings were reinforced by the empirical study 
results. Introduction of iconic symbols should contribute to the compliance of modeling 
languages with PoN principles.  
5.5 Summary 
This survey was performed to acquire insights on the naïve user’s comprehension of cur-
rently existing SRM-extended notations and to answer the sub question, which is as follows:  
RQ2.2. How are available security risk-oriented modelling languages perceived by end us-
ers?  
Overall, it could be said that business (naïve) users prefer semantically immediate symbols, 
comprised of iconic elements. Extended BPMN and extended Misuse Cases are perception 
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leaders (highest number of symbol occurrences), while at the same time being only two 
languages with iconic symbols incorporated. As for the model perception, measured via hit 
rate (percentage of correct answers), it varies from 20% to 41%. So, it could be said that 
end-users without previous knowledge of SRM notations are not able to perform visual 
recognition on the sufficient level.  
 
 
 
43 
 
6 Symbolization Survey 
This chapter includes information on the key experiment, required to design the candidate 
icon set, and is intended to answer the following research question: 
RQ3. What visual icons could be introduced into available security risk-oriented modelling 
notations? 
6.1.1 Audience 
In compliance with the cognitive fit requirement, it was decided to perform the symboliza-
tion survey in the Baltics region, namely in Estonia. Considering the specifics of Security 
Risk Management notations, effectively preventing unexperienced user from designing the 
visually effective iconic symbols due to the initial steep learning curve, it was decided to 
combine conventional experts design with crowdsourcing technique, described in (Caire et 
al., 2013), and have symbols created by crowdsourcing from a group of notation experts. 
Thus, a questionnaire was designed and sent to security experts, skilled in secure system 
modelling and dealing with security modeling languages as a part of their everyday work 
duties while at the same time having no prior experience of notation design. As for the 
demographics, all survey participants possess graduate degree in Computer Science or Soft-
ware Engineering (8 Masters, 3 PhD) and are in the age range between 26 and 37.   
6.1.2 Design 
Overall design of the questionnaire is adapted from the corresponding questionnaire, pro-
vided in (Genon, 2016). Since the experiment would require participants to draw the per-
spective icons by hand, it was decided to go with a paper-based questionnaire. Detailed 
questionnaire design could be found in Appendix XII. 
Overall, the proposed questionnaire consists of 2 parts, with first one being focused on de-
mographics information and containing questions regarding gender, age, geographic region 
and educational level. As for the second part, it consists of 13 pages, one for each ISSRM 
concept. The typical page includes ISSRM concept definition, real-world concept example, 
concept keywords, participant instructions, square area for concept drawing and finally, the 
difficulty rating. Page appearance is similar for all concepts, with the only difference being 
content in definition, example and keywords. It should be also noted that while overall sur-
vey page layout was adapted from (Genon, 2016), it also includes several refinements, 
namely presence of real-world example and keywords. This alteration is meant to simplify 
the design process for participants.  
6.1.3 Process 
Overall symbolization process is meant to be started with reading the concept definition, 
followed by getting acquainted with example and keywords. Afterwards, participants are to 
provide a concept drawing in the dedicated square area. Finally, complexity of concept de-
picted is to be rated at the table below on the grade from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult).  
6.2 Analysis 
As a result of symbolization experiment, 11 completed questionnaires were obtained. Thus, 
each of 13 ISSRM concepts could potentially be depicted by one of 11 produced drawings, 
with an overall size of potential iconset being 143 symbols. Icons, obtained from survey 
participants, could be found in Appendix XIII.  
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According to the proposed research methodology, depicted on Figure 1, symbolization sur-
vey is envisioned to provide material for subsequent works, and initial iconset is to be further 
analysed via the dedicated Symbol Identification survey. Since it seems suboptimal to pro-
vide participants with 11 icons to choose from, it was decided to perform a combined stere-
otyping/prototyping analysis and identify stereotypes (symbols that are most widespread 
among proposed concept depictions) as well as prototypes (symbols that carry most imme-
diate depictions of certain concept). For the purposes of analysis, it was defined that symbol 
should be labelled as stereotype based on the degree of stereotypy measure, as introduced 
in (Howell & Fuchs, 1968). It was also decided that 18% (2/11) would be a minimal support 
threshold. Combination of stereotype and prototype symbols should comprise proposed can-
didate iconset, which is to consist of 5 candidate symbols for each concept. Detailed data 
on the symbol analysis and selection reasoning could be found in Appendix XIV.  
As for the overall candidate iconset creation methodology, it could be described as follows. 
Initially, one stereotype icon for each ISSRM concept was identified whenever possible, as 
for the stereotype to be present icon needed to have degree of stereotypy of at least 18% 
(2/11). It was impossible to highlight stereotypes for two concepts, namely Attack Method 
and Security Requirement.  
Subsequent step was focused on the selection of prototypes, which were identified according 
to the perception of the author and were based on his subjective evaluation of semantical 
clarity and immediateness. In case total count of candidate symbols for a given concept was 
less than 5, additional icons, inspired by available stereotype symbols, were designed by the 
author of this paper so that total number of possible icons for each ISSRM concepts would 
be 5.  
It should also be mentioned that while selection of prototype symbols for each concept was 
performed solely on the basis of degree of stereotypy measure, stereotypes were chosen in 
a subjective manner and according to the author’s best knowledge. However, established 
associative templates and semiotic patterns have clearly impacted the result. While it could 
be said that author has been exposed to various cultural setting and possesses considerable 
international communication experience, selection of stereotypes still was somewhat influ-
enced by the particularities of cultural background. Thus, in order to ensure widespread 
immediateness and preserve symbol appropriateness throughout various cultures, it is of 
paramount importance to perform iconset selection and validation survey in distinct geo-
graphical locations, characterized by a variety of settings.   
6.3 Threats to Validity 
Utilized degree of stereotypy measure was calculated based on results of symbol clustering, 
performed by the author according to the similarities in visual appearance of symbols. How-
ever, there is a chance of certain key symbol features being omitted due to the specifics of 
clustering process and potential difficulties of SRM experts to express ideas, caused by the 
lack of drawing fluency.  
It might be the case that certain participants were not especially enthusiastic about redesign-
ing the modelling notation as they were quite satisfied with the existing one. So, absence of 
NA option and questionnaire design, forcing experts to produce their version of symbols, 
might have pressured the participants into submitting suboptimal drawings, which under 
different circumstances they would characterize as not acceptable.  
With the participants being domain experts, it is reasonable to suggest that a fair share of 
target audience guessed the intended result of the experiment, meaning that produced an-
swers would also reflect their attitude towards presumable goal of the survey. Additionally, 
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survey audience might have felt the pressure of evaluation, and interpret the questionnaire 
in the way that they are asked not only to answer the questions but also to solve the survey 
goal, enforcing additional constraints and affecting the survey results.   
Since all survey participants share similar cultural background, this fact might have influ-
enced their choice of symbols, which would be not so comprehensible by the representatives 
of other cultures. Additionally, all survey participants possess postgraduate education (Mas-
ter’s or PhD degrees). As comprehension of symbols depends on cultural background and 
educational level, there is a possibility that produced symbols are somewhat biased and 
would not be so favorably received by different audiences.   
6.4 Summary 
This chapter covers the details of symbolization survey and provides and answer to the sub 
question, which is: 
RQ3.1. Where could potential iconic symbols be sourced from?  
Since literature review indicated the superiority of crowd-sourced notations, it was decided 
to exploit the SRM experts for design-related purposes. As a result, 143 symbols (11 partic-
ipants * 13 concepts) were obtained and could be characterized as an initial iconset, which 
is to be refined and narrowed down in the subsequent surveys.   
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7 Symbol Identification Survey 
This chapter describes the process of identifying the most suitable symbols to be included 
in the respective SRM modeling notations and answers the following research question:  
RQ3. What visual icons could be introduced into available security risk-oriented modelling 
notations? 
7.1.1 Audience 
As per the cognitive fit requirement, symbol identification element was performed in yet 
another geographical region – Eastern Europe, with the survey participants originating from 
Ukraine. Since symbols, which are to be included in the perspective SRM notations, are to 
be perceived by both experienced and novice users, it was decided to distribute the survey 
among the professional community. Thus, employees of state-owned IT company, focused 
on the development and maintenance of railway management systems, were chosen to be 
the target audience due to the fact that despite certain familiarity with conventional model-
ling notations (including those of UML and BPMN), Security Risk Modeling techniques are 
currently not utilized in the work process.  
7.1.2 Design 
Considering the benefits, provided by web-based questionnaire, it was decided to exploit 
the features of open-source LimeSurvey software and deploy the survey web application to 
a dedicated server, provided by DigitalOcean hosting service. The overall survey design 
follows the previously described pattern and consists of two parts, namely Background and 
Symbol selection. Background part includes questions on age, gender, educational level and 
prior modelling language knowledge. Symbol selection, in its turn, could be further divided 
in three sections, covering three groups of ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al., 2010).  Each 
section starts from the definition, which is followed by the descriptions of relevant concepts, 
provided along with the relevant symbol set. So, participants are offered the selection of 5 
symbols for each concept and are requested to choose the best-of-breed. Concepts in each 
of the 3 sections are concluded with a free-text question, were participants are encouraged 
to provide unstructured feedback and suggestions. Detailed questionnaire design could be 
found in Appendix XV.  
It should also be mentioned that to ensure full comprehension, survey and instructions were 
provided to participants in Russian language, with definitions of SRM concepts were taken 
from the paper by (Dubois et al., 2010) and translated.  
7.1.3 Process 
Since the symbol identification survey was designed with LimeSurvey and made available 
in the Internet, process of distribution and obtaining results was rather streamlined. Survey 
link was sent to perspective participants via corporate email (following the management 
consent), and filled responses were collected by the backend of LimeSurvey instance, de-
ployed to the cloud server. Afterwards, obtained responses were downloaded from the server 
and further analysed.  
7.2 Analysis 
As a result, 39 answers from survey participants were collected through online surveying 
software.  
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The outcomes of performed survey could be seen in Table 12. Participants selected the most 
visually appealing symbol out of 5 options, provided for each of 13 ISSRM concepts. Anal-
ysis details could be found in Appendix XVI.  
Table 12. Identified symbols 
      
Business 
Asset 
Prototype 
33% 
13/39 
IS Asset 
Stereo-
type 
41% 
16/39 
Criterion 
Stereo-
type 
28% 
11/39 
Threat 
Proto-
type 
 
41% 
16/39 
Threat1 
Sugges-
tion, 
based on 
prototype 
41% 
16/39 
Vulner-
ability 
Stereo-
type 
33% 
13/39 
  
    
Threat 
Agent2 
Refined 
prototype 
41% 
16/39 
Attack 
Method3 
Sugges-
tion, 
based on 
prototype 
51% 
20/39 
Impact 
Sugges-
tion, 
based on 
prototype 
28% 
11/39 
Secu-
rity 
Event4 
Sug-
gestion, 
based 
on pro-
totype 
36% 
14/39 
Security 
Event 
Proto-
type 
36% 
14/39 
Risk 
Stereo-
type 
49% 
19/39 
   
 
Risk treat-
ment5 
Stereo-
type 
33% 
13/39 
Security 
Require-
ment6 
Prototype 
41% 
16/39 
Control7 
Stereo-
type 
31% 
12/39 
First of all, it could be seen in the table above that each of two concepts (Threat and Security 
Event) are represented by two symbols with identical support. Considering that proposed 
icon set should include unique icons for 13 ISSRM concepts, it was decided to choose op-
timal symbols (highlighted in green) based on symbol interconnection. Since “hacker in 
hood” icon was selected as the clearest representation of Threat Agent, similar icon of 
hacker with laptop added should serve as icon for Threat. Similar approach could be applied 
in case of Security Event, where link between Impact and Security Event means that icon 
with key and keyhole is preferable.  
                                                 
1
 Derived from “Hacker” by Peter van Driel from www.iconfinder.com and “Skull and Crossbones” by An-
drew Cameron from the Noun Project 
2 Derived from “Hacker” by Peter van Driel from www.iconfinder.com 
3 Derived from “Skull and Crossbones” by Andrew Cameron from the Noun Project 
4 “Key in keyhole” by flaticon from www.freepik.com 
5 “Shield” by Marek Polakovic from the Noun Project 
6 Derived from “Checklist” by Aaron K. Kim from the Noun Project and “Shield” by Marek Polakovic from 
the Noun Project 
7 “Shield” by To Uen from the Noun Project 
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Additionally, it should be noted that two of icons in Table 12, namely Risk and Vulnerabil-
ity, have almost identical appearance as they differ only in shape. Thus, to ensure compli-
ance with perceptual discriminability principle (Chapter 4.2), it could be recommended to 
complement one of these icons with additional visual variables and components.  
Origins of the resulting iconset could be found in Table 13. Detailed process of obtaining 
iconic symbols is described in Chapter 6. As it could be seen from the table, the most com-
mon source of inspiration for icons were stereotypes.  
Table 13. Icon origins 
Symbol Category Occurrences 
Stereotype 6 
Prototype 4 
Refined prototype 1 
Suggestion, based on prototype 4 
As outlined in Section 4.9, one of the reasons for designing additional notation dialects 
might be suitability for manual drawing. Indeed, specifics of SRM process mean that mod-
elling is quite often performed on the traditional mediums, be it paper or whiteboard. Since 
this scenario does not include utilization of CASE tools, proposed modelling notations (and 
icons as their component) should be suitable for hand-drawing. Thus, it was decided to an-
alyse resulting icons for their suitability to be hand-drawn. Time constraints and limited 
drawing skills of software engineers mean that proposed icons should be comprised of easy-
to-draw constructs (basic and easily decomposable shapes) while providing sufficient level 
of discriminability. Considering the visual appearance of icons, it could be said that the 
icons are fully suitable to be drawn by hand as they are comprised of decomposable and 
easy-to-reproduce elements.  
7.3 Threats to Validity 
As the survey was performed in the end of December, it is possible that participants were 
overloaded with the preparations to winter holidays and have not allocated sufficient time 
for the survey completion process, reducing the quality of answers.  
Considering that no reward was available, and participants were motivated only by their 
good will and the informal request of manager, some participants might have used random 
basis for the symbol selection process, making their participation virtually ineffective. In 
order to mitigate this issue, obtained results were analysed for the presence of unusual pat-
terns and outliers.  
Since the target audience presumably has very limited experience with modelling languages 
and is not exposed to modern modelling approaches, it might be the case that intuitive and 
visual effectiveness of models are not their perceived characteristics.  
Since all survey participants share corporate culture and the substantial share of them are 
alumni of the same university, similar cultural background may have influenced the final 
choice of symbols.  
7.4 Summary 
This chapter covered the process of identifying the most suitable symbols out of available 
icon set and answered the sub question, which is as follows: 
RQ3.2. Which iconic symbols are preferred by end users? 
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End-users favour icons that are semantically transparent and easily distinguishable. Out of 
all symbol categories, presented in candidate set, stereotypes (symbol that is most wide-
spread among proposed concept depictions) were the most popular. This further reinforces 
the idea of notation crowdsourcing being superior to other approaches, as the initial selec-
tion of stereotypes was performed by distinct audience in another geographical location. 
Resulting iconset, depicting 13 ISSRM concepts, is to be evaluated in the final, validation 
survey. Furthermore, based on the concept of Rich Pictures, covered in (Lewis, 1992), it 
was also decided to produce a stand-alone rich-picture like notation and compare its perfor-
mance with that of existing SRM extended notations as well as icon-augmented ones.  
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8 Validation Survey 
In this chapter Validation survey is described in detail to answer the following research 
question: 
RQ4. How could the effectiveness of security risk-oriented modelling notations be evalu-
ated? 
8.1 Proposed Notations 
This survey is aimed to provide a comparison of 4 existing SRM notations versus their icon-
enhanced rivals. Revised notations are created based on the icon set, outlined in the Sub-
chapter 7.2, so that existing symbols of all 4 extended notations, taken from the relevant 
papers, were augmented with introduced icons. As a material for comparison, it was decided 
to utilize user registration models, adopted from (Matulevičius, 2014). Since the 4 original 
models were already exploited in the Symbolization survey and could be found in Appendix 
IX, Validation survey would include only 4 revised models, made with the addition of in-
troduced icons. Additionally, these 4 models were also complemented with a rich-picture 
like model, comprised solely of iconic symbols and called “Security Ideogram”. Thus, 4 
ISSRM notations were contrasted with 4 icon-augmented ones and with dedicated picto-
gram-based notation so that survey participants could evaluate the effect of icon utilization.   
8.1.1 Audience 
Validation survey was performed among University of Tartu students, taking the Security 
Risk Modelling-oriented graduate course. All the participants are majoring in the field of 
Information Technology, with study programs including Software Engineering (1), Com-
puter Science (2), Informatics (1) and Cyber Security (12). It should also be noted that since 
the course is highly specialized, students have already been exposed to the domain of Secu-
rity Risk Modelling or/and have interest in the field. As for the experience with 4 extended 
modelling notations, participants are expected to possess basic notational knowledge, ob-
tained through several relevant lectures. Thus, survey audience falls under the category of 
“security experts”, who would potentially use modelling languages to model information 
systems.  
Since extended modelling languages are planned to be utilized by two categories of end 
users, namely experts and naïve users, survey was also performed within the beginner user 
audience, comprised of students from Dnipro National University of Railway Transport 
(Dnipro, Ukraine). The total number of participants is 23, and they are comprised of 6 BSc 
students, 4 PhD students and 13 MSc students, majoring in Computer Engineering (6), 
Cyber Security (3) and Software Engineering (14). It should also be noted that all survey 
participants have the understanding of information technologies and general-purpose mod-
elling languages but have never been exposed to security risk-modelling extensions or 
ISSRM domain model concepts.  
8.1.2 Design 
First of all, it should be said that Validation survey is comprised of 47 questions and includes 
5 main sections. Detailed survey structure could be found in Table 14.  
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Table 14. Validation survey structure 
Section Contents 
Background 6 questions on participants gender, age, education, study program and knowledge of mod-
elling notations.  
BPMN Model Participants are provided with a BPMN model, designed with utilization of introduced 
iconset, and textual description of the modelled system. Afterwards, they are requested to 
match diagram concepts with their names.  
BPMN Concepts Participants are offered 6 BPMN symbols, modelled in two versions – original notation 
and notation, complemented with icons, and are asked to choose the preferred version.  
Secure Tropos Model  Participants are provided with a Secure Tropos model, designed with the utilization of 
introduced iconset, and textual description of the modelled system. Afterwards, they are 
requested to match diagram concepts with their names. 
Secure Tropos Concepts Participants are offered 8 Secure Tropos symbols, modelled in two versions – original 
notation and notation, complemented with icons, and are asked to choose the preferred 
version. 
Misuse Cases Model Participants are provided with a Misuse Cases model, designed with the utilization of in-
troduced iconset, and textual description of the modelled system. Afterwards, they are re-
quested to match diagram concepts with their names. 
Misuse Cases Concepts Participants are offered 8 Misuse Cases symbols, modelled in two versions – original no-
tation and notation, complemented with icons, and are asked to choose the preferred ver-
sion. 
Mal-activity Diagrams Model Participants are provided with a Mal-activity Diagrams model, designed with the utiliza-
tion of introduced iconset, and textual description of the modelled system. Afterwards, 
they are requested to match diagram concepts with their names. 
Mal-activity Diagrams Concepts Participants are offered 7 Mal-activity Diagrams symbols, modelled in two versions – 
original notation and notation, complemented with icons, and are asked to choose the pre-
ferred version. 
Security Ideograms Model Participants are provided with a Security Ideograms model, designed based on the intro-
duced iconset, and textual description of the modelled system. Afterwards, they are re-
quested to match diagram concepts with their names. 
Review In the final sections, participants are asked to review their answers and to provide overall 
survey feedback via the open text question.  
It should be also mentioned that diagram, utilized for the purposes of matching described 
concepts with their names and providing data for the validation metrics, is similar for all 5 
notations (4 extended languages and Security Ideograms) and originates from (Mat-
ulevičius, 2014).  
Questionnaire for the survey was designed with the open-source LimeSurvey software and 
is distributed to the participants in a digital form. LimeSurvey instance was deployed on the 
cloud server, provided by DigitalOcean. Detailed questionnaire design could be found in 
Appendix XVII.  
8.1.3 Process 
Survey was introduced to the participants during relevant university classes. Participants 
were provided with URL link and were given one week to complete the survey. Afterwards, 
results were downloaded and analysed.  
8.2 Analysis 
This subsection includes results of Validation survey answers provided by both audiences, 
experts and naïve users. Analysis details could be found in Appendix XVIII.  
As mentioned in subsection 8.1.2, Validation survey is comprised of two types of assign-
ments, namely models and individual symbols. Since the analysis approaches to the results 
of those assignments differ, they are represented in separate tables. The results of individual 
symbol evaluation could be found in Table 15.  
52 
 
Table 15. Validation survey – evaluation of individual symbols 
Language Concept Novice users Expert users 
new old total support new old total support 
BPMN Business Asset 22 1 23 95.65% 13 3 16 81.25% 
Information System Asset 17 6 23 73.91% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Vulnerability 15 8 23 65.22% 4 12 16 25.00% 
Attack Method 17 6 23 73.91% 8 8 16 50.00% 
Security Requirement 17 6 23 73.91% 12 4 16 75.00% 
Threat Agent 20 3 23 86.96% 13 3 16 81.25% 
Secure Tropos Business Asset 19 4 23 82.61% 15 1 16 93.75% 
Information System Asset 18 5 23 78.26% 16 0 16 100.00% 
Threat 18 5 23 78.26% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Vulnerability 22 1 23 95.65% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Attack Method 20 3 23 86.96% 12 4 16 75.00% 
Security Requirement 19 4 23 82.61% 15 1 16 93.75% 
Criterion 20 3 23 86.96% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Threat Agent 20 3 23 86.96% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Mal-activity Di-
agrams 
Business Asset 18 5 23 78.26% 12 4 16 75.00% 
Information System Asset 18 5 23 78.26% 13 3 16 81.25% 
Impact 19 4 23 82.61% 15 1 16 93.75% 
Attack Method 17 6 23 73.91% 12 4 16 75.00% 
Security Requirement 17 6 23 73.91% 16 0 16 100.00% 
Control 18 5 23 78.26% 15 1 16 93.75% 
Threat Agent 19 4 23 82.61% 16 0 16 100.00% 
Misuse Cases Business Asset 12 11 23 52.17% 11 5 16 68.75% 
Information System Asset 21 2 23 91.30% 14 2 16 87.50% 
Impact 19 4 23 82.61% 16 0 16 100.00% 
Vulnerability 19 4 23 82.61% 16 0 16 100.00% 
Attack Method 16 7 23 69.57% 10 6 16 62.50% 
Security Requirement 9 14 23 39.13% 13 3 16 81.25% 
Criterion 19 4 23 82.61% 13 3 16 81.25% 
Threat Agent 16 7 23 69.57% 13 3 16 81.25% 
As it could be seen on the table above, the level of support for the new symbols (augmented 
with designed icons) is overwhelming, and it could be said that survey participants clearly 
prefer the icon-enriched notations over the traditional ones. However, certain individual 
symbols are not well-perceived by the novice and expert users audiences (highlighted with 
red in the table above). This is the case for BPMN notation, where redesigned symbol, de-
picting Vulnerability are deemed inferior to previous designs. Similar situation is observed 
also with Misuse Cases, where support for Security Requirement is also quite low. In order 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the expert users’ evaluation, mean support for each 
of 10 concepts was also calculated and could be found in Table 16.  
Table 16. Validation survey – aggregation over concepts 
Concepts Novice users Expert users 
Occurrences Mean (support) Occurrences Mean (support) 
Attack Method 4 76.09% 4 65.63% 
Business Asset 4 77.17% 4 79.69% 
Control 1 78.26% 1 93.75% 
Criterion 2 84.78% 2 84.38% 
Impact 2 82.61% 2 96.88% 
Information System Asset 4 80.43% 4 89.06% 
Security Requirement 4 67.39% 4 87.50% 
Threat 1 78.26% 1 87.50% 
Threat Agent 4 81.52% 4 87.50% 
Vulnerability 3 81.16% 3 70.83% 
Based on the numbers, shown in Table 15 and Table 16, it could be said that certain indi-
vidual symbols, having support of less than 50% is indeed not the best candidates and should 
be further investigated before they could potentially be introduced into respective notations. 
The detailed results of model-matching (by expert users) could be found in Appendix XVIII.  
At the same time, aggregated support figures, shown in Table 16, indicate that overall sup-
port for introduced icons is quite high, especially among the naïve users. Expert users are 
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also quite enthusiastic about the potential of freshly designed icons, as the lowest mean 
support (for Attack Method) is nevertheless on the 65% level.  
As for the evaluation of model-matching survey component, it was decided to adapt overall 
approach of Caire et al. (2013) and apply the measures of hit rate (percentage of correct 
symbols) and semantic transparency coefficient (describes connection between design and 
symbol definition). It is also noted in (Caire et al., 2013) that effective notational symbols 
should respect the ISO 9186 comprehensibility threshold which is 67% hit rate. Overview 
of mean hit rate and semantic transparency, grouped by ISSRM concepts, could be found in 
Table 17.  
Table 17. Notational comparison – aggregation over concepts 
Concept Icon-enriched notations Existing notations 
Novice users Expert users Novice users 
Oc-
cur-
rence
s 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
Mean (se-
mant. 
transp. co-
efficient) 
Occur-
rences 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
Mean (se-
mant. transp. 
coefficient) 
Occur-
rences 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
Mean (se-
mant. transp. 
coefficient) 
Attack 
Method 
4 82.61
% 
0.80 4 98.44% 0.98 4 29.66
% 
0.19 
Business As-
set 
4 40.22
% 
0.31 4 87.50% 0.85 4 28.39
% 
0.17 
Control 1 65.22
% 
0.59 1 81.25% 0.78 1 20.34
% 
0.07 
Criterion 3 39.13
% 
0.30 3 75.00% 0.71 3 23.73
% 
0.12 
Impact 2 65.22
% 
0.60 2 100.00
% 
1.00 2 29.66
% 
0.19 
Information 
System As-
set 
4 43.48
% 
0.35 4 90.63% 0.89 4 28.81
% 
0.18 
Security Re-
quirement 
4 59.78
% 
0.54 4 89.06% 0.87 4 25.85
% 
0.14 
Threat 1 52.17
% 
0.45 1 87.50% 0.86 1 20.34
% 
0.09 
Threat Agent 4 78.26
% 
0.75 4 98.44% 0.98 4 41.53
% 
0.32 
Vulnerabil-
ity 
3 56.52
% 
0.50 3 93.75% 0.93 3 29.38
% 
0.19 
It could be seen that the lowest mean hit rate for answers by expert users is 75%, which is 
still within the ISO threshold. Icons seem to considerably change the hit rate for novice 
users, since 4 concepts out of icon-enriched notations have reached the required hit rate 
threshold while numbers for existing versions of notations are significantly below required 
67%. 
However, it should also be noticed that according to detailed model-matching figures, rep-
resented in Appendix XVIII, expert users were unable to correctly distinguish Criterion  
symbol in extended BPMN notation, as it’s hit rate (62%) is slightly below established ISO 
threshold. Thus, it could be concluded that icon for Criterion should receive additional at-
tention before it would be fully suitable for implementation.  
Finally, descriptive statistics for the modelling languages (answers by expert users) could 
be seen in Table 18.  
54 
 
Table 18. Notational comparison – aggregation over languages 
Lan-
guag
es 
Icon-enriched notations Existing notations 
Novice users Expert users Novice users 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
SD 
(hit 
rate
) 
Mean 
(semant. 
transp. 
coeffi-
cient) 
SD (se-
mant. 
transp. 
coeffi-
cient) 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
SD 
(hit 
rate
) 
Mean 
(semant. 
transp. 
coeffi-
cient) 
SD (se-
mant. 
transp. 
coeffi-
cient) 
Mean 
(hit 
rate) 
SD 
(hit 
rate
) 
Mean 
(semant. 
transp. 
Coeffi-
cient) 
SD (se-
mant. 
transp. 
Coeffi-
cient) 
BPM
N 
55.28
% 
20.5
0 
0.48 0.24 89.29
% 
5 0.88 0.15 33.41
% 
10.3
0 
0.22 0.12 
Mal-
activ-
ity 
Dia-
gram
s 
67.08
% 
18.7
6 
0.62 0.22 91.96
% 
3 0.91 0.12 27.60
% 
9.11 0.16 0.11 
Mis-
use 
Cases 
59.78
% 
15.8
9 
0.54 0.18 91.41
% 
2 0.90 0.10 29.03
% 
6.75 0.19 0.08 
Se-
cure 
Trop
os 
52.17
% 
17.8
5 
0.45 0.20 91.41
% 
1 0.90 0.07 27.12
% 
8.74 0.17 0.10 
Ideo-
gram
s 
57.83
% 
14.9
3 
0.53 0.17 90.00
% 
4 0.89 0.14 NA NA NA NA 
As for the overall perceptiveness of modeling language, which could be described through 
hit rate and semantic transparency coefficient, figures in the Table 18 show that notations, 
augmented with proposed iconset, are quite efficient in conveying meanings of concepts. At 
the same time, the table above indicates that the idea of Ideogram notation, based strictly on 
introduced icons, is not that efficient and its performance is on the level with traditional 
notations, complemented with iconset. However, similar performance could be also at-
tributed to the fact that survey participants were already familiar with traditional notations, 
which was not the case with Ideograms.  
8.3 Threats to Validity 
It should be taken into the account that survey conclusion could also be impacted by the 
selection of metrics. While  hit rate and semantical transparency coefficient have been ap-
probated in (Caire et al., 2013), measure of support was not previously utilized in the pro-
vided manner.  
While survey was proposed for all the students (total of 67), taking security risk modelling-
related class at the University of Tartu, only 16 of them decided to complete the survey 
which was advertised as one of the tools to further improve modelling skills. So, it could be 
assumed that only the motivated students, interested in the domain, decided to answer all 
the questions and provide materials for analysis. Motivation and dedication towards survey 
most likely is also projected on the content of the course as well, which means that students 
from the survey audience could be considered more skilful in SRM modelling. Additionally, 
it should be said that the majority of participants are enrolled into the Cybersecurity curric-
ulum, further reinforcing the motivation to contribute to the survey. Thus, it is reasonable 
to conclude that high numbers for hit rate and semantic transparency coefficient are at least 
partially caused by student’s knowledge of notation elements (concepts of four languages 
were introduced to the audience during several preceding lectures) and could not be at-
tributed solely to the visual effectiveness of symbols, augmented with introduced iconset.  
It is also possible to suppose that through the provided questions survey participants were 
able to deduce the survey aims and answered accordingly. Having just recently learned four 
modelling notations, representatives of target audience definitely should not be very thrilled 
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with the perspective to relearn the meanings of additional symbols, which were to be intro-
duced as a direct result of the survey.   
8.4 Summary 
RQ4.2 Should designed iconic symbols be refined prior to the implementation into the sub-
sequent versions of security-risk oriented notations? 
Results of validation survey provided a comprehensive picture on the perception of pro-
posed iconset by target audience. Since symbols are validated once they comply with set 
thresholds, design of several proposed symbols should be altered before they could be in-
troduced to the modeling notations. Vulnerability icon, as currently available in Secure 
BPMN, was clearly preferred by the participants over the redesigned version. According to 
the hit rate, icon for Criterion (in Secure BPMN as well) should also be modernized as it 
has scored below the defined threshold.  Details on symbols which might be refined could 
be found in Table 19.  
Table 19. Icons for refinement 
Symbol Language Metrics Audience Issue 
Vulnerability BPMN Support Expert users Quite low (25%), major-
ity of participants prefer 
previous version 
Security Requirement Misuse Cases Support Novice users Quite low (39%), major-
ity of participants prefer 
previous version 
Criterion BPMN Hit rate Expert users Less than ISO threshold 
RQ4.1 Are security risk-oriented notations, augmented with iconic symbols, more effective? 
Finally, it is now interesting to look at the performance of hit rate (key metrics) in the three 
distinct datasets (existing notations, novice users; icon-enriched notations, novice users; 
icon-enriched notations, expert users). Numbers, aggregated by language concepts, could 
be found in Table 20.  
Table 20. Mean hit rate by concepts 
Concepts Mean (hit rate) 
Existing notations Icon-enriched notation 
Novice users Novice users Expert users 
Attack method 29.66% 82.61% 98.44% 
Business Asset 28.39% 40.22% 87.50% 
Control 20.34% 65.22% 81.25% 
Impact 29.66% 65.22% 100.00% 
Information System Asset 28.81% 43.48% 90.63% 
Criterion 23.73% 39.13% 75.00% 
Security Requirement 25.85% 59.78% 89.06% 
Threat 20.34% 52.17% 87.50% 
Threat Agent 41.53% 78.26% 98.44% 
Vulnerability 29.38% 56.52% 93.75% 
On the table above, it could be clearly seen that icon-enriched notations are superior to tra-
ditional ones, and addition of icons allows to achieve significant raise in hit rate. While 
traditional notations require steep learning curve, as evidenced by mean hit rate not raising 
above 41%, icon-enriched notations at least partially allow unexperienced users to grasp the 
security-related concepts from the first glance, as four concepts already have hit rate higher 
than ISO threshold.  
Mean hit rates, aggregated by modelling languages, could be found in Table 21.  
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Table 21. Mean hit rate by languages 
Languages Mean (hit rate) 
Existing notations Icon-enriched notations 
novice users novice users expert users 
BPMN 33.41% 55.28% 89.29% 
Mal-activity Diagrams 27.60% 67.08% 91.96% 
Misuse Cases 29.03% 59.78% 91.41% 
Secure Tropos 27.12% 52.17% 91.41% 
Ideograms Not applicable 57.83% 90.00% 
As it could be percieved from the table above, overall hit rate for the languages within par-
ticipant groups stays overall on the same level, with insignificant fluctuations. The only 
deviation is Mal-activity Diagrams, having mean support equal to ISO minimum in icon-
enriched version. It should also be noted that Ideogram (icon-based) notation does not actu-
ally stand out, as it has hit rate similar to other notations. Thus, it could be said that design 
of separate icon-based notation is not justifiable in terms of increasing hit rate and improv-
ing perception.  
Performed empirical experiment has shown that notational symbols, augmented with icons, 
are clearly preferred by end users over previous depictions and could indeed increase the 
cognitive effectiveness.  
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9 Conclusion 
Finally, the last chapter is providing overall summarization of concluded work, as well as 
drawing broad outline of future tasks to be conducted.  
9.1 Summary 
Overview of Security Risk Management domain has identified the lack of design rationale 
behind available SRM-extended modelling notations. Results of analysis, performed ac-
cording to the Physics of Notations theory, were reinforced by the outcomes of empirical 
survey and have shown the actual intuitiveness and inefficiency of current modelling nota-
tions. Following the established process of “notational crowdsourcing”, a set of semantically 
transparent icon designs has been obtained from the community of security modelling ex-
perts. Survey among potential end users allowed to choose best-of-breed icon for each of 13 
ISSRM concepts. Proposed icon set was evaluated with a concluding survey and acquired 
results have shown the superiority of icon-augmented notations over the traditional ones. 
While the introduction of semantically transparent icons is not the only possible approach 
to improve the effectiveness of modelling notations, obtained quantative data indicate that 
it’s an effective way to increase hit rate, overall intuitiveness and reduce learning curve.  
9.2 Answers to Research Questions 
MRQ. How to improve visual effectiveness and intuitiveness of modelling notations for se-
curity risk management? 
One empirically proven approach to further improve the effectiveness and intuitiveness of 
SRM-oriented notations is to augment existing concept symbols with semantically transpar-
ent icons. However, this is not the only possible approach, and additional improvements 
could be made by fully aligning the notations with PoN principles, proposed by Moody 
(2009a).  
RQ1. What is the state of the art in the domains of security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages and visual notation analysis? 
Available security-risk oriented modelling languages are derived from the traditional mod-
elling languages and are constructed by extending general-purpose modelling languages to 
support a set of concepts, described in ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al., 2010). The 
established standard in visual notation analysis is the Physics of Notation theory, described 
in a seminal paper by Moody (2009a). Proposed analytical approach is specifically tailored 
for notational assessment and refinement and has been widely used by the researchers (Gra-
nada et al., 2017).  
RQ2. How are current security risk-oriented modelling notations evaluated? 
According to the empirical research, existing notations are rather poorly percieved by the 
end users without previous exposure to SRM-related notations. Performed PoN analysis has 
also revealed issues with cognitive efficiency from the theoretical perspective.    
RQ3. What visual icons could be introduced into available security risk-oriented modelling 
notations? 
Perspective icons could be obtained through a well-established crowdsourcing process, de-
scribed in (Leitner et al., 2013) and (El Kouhen et al., 2015). Unlike in the traditional nota-
tion design process, candidate icons are to be drawn by the potential notation end users.  
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RQ4. How could the effectiveness of security risk-oriented modelling notations be evalu-
ated? 
Effectiveness could be measured with the help of metrics, introduced in (Caire et al., 2013), 
namely hit rate and semantic transparency coefficient. While those metrics are calculated 
for each component (concept) separately, aggregated numbers could provide an overall no-
tational characteristic.  
Executed experiments indicate that notations, complemented with icons, are favoured by 
end users and, as evidenced by increase in hit rate and semantic transparency coefficient, 
could increase the overall cognitive effectiveness of ISSRM-extended notations.  
9.3 Limitations 
First of all, it should be said that perception of visual symbols is heavily dependent on cul-
tural background. While surveys were perfomed in different countries (Ukraine, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Estonia), characterized by distinct cultures, traditions and historical cir-
cumstances, all three countries nevertheless have strong ties with pan-European identity. 
Thus, it could be concluded that observed connection between raise in hit rate and introduc-
tion of icons may not be applicable in worldwide context.  
Design of surveys (especially of Validation survey) was done in a way that participants were 
shown individual symbols (along with their titles) prior to being asked to identify the same 
symbols on the provided models. So, it could be assumed that success in matching elements 
of models (symbols) with their titles could be partially attributed to the fact that survey 
participants were using visual resemblance with previously seen individual symbols and not 
just visual appearance of diagrams.  
Moreover, it should be also noted that based on the design of questionnaires, participants 
could have understood the purpose of performed surveys.  This might especially be the case 
for Validation survey, as students, having relatively recently learned the ISSRM-extended 
notation, could have had limited motivation to identify icon-enriched notations as superior 
since that would result in extensive re-learning.  
9.4 Future Work 
While as noted in subchapter 8.4, several symbols might need additional refinement and 
consideration, proposed unified set of icons could overall be utilized in the subsequent up-
date of SRM-related notations and is suggested to be introduced in the refined versions of 
Secure BPMN, Secure Tropos, Mal-activity Diagrams and Misuse Cases.  
Since as of now SRM-extended modelling notations are not supported by CASE tools, it is 
also proposed to design a universal security risk modelling-related tool with support of both 
available SRM notations and icons from proposed iconset.  
Finally, it should also be noted that proposed introduction of semantically transparent icons 
is only one of possible approaches to improve the cognitive efficiency of modelling nota-
tions. Since the implementation of proposed iconset covers limited number of PoN princi-
ples, additional improvements of notational intuitiveness and visual effectiveness could be 
achieved via ensuring complete compliance to the Physics of Notation guidelines.   
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Appendix 
I. Notation Overview 
While detailed description of extension process is out of scope of this paper,  comparison of 
extended modeling languages, adopted from (Matulevičius, 2017), could be found below. 
Figure 3 represents the comparison of asset-related concepts. Figure 4 shows the compara-
tive table of risk-related concepts. Finally,  Figure 5 depicts the contrast between the repre-
sentation of risk treatment-related concepts.  
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of asset-related concepts, adopted from (Matulevičius, 2017) 
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Figure 4. Comparison of risk-related concepts, adopted from (Matulevičius, 2017) 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of risk treatment-related concepts, adopted from (Matulevičius, 
2017) 
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II. Secure BPMN – Physics of Notation Summary 
According to Genon et al. (2010). 
PoN Principle Description 
Semiotic clarity 23.6 % symbol deficit, 5.4% symbol overload, 0.5% symbol excess, 0.5% symbol 
redundancy. While symbol overload and excess could be overlooked, symbol def-
icit should be dealt with.  
Perceptual discriminability Discriminability should be increased by the usage of shape categories. Extensive 
utilization of colour should also be introduced. 
Semantic transparency Symbol shapes are not semantically transparent and have no rationale behind the 
shape selection, existing BPMN icons are semantically opaque and should be re-
placed.  
Complexity management Existing modularization mechanisms are sufficient.  
Cognitive integration No technique is offered to reinforce integration. Integrations could be improved 
by introducing diagram level numbering, signposting and navigation maps.  
Visual expressiveness While visual variables are chosen appropriately, colour is underused.   
Dual coding While no issue is noted, text could be further used to facilitate dual coding and 
decrease the overall number of employed symbols.    
Graphic economy Models currently have a graphic complexity of 171. This is way over the limit, 
especially for novice users, and should be improved by utilizing dual coding.  
Cognitive fit While the most common symbols are basic shapes, well-suited for representation 
in different media, no differentiation between notations for novices and experts is 
offered. So, it might be beneficial to introduce separate language dialects.  
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III. UML – Physics of Notation Summary 
According to Moody & van Hillegersberg (2008).  
PoN Principle Description 
Semiotic clarity Levels of symbol redundancy, overload, and symbol excess are unacceptably high 
and should be reduced. Unnecessary symbols should be excluded, existing sym-
bols should be further differentiated between each other, symbol should act as a 
sole representative of a concept.  
Perceptual discriminability Current symbols are not especially discriminable, only one visual variable (shape) 
is used for differentiating, selected shapes are similar and often confused. Symbols 
should have a unique value on at least one visual variable, shapes for various con-
structs should be easily distinguishable.  
Semantic transparency /Perceptual imme-
diacy  
UML heavily relies on abstract shapes which do not convey meaning, out of all 
diagram types icons currently are allowed to be used only in Use Case Diagrams. 
Perceptually direct shapes instead of simple ones should be used where possible, 
usage of icons should be extended. Since spatial relationships are more transparent 
for end-users than arrow-based they should be extensively utilized as well.  
Visual expressiveness Only two visual variables (shape and value) are used in the majority of diagrams, 
colour is specifically avoided. Since colour is cognitively efficient, it should be 
introduced and employed across the diagrams. Encoding should be graphical ra-
ther than textual, as the cognitive effectiveness of the text is lower. 
Graphic economy/ Graphic parsimony Graphic complexity is overwhelming and should be reduced. Number of con-
structs in each diagram type is to be shortened, while number of visual variables 
to differentiate between symbols should be increased.  
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IV. i* - Physics of Notation Summary 
According to Moody et al. (2010). 
 
  
PoN Principle Description 
Semiotic clarity Symbol redundancy and overload are present, with symbol overload being a par-
ticularly significant issue. Redundancy should be solved by ensuring that each 
concept is denoted by a sole symbol, additional visual variables should be used.  
Perceptual discriminability Shape similarity between symbols is indicated and should be removed. Since re-
lationships are differentiated primarily by the means of text, and their representa-
tion is not discriminable, text should be replaced by visual symbols.  
Semantic transparency Semantic transparency is heavily underused, most symbols are represented by ab-
stract shapes. Transparent notation symbols and icons should be utilized to im-
prove the level of transparency.   
Complexity management Overcomplexity of diagrams is a serious issue, effective complexity management 
mechanisms are missing. Decomposition of all constructs and diagram partition-
ing should be introduced, recursive decomposition capability should be present as 
well.    
Cognitive integration Not quite a problem since only two diagrams are available, could be problematic 
once complexity management is introduced. Diagram names should be replaced 
with more specific ones, diagram types should be linked, it would be beneficial to 
introduce contextual and overview diagram (map).  
Visual expressiveness Three visual variables are utilized, overall expressiveness is sufficient. However, 
colour should be used more effectively, and additional visual variables could be 
introduced to increase distinguishability. 
Dual coding No use of dual coding, graphics either text. Relationships should be labelled; sup-
portive definitions and textual annotations should be introduced.  
Graphic economy Graphic complexity is currently overwhelming, especially for a novice user. 
Number of constructs should be decreased; different diagram types could also re-
duce the graphic complexity of each type. Certain symbols could be shown in 
form, other than graphical, and usage of multiple variables would also expand the 
differentiating ability.  
Cognitive fit Single visual dialect is currently available. Several dialects should be introduced 
based on the knowledge level (expert vs novice), cultural background and repre-
sentation medium (simplified for hand sketching and enriched). 
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V. Analysis of Secure BPMN 
First of all, it should be noted that a thorough analysis of non-extended BPMN from the 
PoN viewpoint was done in (Genon et al., 2010) and is summarized in Appendix II. Thus, 
analysis of traditional BPMN is out of scope and is not performed. This chapter is focused 
solely on the analysis of security-extended BPMN, encompassing the ISSRM concepts as 
proposed in (Altuhhova et al., 2013).  
Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
According to the theory of symbols, defined by Goodman (1968), for a notation to satisfy 
the requirements of notational system, there should be a 1:1 correspondence between sym-
bols and the relevant concepts. Thus, prior to performing the analysis it is essential to define 
the symbol set and concept set as used in ISSRM-extended BPMN. As for the concept set, 
definition is relatively straightforward, and 13 ISSRM concepts covered in (Dubois et al., 
2010) could be characterized as language concepts. To distinguish the symbol set, it should 
be taken into consideration that symbols for certain concepts are composite and not unique 
across the symbol set. Thus, it is possible to identify a list of symbols along with their cate-
gory, which is to de defined as unique, combined or not represented. Symbol set of extended 
BPMN is depicted in Table 22.  
Table 22. Symbol set of ISSRM-extended BPMN 
ISSRM BPMN Symbol Category 
Business Asset 
 
Unique 
IS Asset 
 
Unique 
Threat agent 
 
Unique 
Impact 
 
Unique 
Security criterion 
 
Unique 
Vulnerability 
 
Unique 
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Assets 
 
Unique 
Attack method 
 
Unique 
Security requirement 
 
Unique 
Risk Combination of Event and Impact Combined 
Event Combination of Vulnerability and Treat Combined 
Threat Combination of Attack method and 
Threat agent 
Combined 
Risk treatment - Not represented 
Control - Not represented 
 
Based on the provided symbols list, analysis of the extended BPMN notation could be per-
formed from the Semiotic Clarity perspective. For the purposes of analysis, four anoma-
lies, as defined in (Moody, 2009a), are to be considered: symbol redundancy, symbol 
overload, symbol excess and symbol deficit. These anomalies could be defined as follows. 
• Symbol redundancy: 1 construct – several symbols. 
• Symbol overload: 1 symbol – several constructs. 
• Symbol excess: 1 symbol – no constructs. 
• Symbol deficit: 1 construct – no symbols. 
Following the provided definitions, it is now possible to quantify the cases of anomalies. 
Information System Asset is a clear occurrence of symbol redundancy, as one construct 
could be represented by two symbols. As for the symbol overload, this seems to be the 
incident of Information System Asset-Threat Agent, as two concepts are represented by a 
similar symbol of pool with difference only in colour appearance. Same situation could be 
observed with Assets – Attack Method – Security Requirement, as they are as well repre-
sented by a combination of three similar BPMN symbols (task, event and gateway) with 
only colour of task symbol ensuring the differentiation. Symbol deficit clearly occurs with 
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Risk Treatment and Control, since there are no corresponding symbols in extension, pro-
vided by Altuhhova et al. (2013). Additionally, three other concepts, namely Risk, Event 
and Threat, suffer from symbol deficit as they are represented not by a dedicated symbol, 
but rather by amalgamation of existing ones, used on their own to denote other concepts. 
Furthermore, as defined by (Matulevičius, 2017), three other concepts (Security Criterion, 
Impact and Vulnerability) are affected by symbol deficit since not all aspects of those 
ISSRM concepts could be represented with proposed symbols. Finally, three concepts – 
Assets, Attack Method and Security Requirements –  exhibit symbol excess as they are rep-
resented by a combination of three BPMN symbols (task, event and gateway) which on their 
own do not depict any of ISSRM concepts. Based on the abovementioned clarity-related 
issues, relevant modifications to problematic symbols should be introduced on the nota-
tional level.  
Principle of Perceptual Discriminability  
Perceptual discriminability is defined as both the simplicity and the accuracy with which 
the graphical symbols could be told apart (Moody, 2009a). As such, discriminability is de-
termined by visual distance between symbols, which could be characterized as a number of 
visual variables on which they differentiate and number of perceptible steps. Thus, prior to 
performing the analysis, it would be required to define a set of visual variables, currently 
used in ISSRM-extended BPMN notation. Based on the symbol set overview, presented in 
Table 22, it is possible to deduce that four visual variables, namely colour, shape, size and 
texture (appearance of borders) are currently employed for the discriminability purposes. 
While 4 visual variables should be sufficient to ensuring distinguishable symbol appearance, 
this not the case due to the particularities of variable application in the notation design.   
The prime visual variable, shape, is presently applied in a suboptimal manner. While selec-
tion of shapes allows distinction between representations of Business Assets and Infor-
mation System Asset, same could not be said about other symbols. Information System As-
set and Threat are represented by an identical shape, based on the pool symbol of non-ex-
tended BPMN, and could be differentiated only by colour. Same occurs in the group of three 
concepts (Assets, Attack Method, Security Requirement), which are represented by a com-
bination of similar shapes, derived from BPMN symbols of task, event and gateway. Fol-
lowing the abovementioned pattern, these symbols could be represented only by colour. 
Finally, Impact and Security Criterion are represented by a similar shape of lock with dif-
ferences in lock shackle appearance, denoting a degree of similarity as well as ensuring 
differentiation from other concepts.  
As for the usage of colour, it should be said that colour could be used to improve discrimi-
nability between symbols but should not serve as only means of discrimination. However, 
Altuhhova et al. (2013) propose colour coding to distinguish between various groups of 
ISSRM constructs (asset-related, risk related and risk treatment related). This approach re-
sults in situation when two groups of concepts (Information System Asset – Threat Agent 
and Assets – Attack Method – Security Requirement) could be distinguished only by colour, 
which is not acceptable. While Altuhhova et al. (2013) acknowledge familiarity with PoN 
principles and suggest that alternative notation could be designed for black/white printing 
purposes, colour as single means of discrimination is not a good practice due to several other 
reasons, including colour blindness, and should be complimented by additional visual vari-
able. Colour is especially effective for redundant coding, allowing easy discrimination and 
high degree of visual pop-out. However, in the proposed BPMN notation colour is used as 
a distinguishable variable and it’s redundant coding potential is not exploited. Thus, it 
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should be said that abovementioned symbols require the addition of extra visual variable, 
such as shape (iconic) or texture, for the discriminability purposes.  
Due to the specifics of notation size is not extensively utilized. However, it seems quite in 
place for distinction of what could be called “add-on concepts”, as symbols for Vulnerabil-
ity, Impact and Security Criterion are to be applied on top of other symbols and are notice-
ably smaller.  
Finally, usage of texture (border appearance) is limited, and only two solid styles of border 
line (single solid and double solid) are utilized across the symbol set. Since in comparison 
with traditional BPMN texture seems underexploited, it might be a good idea to expand the 
texture appearance options and use texture to ensure effective distinction between the sym-
bols, currently discriminated only by colour. Finally, It could be concluded that while num-
ber of used visual variables is expected to ensure sufficient discriminability between sym-
bols, number of poor design choices hamper the visual distance between symbols and affect 
discriminability in a negative way.  
Principle of Semantic Transparency  
Semantic transparency is to be defined as how well could the meaning of the symbol be 
deduced from its visual appearance. Semantic transparency, defining how well the symbols 
provide cues to their meaning, could be described by one of three states (Moody, 2009a), 
which are semantically immediate, semantically opaque or semantically perverse.  
So, semantic transparency is to be determined for each symbol. Transparency characteristics 
of extended BPMN symbol set (only unique category) are covered in the Table 23.  
Table 23. Semantical transparency of extended BPMN symbol set 
ISSRM BPMN Semantic Transparency Sign type 
Business Asset 
 
Perverse Iconic 
IS Asset 
 
Opaque/ 
Immediate 
Symbolic/ 
Iconic 
Threat agent 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Impact 
 
Immediate Iconic 
Security criterion 
 
Immediate Iconic 
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Vulnerability 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Assets 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Attack method 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Security requirement 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
 
Based on the guidelines, provided in (Moody, 2009a), it could be said that semantically 
pervasive symbols should be redesigned, and semantical immediateness is to be embraced 
whenever possible. As for the semantically immediate symbols, one way to achieve imme-
diateness is to implement icons instead of abstract symbolic signs. Icons are utilized in ex-
tended BPMN notation, and all semantically immediate symbols (Impact, Security Criterion 
and partially Information System Asset), as defined in Table 23, are in fact icons. However, 
usage of icons is not so straightforward, as shown in the situation with Business Asset and 
previously described in (Genon et al., 2010). While data object symbol is an icon, its visual 
appearance resembles stick-it note and bears no association with Business Asset whatso-
ever. Since semantically perverse symbols are confusing the notation end users, best prac-
tice is to have them redesigned.  
As for the opaque symbols, a clear pattern of them being symbolic signs is also visible. 
Overall, usage of semantically opaque symbols is permissible. However, it should be noted 
that replacement of abstract shapes by icons is makes the diagrams friendlier to novices. 
Additionally, it should be mentioned that icons are encouraged to be used along the other 
visual variables to ensure redundant coding and improve symbol discriminability. Taking 
into consideration the results of discriminability analysis, performed in subchapter 0, aug-
mentation of existing symbols by introduced icons would ensure effective redundant coding 
and improve the visual pop-out. Thus, it is recommended to augment the symbolic appear-
ance of Information System Asset (pool sign), Threat Agent, Assets, Attack method and 
Security requirement with semantically immediate icons.  
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Finally, Vulnerability symbol is also semantically opaque and should be refined. Even 
though, as defined in (Matulevičius, 2017), Vulnerability concept in BPMN serves in a lim-
ited role of Vulnerability point, it’s current shape is that of square. Thus, it is recommended 
to replace the square with a circle, which is expected to be semantically immediate repre-
sentation of vulnerability point.  
Principle of Complexity Management 
Complexity management is defined as ability of a visual notation to depict information 
while not overflooding human mind (Moody, 2009a). While complexity here sounds some-
what vague, it could be further defined as number of elements on a diagram. As such, com-
plexity impacts key metrics, which are as perceptual limits and cognitive limits.  
While complexity is a diagram-level issue, possible improvements are to be performed on 
the notation level. It should also be mentioned that effective techniques include modulari-
zation and hierarchical organization (Moody, 2009a). Since ISSRM-extended BPMN on the 
notational level is similar to the non-extended version, it seems justified to start the analysis 
from stating information, adopted from the paper by Genon et al. (2010).  
So, BPMN 2.0 provides several mechanisms to deal with the complexity of diagrams, in-
cluding viewpoints, Link Events and Sub Processes. Viewpoints provide modelling along 4 
different viewpoints that correspond to the 4 different types of diagrams. Link Events com-
bined with Sub Processes enable vertical decomposition of diagrams in two levels: high-
level view (collapsed sub process) and a fine-grained one (expanded sub process). Structur-
ing, which could be achieved by Sub processes, allows the system to be represented with 
different detalization levels. However, as noted by Genon et al. (2010), different levels 
should be represented in independent diagrams instead of expanding into parent diagrams.  
While all the above-mentioned information is applicable to extended BPMN, there are also 
certain extension-specific features. As proposed by Altuhhova et al. (2013), three groups of 
ISSRM concepts are colour coded and differentiated between each other. Thus, diagram 
levels could be organized not only on the basis of detalization levels, but derived from dis-
tinct groups of ISSRM concepts.  
Principle of Cognitive Integration  
Cognitive integration should be applied when system is represented by more than one dia-
gram. The idea is that since relevant information is spread across a number of diagrams, 
diagram readers often struggle with keeping the current position and comprehending the 
complete picture. For the multiple diagrams to be cognitively effective, they are to include 
integration mechanisms (Moody, 2009a), which are conceptual integration and perceptual 
integration. As it was already mentioned in the Complexity Management principle, BPMN 
notation supports multiple diagrams. However, as pointed out by Genon et al. (2010), no 
technique is available to reinforce perceptual or conceptual integration. Out of a pool of 
mechanisms, including diagram level numbering, signposting, navigational maps, none are 
currently implemented. As suggested by Genon et al. (2010), navigational map could be 
created on the basis of Link Events and Sub Processes. As for the contextualization, it is 
partially achieved by the integration of expanded Sub Processes into parent Activities. Since 
extended BPMN in terms of cognitive integration is similar to non-extended one, proposed 
changes could also be considered and implemented.  
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Principle of Visual Expressiveness 
Visual expressiveness could be defined as a number of visual variables, used in a notation 
and evaluating overall exploitation of available design space (Moody, 2009a). Based on the 
visual expressiveness metrics, visual variables of the notation could be divided between two 
subsets, which are information-carrying variables, and free variables.  
According to the distribution between visual expressiveness and degrees of visual freedom, 
notations could range from nonvisual (expressiveness = 0, 8 degrees of freedom) to visually 
saturated (expressiveness = 8, 0 degrees of freedom). The Table 24 summarizes information 
on power (highest measurement level that could be encoded), capacity (number of possible 
values for each variable) and values as employed in extended BPMN. Information regarding 
power and capacity of visual variables is adopted from (Moody, 2009a), while the overall 
representation style is taken from (Genon et al., 2010).  
Table 24. Visual variables of BPMN, partially adopted from (Moody, 2009a) 
Visual Variable Power Capacity Extended BPMN values 
Horizontal position (x) Interval 10-15 Enclosure 
Vertical position (y) Interval  10-15 Enclosure 
Size  Interval  20 Normal (symbolic repre-
sentation), small (iconic 
representation) 
Colour Nominal 7-10 Black, red, yellow, grey, 
blue, dark red, pink, azure.  
Texture Nominal 2-5 single solid, double solid 
Shape Nominal Unlimited circle, roundangle, dia-
mond, rectangle, various 
icon shapes   
Brightness  Ordinal 6-7 Not utilized 
Orientation Nominal 4 Not utilized 
 
As it could be seen from the Table 24, ISSRM-extended BPMN has a visual expressiveness 
of 6 and is characterized by 2 degrees of visual freedom. However, it should be mentioned 
that while visually 6-dimensional notation of extended BPMN is considered to be sufficient 
for the discriminability purposes (Moody, 2009a), poor design choices have a negative im-
pact on the pairwise visual variation across visual vocabulary, as described in subchapter 0.  
As for the overall overview of exploited visual variables, it is provided as follows. Both 
horizontal and vertical positions could be utilized to depict intervals. However, similar to 
the situation with non-extended BPMN (Genon et al., 2010), both variables are employed 
only to denote enclosure (location of symbol inside of another one) and are not fully ex-
ploited.  
Usage of size in extended BPMN could be characterized as a step forward, comparing with 
the non-extended version, and is closely connected to the positioning (enclosures). Since 
iconic representations are expected to be contained in another symbols, their representation 
in size differ, allowing end users to discriminate between symbols with added easiness.  
It could be said that visual variable of texture is somewhat underused, since out of 5 possible 
perceptible steps only two are currently incorporated.  
As for the colour, it’s usage in extended BPMN notation violates the best practices and 
should be refined. Currently 9 colours could be present on the diagram, meaning that 9 out 
of 10 perceptible steps are in place. However, while colour is one of the most cognitively 
effective of all visual variables (Moody, 2009a), it’s usage should follow the robust design 
guidelines. According to the robust design principles, outlined by D. Moody (2009a), colour 
could be used only for redundant coding. As it was already mentioned in subchapter 0, this 
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is not the case for the notation, proposed by Altuhhova et al. (2013), and colour is currently 
used as a sole basis of differentiation between a number of symbols. Such utilization of 
colour clearly violates the robust design principles and should be optimized by adding sup-
plemental visual variable like texture or icon-based shape. 
Considering the variable of shape, it should first be noted that it’s the only variable featuring 
unlimited capacity. As for the utilization of shapes in extended BPMN notation, it could be 
said that a combination of abstract shapes with iconic ones should provide sufficient dis-
crimination capabilities. However, as already mentioned, the majority of existing shapes, 
adopted from non-extended BPMN, suffer from being semantically opaque, with even one 
case of semantically preserve shape. So, as outlined in subchapter 0 and covered in (Genon 
et al., 2010), existing abstract shapes should be replaced or augmented by their semantically 
immediate counterparts.  
Finally, extended BPMN notations makes no use of two remaining visual variables – Bright-
ness and Orientation. While no specific details are provided, it should be noted that instead 
of potentially overloading available variables, it is possible to employ those currently not 
utilized for obtaining potential benefits from dual coding and increasing visual expressive-
ness.  
Principle of Dual Coding 
According to the dual coding theory, text and graphics in combination convey information 
better than either one of them by itself. There are several ways to encapsulate textual infor-
mation, namely annotations and hybrid symbols (Moody, 2009a). In the current version of 
notation, dual coding is used to denote four concepts – Vulnerability, Security Criterion, 
Business Asset and Information System Asset. Starting from Vulnerability depiction, it 
could be said that available symbol is not especially informative. While it was already pro-
posed to alter shape of the Vulnerability and introduce a circle instead (as more semantically 
immediate visualisation of Vulnerability point), increased visual perceptibility could also 
be achieved by refining a hybrid symbol and complementing existing graphical symbol with 
textual information. Similar pattern could also be applied to the Security Criterion, since 
current version with just first letter inside the lock shape seems to be incomplete. It could 
be assumed that addition of complete Security Criterion option name, such as “Confidence” 
for “C” letter, would include the discriminability as well as recognition of the symbol. Con-
sidering the consistence and shape similarity, it is also suggested to transform Impact sym-
bol into a hybrid one, so that the appearance of all lock-shaped symbols would be kept in 
line.  
As for the other two concepts, namely Information System Asset and Business Asset, they 
offer the example of effective dual coding usage. Thus, only possible upgrade would be the 
replacement of Business Asset icon with a more semantically immediate one.  
 Finally, it should be noted that for the remaining symbols (Threat Agent, Assets, Attack 
Method, Security Requirements), it has already been proposed to complement colour coding 
by introduction of additional icons. Since two visual variables (colour and shape) are suffi-
cient for the easy differentiation between symbols, additional colour coding would be ex-
cessive.  
Principle of Graphic Economy  
Graphic complexity is overall characterized by a amount of graphical symbols in the nota-
tion, which could be also called size of visual vocabulary. As denoted in Table 22, extended 
BPMN employs 14 symbols, and is therefore overwhelming. D. Moody (2009a) offers three 
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approaches to reduce visual vocabulary, which are reduce semantic complexity, increase 
symbol deficit and increase visual expressiveness.  
Symbol deficit is already present in the notation, so it won’t be helpful in reducing the com-
plexity. Reduction of semantic complexity is the most straightforward approach, aimed at 
analyzing the unnecessary symbols and excluding them from the notation. However, the 
overall number of symbols is specified by ISSRM domain model, and can’t really be re-
duced. Thus, the only applicable approach is related to the improvement of visual expres-
siveness by increasing the visual distance between symbols. It should be noted that analysis 
of previous Physics of Notation principles already included practical recommendations, 
such as implementation of dual coding and immediately perceptive icons. So, it could be 
concluded that refined notation would already be characterized by increased visual expres-
siveness, and no additional steps are required for improving it. Finally, it should also be 
mentioned that one additional approach to reduce semantic complexity is to implement ad-
ditional language dialect. This suggestion is further covered in the subsequent subchapter.  
Principle of Cognitive Fit 
Cognitive fit theory states that non-resembling representations of information are acceptable 
for various tasks as well as audiences. In connection with visual notation design, cognitive 
fit implies that for different audiences (especially for experts and novices) development of 
different subdialects might be required to facilitate complete understanding of visual repre-
sentation. Additionally, it might be required to develop a variety of dialects for different 
representational mediums, so that black-and-white printer, unable to transmit colours, would 
not make a notation undistinguishable (Moody, 2009a). Extended version of BPMN, devel-
oped by Altuhhova et al. (2013), would indeed require separate dialect for various mediums 
since discrimination between several concepts was based solely on colour. However, 
changes proposed in this chapter ensure that colour coding would be complemented by icons 
and therefore reduced to redundant coding. Thus, proposed changes are expected to elimi-
nate the problem, resulting in one dialect being sufficient and discriminable across all me-
diums.  
As for the expert-novice difference, there indeed might be a need for the separate notations 
for pro users and beginners. This need is further reinforced by the fact that size of visual 
vocabulary is excessive for beginner users, and separate dialect offers a convenient way of 
dictionary optimization. However, the obstacle for such a separation would be a need to 
divide symbols between essential and occasionally-used symbol sets. Since this separation 
have not yet been performed and is out of scope for this paper, separate dialects for experts 
and novices currently could not be defined. Thus, the only available strategy to mitigate 
issues with perception among novice users is extensive introduction of visually expressive 
and semantically immediate symbols.  
Conclusion  
The concentrated results of preformed analysis could be found in Table 25.  
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Table 25. Security-extended BPMN analysis 
Principle Results 
Semiotic clarity  Occurrences of symbol excess, symbol deficit, symbol redun-
dancy and symbol overload. Cases of symbol redundancy and 
symbol overload have priority to be dealt with.  
Perceptual Discriminability Shapes and colours are used suboptimally, distinction between 
symbols is complicated. Colour coding should be complemented 
by additional visual variable such as iconic shapes or texture.  
Semantic Transparency Majority of symbols are semantically opaque due to them being 
abstract shapes, should be augmented by icons. One iconic sym-
bol is semantically perverse which is not acceptable.  
Complexity Management Several mechanisms to deal with complexity are inherited from 
non-extended BPMN, they could be complemented by diagram 
structuring.  
Cognitive Integration No technique is currently available to reinforce perceptual or con-
ceptual integration. One mitigating approach would entitle the 
creation of navigational map on the basis of Link Events and Sub 
Processes.  
Visual Expressiveness Notation has a visual expressiveness of 6 and is characterized by 
2 degrees of visual freedom. However, poor design choices have 
a negative impact on the pairwise visual variation across visual 
vocabulary 
Dual Coding While hybrid symbols are already introduced, their appearance 
should be refined. Furthermore, several non-hybrid symbols 
should be transformed into hybrid ones.  
Graphic Economy Existing notation employs 14 symbols and is therefore over-
whelming.  
Applicable approach to reduce complexity of visual vocabulary 
is related to the improvement of visual expressiveness by increas-
ing the visual distance between symbols.  
Cognitive Fit While specifics of currently used dialect render it inoperable in 
case of non-colour representation, proposed changes mitigate the 
problem and eliminate the need for specific dialect. As for the 
expert-novice difference, it is considered that extensive introduc-
tion of visually expressive symbols should reduce earning chal-
lenges for novice users and would not require dedicated dialect.  
 
VI. Analysis of Secure Tropos 
The analysis of extended Secure Tropos is performed according to the notation, presented 
in (Matulevicius et al., 2012). Since authors also provided the evaluation, according to the 
semiotic clarity principle, their findings would serve as a basis for the corresponding prin-
ciple overview. Additionally, it should also be mentioned that unlike the majority of 
ISSRM-extended notation, adherence of i* notation, exploited in Secure Tropos, is already 
reviewed in (Moody et al., 2010). Thus, this analysis is built upon the results, stemming 
from the two abovementioned papers. 
Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
According to the theory of symbols, defined by Goodman (1968), for a notation to satisfy 
the requirements of notational system, there should be a 1:1 correspondence between sym-
bols and the relevant concepts. Thus, prior to performing the analysis it is essential to define 
the symbol set and concept set as used in ISSRM-extended Secure Tropos. As for the con-
cept set, definition is relatively straightforward, and 13 ISSRM concepts covered in (Mat-
ulevicius et al., 2012) could be characterized as language concepts. To distinguish the sym-
bol set, it should be taken into consideration that symbols for certain concepts are composite 
and not unique across the symbol set. Thus, it is possible to identify a list of symbols along 
with their category, which is to de defined as unique, combined or not represented. Symbol 
set of extended Secure Tropos is depicted in Table 26.   
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Table 26. Symbol set of ISSRM-extended Secure Tropos 
ISSRM Secure Tropos Symbol Category 
Threat agent 
 
Unique 
Vulnerability 
 
Unique 
Attack method 
 
Unique 
Impact 
 
Unique 
Event 
 
Unique 
Business Asset 
 
Unique  
IS Asset 
 
Unique 
Security criterion 
 
Unique 
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Security requirement 
 
Unique 
Threat 
 
Unique 
Risk Combination of Event and Impact Combined 
Risk treatment - Not represented 
Control - Not represented 
 
Based on the provided symbols list, analysis of the extended Secure Trops notation could 
be performed from the Semiotic Clarity perspective. For the purposes of analysis, four 
anomalies, as defined in (Moody, 2009a), are to be considered: symbol redundancy, sym-
bol overload, symbol excess and symbol deficit. These anomalies could be defined as fol-
lows. 
• Symbol redundancy: 1 construct – several symbols. 
• Symbol overload: 1 symbol – several constructs. 
• Symbol excess: 1 symbol – no constructs. 
• Symbol deficit: 1 construct – no symbols. 
Following the provided definitions, it is now possible to quantify the cases of anomalies. 
Information System Asset is a clear occurrence of symbol redundancy, as one construct 
could be represented by two symbols. As for the symbol overload, this seems to be the 
incident of Information System Asset-Threat Agent, as two concepts are represented by a 
similar symbol of pool with difference only in colour appearance. Same situation could be 
observed with Assets – Attack Method – Security Requirement, as they are as well repre-
sented by a combination of three similar BPMN symbols (task, event and gateway) with 
only colour of task symbol ensuring the differentiation. Symbol deficit clearly occurs with 
Risk Treatment and Control, since there are no corresponding symbols in extension, pro-
vided by Altuhhova et al. (2013). Additionally, three other concepts, namely Risk, Event 
and Threat, suffer from symbol deficit as they are represented not by a dedicated symbol, 
but rather by amalgamation of existing ones, used on their own to denote other concepts. 
Furthermore, as defined by (Matulevičius, 2017), three other concepts (Security Criterion, 
Impact and Vulnerability) are affected by symbol deficit since not all aspects of those 
ISSRM concepts could be represented with proposed symbols. Finally, three concepts – 
Assets, Attack Method and Security Requirements –  exhibit symbol excess as they are rep-
resented by a combination of three BPMN symbols (task, event and gateway) which on their 
own do not depict any of ISSRM concepts. Based on the abovementioned clarity-related 
issues, relevant modifications to problematic symbols should be introduced on the nota-
tional level.  
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Principle of Perceptual Discriminability  
Perceptual discriminability is defined as both the simplicity and the accuracy with which 
the graphical symbols could be told apart (Moody, 2009a). As such, discriminability is de-
termined by visual distance between symbols, which could be characterized as a number of 
visual variables on which they differentiate and number of perceptible steps. Thus, prior to 
performing the analysis, it would be required to define a set of visual variables, currently 
used in ISSRM-extended BPMN notation. Based on the symbol set overview, presented in 
Table 26, it is possible to deduce that three visual variables, namely shape, size and colour 
are currently employed for the discriminability purposes. While 3 visual variables should 
be overall sufficient to ensuring distinguishable symbol appearance, this not the case due to 
the particularities of variable application in the notation design.   
The prime visual variable, shape, is currently used not in the most optimal manner. While 
exploited range of shapes is quite varied and includes among other pentagon, hexagon and 
octagon, shape-based distinction within concept groups is quite complicated. This is espe-
cially the case with assets (both IS Asset and Business Asset), as they could be represented 
by almost identical rectangles of hardgoal and resource. Same should be also said about the 
Threat, depicted by a combination of goal and plan. Since hardgoal and goal are different 
only in coloring, represented by shades of same colour, differentiation becomes tangled. 
Overall, shape issues are especially noticeable within Attack method, Threat, Security Re-
quirement, Business Asset and Information Asset, with the other concepts being distinct in 
shape.  
As for the usage of colour, it should be said that coloring principles are directly transferred 
from the non-extended Secure Tropos could be characterized as suboptimal. Considering 
the fact that colors in i* are used ineffectively (Moody et al., 2010), same could be said 
about the ISSRM-extended Secure Tropos. While the color palette is extensive and varies 
from black to purple, the overall impression is that colours are chosen on a chaotic basis and 
do not embrace similarities between three major groups of ISSRM concepts. Furthermore, 
certain concepts, including Threat and Security Criterion, are depicted with a combination 
of different-colored elements, further reducing the intuitiveness of notation. Overall, a com-
bination of different concepts has an unnecessary patchy appearance, not assisting easy dis-
crimination and effectively eliminating the visual popout. Since the current colour palette is 
unnecessary multicolored, it should be further altered. The modifications should be based 
on the proposal of Altuhhova et al. (2013), so that concepts, belonging to the same ISSRM 
categories, would be painted correspondingly.  
While due to the specifics of notation size is not extensively used, it’s utilization is rather 
effective as the activity initiation of Actor/Threat Agent is represented via spatial enclosure.  
Finally, it could be concluded that while number of used visual variables is expected to 
ensure sufficient discriminability between symbols, number of poor design choices hamper 
the visual distance between symbols and affect discriminability in a negative way.  
Principle of Semantic Transparency  
Semantic transparency is to be defined as how well the meaning of the symbol could be 
deduced from its visual appearance. Semantic transparency, defining how well the symbols 
provide cues to their meaning, could be described by one of three states (Moody, 2009a), 
which are semantically immediate, semantically opaque or semantically perverse.  
So, semantic transparency is to be determined for each symbol. Transparency characteristics 
of extended BPMN symbol set (only unique category) are covered in the Table 27.  
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Table 27. Semantic transparency of extended Secure Tropos symbol set 
ISSRM Secure Tropos Semantic Transparency Sign type 
Business Asset 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
IS Asset 
 
Opaque 
 
Symbolic 
 
Threat agent 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Impact 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Event 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Threat 
 
Opaque  Symbolic 
Attack method 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Threat Agent 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Vulnerability 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Security criterion 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
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Security requirement 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
 
Based on the guidelines, provided in (Moody, 2009a), it could be said that semantically 
pervasive symbols should be redesigned, and semantical immediateness is to be embraced 
whenever possible. As for the semantically immediate symbols, one way to achieve imme-
diateness is to implement icons instead of abstract symbolic signs.  
Since extended Secure Tropos notation is solely comprised of abstract geometric shapes, it 
could be said that all the symbols are opaque, and none is semantically immediate. While 
it’s not mandatory to replace opaque symbols with the immediate ones, introduction of im-
mediate symbols (icons) would improve the visual efficiency and reduce the steepness of 
learning curve.  
Additionally, it should be mentioned that icons are encouraged to be used along the other 
visual variables to ensure redundant coding and improve symbol discriminability. Taking 
into consideration the results of discriminability analysis, replacement of existing symbols 
with introduced icons would ensure effective redundant coding and improve the visual pop-
out.  
Principle of Complexity Management 
Complexity management is defined as ability of a visual notation to depict information 
while not overflooding human mind (Moody, 2009a). While complexity here sounds some-
what vague, it could be further defined as number of elements on a diagram. As such, com-
plexity impacts key metrics, which are as perceptual limits and cognitive limits.  
While complexity is a diagram-level issue, possible improvements are to be performed on 
the notation level. It should also be mentioned that effective techniques include modulari-
zation and hierarchical organization (Moody, 2009a). Since ISSRM-extended Secure 
Tropos on the notational level is similar to non-extended i* notation, it seems justified to 
start the analysis from stating information, adopted from the paper by (Moody et al., 2010).  
As outlined by (Moody et al., 2010), lack of complexity management mechanisms prevents 
i* from being adapted in complex real-world projects. Authors also propose to introduce 
recursive (element to diagram) decomposition, which is intended to solve the complexity 
issue.  
While all the above-mentioned information is applicable to extended Secure Tropos, there 
are also certain extension-specific features. As proposed by Altuhhova et al. (2013), three 
groups of ISSRM concepts are colour coded and differentiated between each other. Thus, 
diagram levels could be organized not only on the basis of detalization levels but derived 
from distinct groups of ISSRM concepts.  
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Principle of Cognitive Integration  
Cognitive integration should be applied when system is represented by more than one dia-
gram. The idea is that since relevant information is spread across a number of diagrams, 
diagram readers often struggle with keeping the current position and comprehending the 
complete picture. For the multiple diagrams to be cognitively effective, they are to include 
integration mechanisms (Moody, 2009a), which are conceptual integration and perceptual 
integration. As it was already mentioned in the Complexity Management principle, i* nota-
tion supports multiple diagrams.  
However, (Moody et al., 2010) point out that since only two diagrams are currently available 
in the i*, cognitive integration is not an issue. At the same time, introduction of the addi-
tional diagrams would cause a need for effective complexity management mechanism.  
As for the ISSRM-extended Secure Tropos, it should be mentioned that both (Matulevicius 
et al., 2012) and (Matulevičius, 2017) provide examples of only one, unified diagram style, 
thus minimizing the problem of cognitive integration.  
Principle of Visual Expressiveness 
Visual expressiveness could be defined as a number of visual variables, used in a notation 
and evaluating overall exploitation of available design space (Moody, 2009a). Based on the 
visual expressiveness metrics, visual variables of the notation could be divided between two 
subsets, which are information-carrying variables, and free variables.  
According to the distribution between visual expressiveness and degrees of visual freedom, 
notations could range from nonvisual (expressiveness = 0, 8 degrees of freedom) to visually 
saturated (expressiveness = 8, 0 degrees of freedom). Table 28 summarizes information on 
power (highest measurement level that could be encoded), capacity (number of possible 
values for each variable) and values as employed in extended Secure Tropos. Information 
regarding power and capacity of visual variables is adopted from (Moody, 2009a), while the 
overall representation style is taken from (Genon et al., 2010).  
Table 28. Visual variables of Secure Tropos, adopted from  (Moody, 2009a) 
Visual Variable Power Capacity Extended SecureTropos 
values 
Horizontal position (x) Interval 10-15 Enclosure 
Vertical position (y) Interval  10-15 Enclosure 
Size  Interval  20 Normal, large (enclosure)  
Colour Nominal 7-10 Purple, green, light blue, 
blue, pink, yellow, orange, 
black, dark green, sage, pur-
ple 
Texture Nominal 2-5 Single solid 
Shape Nominal Unlimited Circle, rounded rectangle, 
hexagon, rectangle, octa-
gon, cloud, pentagon    
Brightness  Ordinal 6-7 Not utilized 
Orientation Nominal 4 Not utilized 
 
As it could be seen from the Table 24, ISSRM-extended Secure Tropos has a visual expres-
siveness of 6 and is characterized by 2 degrees of visual freedom. However, it should be 
mentioned that while visually 6-dimensional notation of extended BPMN is considered to 
be sufficient for the discriminability purposes (Moody, 2009a), poor design choices have a 
negative impact on the pairwise visual variation across visual vocabulary.  
As for the overall overview of exploited visual variables, it is provided as follows. Both 
horizontal and vertical positions could be utilized to depict intervals. However, similar to 
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the situation with non-extended i*, both variables are employed only to denote enclosure 
(location of symbol inside of another one) and are not fully exploited.  
Usage of size in extended Secure Tropos is currently identical to that of non-extended ver-
sion, with only Actor/Attacker element being significantly larger as to depict the power of 
activity initiation. All the other symbols are currently being of the similar size, non-dis-
criminable on its basis.  
Visual variable of texture is somewhat underused, since out of 5 possible perceptible steps 
only one is currently incorporated. It could be recommended to further exploit the texture, 
and it could be effective to complement colour-based coding by introducing several types 
of symbol border shapes.  
As for the colour, it’s usage in extended Secure Tropos notation violates the best practices 
and should be refined. Currently 11 colours could be present on the diagram, meaning that 
perceptible steps are overloaded, since colour variable has a maximum capacity of 10. Since 
colour is one of the most cognitively effective of all visual variables (Moody, 2009a), it’s 
usage should follow the robust design guidelines. According to the robust design principles, 
outlined by D. Moody (2009a), colour could be used only for redundant coding, and it’s 
capacity should not exceed that of 10. While redundant coding is ensured by the variety of 
symbol shapes, colour palette currently leads to cognitive overload. Thus, it is recommended 
to reduce the overall number of exploited colours. Additionally, colour coding should follow 
the proposition of (Altuhhova et al., 2013), so that elements, belonging to the distinct groups 
of ISSRM concepts, would be painted accordingly.  
Considering the variable of shape, it should first be noted that it’s the only variable featuring 
unlimited capacity. As for the utilization of shapes in extended Secure Tropos notation, it 
could be said that utilized range of shapes provides sufficient discrimination capabilities. 
However, all of the existing shapes, adopted from non-extended BPMN, suffer from being 
semantically opaque. So existing abstract shapes should be replaced or augmented by their 
semantically immediate counterparts, obtained via the implementation of icons.   
Finally, extended Secure Tropos notation makes no use of two remaining visual variables – 
Brightness and Orientation. While no specific details are provided, it should be noted that 
instead of potentially overloading available variables, it is possible to employ those cur-
rently not utilized for obtaining potential benefits from dual coding and increasing visual 
expressiveness.  
Principle of Dual Coding 
Dual coding theory indicates that text and graphics together transmit information better than 
either one of them by itself. There are several ways to encapsulate textual information, 
namely annotations and hybrid symbols. (Moody, 2009a). 
Currently, extended Mal-activity Diagrams notation has no hybrid symbols, reducing the 
notational intuitiveness and increasing steepness of learning curve. While dual coding is a 
powerful approach, enabling increase in visual perceptibility, it could be said that refinement 
of colour coding and intuitive iconic symbols would increase the visual popout while at the 
same time reducing overall notation complexity. Thus, transformation of non-hybrid sym-
bols into hybrid ones is not justified, and it is recommended only to implement notation 
modifications, proposed in previous subchapters.   
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Principle of Graphic Economy  
Graphic complexity is overall characterized by an amount of graphical symbols in the nota-
tion, which could be also called size of visual vocabulary. As denoted in Table 28Table 22, 
extended Secure Tropos employs 12 symbols, and is therefore overwhelming. (Moody, 
2009a) offers three approaches to reduce visual vocabulary, which are reduce semantic com-
plexity, increase symbol deficit and increase visual expressiveness.  
Symbol deficit is already present in the notation, so it won’t be helpful in reducing the com-
plexity. Reduction of semantic complexity is the most straightforward approach, aimed at 
analyzing the unnecessary symbols and excluding them from the notation. However, the 
overall number of symbols is specified by ISSRM domain model, and can’t really be re-
duced. Thus, the only applicable approach is related to the improvement of visual expres-
siveness by increasing the visual distance between symbols. It should be noted that analysis 
of previous Physics of Notation principles already included practical recommendations, 
such as implementation of dual coding and immediately perceptive icons. So, it could be 
concluded that refined notation would already be characterized by increased visual expres-
siveness, and no additional steps are required for improving it. Finally, it should also be 
mentioned that one additional approach to reduce semantic complexity is to implement ad-
ditional language dialect. This suggestion is further covered in the subsequent subchapter.  
Principle of Cognitive Fit 
Cognitive fit theory states that non-resembling representations of information are acceptable 
for various tasks as well as audiences. In connection with visual notation design, cognitive 
fit implies that for different audiences (especially for experts and novices) development of 
different subdialects might be required to facilitate complete understanding of visual repre-
sentation. Additionally, it might be required to develop a variety of dialects for different 
representational mediums, so that black-and-white printer, unable to transmit colours, would 
not make a notation undistinguishable (Moody, 2009a). Extended version of Secure Tropos 
would indeed require separate dialect for various mediums since discrimination between 
several concepts is heavily based on colour differences as corresponding shapes are rather 
similar. However, changes proposed in this chapter ensure that colour range would be scaled 
down, shapes would be refined, and icons are to be introduced. Thus, proposed changes are 
expected to eliminate the problem, resulting in one dialect being sufficient and discriminable 
across all mediums.  
As for the expert-novice difference, there indeed might be a need for the separate notations 
for pro users and beginners. This need is further reinforced by the fact that size of visual 
vocabulary is excessive for beginner users, and separate dialect offers a convenient way of 
dictionary optimization. However, the obstacle for such a separation would be a need to 
divide symbols between essential and occasionally-used symbol sets. Since this separation 
have not yet been performed and is out of scope for this paper, separate dialects for experts 
and novices currently could not be defined. Thus, the only available strategy to mitigate 
issues with perception among novice users is extensive introduction of visually expressive 
and semantically immediate symbols.  
VII. Analysis of Misuse Cases 
First, it should be noted that details regarding the extended Misuse Case notation were taken 
from (Soomro & Ahmed, 2012) and (Matulevičius, 2017). Since Misuse cases are derived 
from Use cases, constituting one of UML diagram types, analysis of UML from the PoN 
viewpoint, as described in (Moody & van Hillegersberg, 2008), provides several valuable 
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notation insights. Furthermore, it should be noted that Saleh & El-Attar (2015) perform an 
analysis, dedicated specifically to the Misuse Cases notation. Since the paper by Saleh & 
El-Attar (2015) thoroughly investigates non-extended Misuse Cases notation and provides 
a number of suggested improvements, it serves as a source of valuable insights and overall 
inspiration. This research, in its turn, concentrates on the analysis of extended Misuse Cases 
notation, as introduced in (Soomro & Ahmed, 2012).  
Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
Before performing the analysis, it’s crucial to define both symbol set and concept set, em-
ployed in ISSRM-extended Misuse Cases. Concept set could be defined as 13 ISSRM con-
cepts, outlined in the paper by Dubois et al. (2010). As for the symbol set, it could be char-
acterized based on the suggestion by Soomro & Ahmed (2012). However, it’s important to 
remember that symbols set could be divided into three unequal parts, which are unique sym-
bols, combined or not represented ones. Out of three categories, only unique symbols should 
be referred to as symbol set. Obtained set of symbols for extended Misuse Case notation is 
present in Table 29.  
Table 29. Symbol set of ISSRM-extended Misuse Cases 
ISSRM BPMN Symbol Category 
IS Asset 
 
Unique 
Business Asset 
 
Unique 
Assets 
 
Unique 
Security requirement 
 
Unique 
Threat agent 
 
Unique 
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Security criterion 
 
Unique 
Impact 
 
Unique 
Vulnerability 
 
Unique 
Attack method 
 
Unique 
Risk Combination of Event and Impact Combined 
Event Combination of Vulnerability and Treat Combined 
Threat Combination of Attack method and Threat 
agent 
Combined 
Risk treatment - Not represented 
Control - Not represented 
 
Based on the provided list of symbols, it is now possible to perform the analysis from the 
Semiotic Clarity perspective, in regard to four metrics – symbol redundancy, symbol over-
load, symbol excess and symbol deficit.   
As for the symbol redundancy, Assets is a clear case since single construct could be pre-
sented by several symbols (Matulevičius, 2017). Additionally, Assets are also an example 
of overload, since same combination of constructs could represent different ISSRM con-
cepts (Matulevičius, 2017). Symbol deficit is evidential in the situation with Risk Treatment 
and Control as none of those concepts has a symbolic representation. Furthermore, Event, 
Risk and Threat are also cases of symbol deficit, as they are represented by a combination 
of available symbols rather than by dedicate ones. Finally, it should be noted that Assets, 
Business Asset and Security Requirements both suffer from the symbol excess. As for the 
Assets and Business Asset, this is caused by the oval symbol, serving as a depiction for use 
case in non-extended Use Case notation. However, unlike the Use Cases, ISSRM-extended 
Misuse Case notation does not include use case symbol, meaning symbol excess. Finally, 
Security Requirement is affected by symbol excess as it includes a closed lock symbol, 
having no ISSRM correspondence o its own.    
Principle of Perceptual Discriminability  
Perceptual discriminability is defined as simplicity and the accuracy with which the graph-
ical symbols could be separated between each other (Moody, 2009a). Based on the overview 
of symbols, presented in the Table 29, it could be seen that two out visual variables, namely 
shape and colour, are utilized across the notation. While two variables are not sufficient to 
discriminate between such a broad range of symbols, distinction is further hampered by 
suboptimal design choices, such as exploitation of only three shape types, including stick 
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figure. It could be deduced that symbols, chosen by Soomro & Ahmed (2012), are derived 
from non-extended Misuse Case notation, based on the original Use Case version. However, 
growth of concept set made the notation complicated for perception, and opportunity to trace 
origins and draw from Use Case knowledge should not be prioritized over discriminability. 
Furthermore, novice users are expected to comprise a significant share of potential user 
audience. Since novices would have no prior experience with UML and, respectively, Use 
Cases, strict resemblance to Use Case notation is not mandatory.  
As for the discriminability between symbols, it should be noted that its unacceptably low 
and should be further improved. Information Asset symbol is the only one with the distinct 
shape, ensuring sufficient visual popout. Symbols, representing Asset, Business Asset and 
Threat agent are similar, with stick figure being different only for Threat agent. While it 
should be acknowledged that chosen design approach allows Threat agent to be differenti-
ated on different representation mediums (including black-and white copies), usage of col-
our is not recommended as a single discriminative variable. Furthermore, colored (dark-
ened) part of stick figure covers only part of its appearance (head), further reducing the 
popout. Following the analysis of shape, it should also be mentioned that Assets, Business 
Asset, Security requirement, Security Criterion, Impact, Vulnerability and Attack method 
all share the same abstract shape of oval, and with the single exception of Security Require-
ment, could be recognized only by colour and textual information (as hybrid symbols). Ad-
ditionally, utilized colours (for Security Criterion, Impact and Vulnerability) are not visually 
appearing and could be described as various shades of gray. While authors (Soomro & Ah-
med, 2012) clearly had black-and white printer friendliness in mind, obtained result is far 
from perfect. It should also be mentioned that in the case of abovementioned concepts, col-
our is employed as a single visual variable and only means of discrimination. According to 
the PoN principles (Moody, 2009a), this is not acceptable.  
Overall colour and shape decisions, made by authors, are puzzling if to consider a Security 
Requirement symbol, comprised of shape and iconic symbol. Unlike colour, iconic symbols 
are a superior choice as only means of distinction and should be used in a more extensive 
manner. Furthermore, it should be also mentioned that a number of symbols (Security Re-
quirement, Security Criterion, Impact, Vulnerability) are in fact hybrid symbols, combining 
graphics and text annotation. However, while dual coding of information has shown itself 
highly efficient (Moody, 2009a), textual information should not be used on its own and 
could be used as a replacement of visual variables only as a last resort. Thus, since symbols 
of the current symbol set could not be effectively distinguished, it is recommended to ex-
pand the range of employed visual variables (extra colours, additional shapes) as well as 
icons. Overall, It could be concluded that symbols of the current symbol set could not be 
effectively distinguished.  
Principle of Semantic Transparency  
From the semantic transparency point of view, symbols could be characterized as either 
semantically immediate, semantically opaque or semantically perverse (Moody, 2009a). 
Transparency characteristics of extended BPMN symbol set (only unique category) are cov-
ered in the Table 30.  
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Table 30. Semantic transparency of the extended Misuse Cases notation 
ISSRM BPMN Semantic Transparency Sign type 
Security requirement 
 
Immediate Iconic 
Business Asset 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
 
Assets 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
IS Asset 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Threat agent 
 
Immediate Iconic 
Security criterion 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Impact 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Vulnerability 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
Attack method 
 
Opaque Symbolic 
 
First of all, it should be noted that no semantically pervasive symbols could be found. How-
ever, only one symbol out of entire itemset is semantically immediate, with all others being 
semantically opaque. While semantically opaque symbols are acceptable (D. Moody, 
2009a), one way to improve the visual intuitiveness of a notation is to transform opaque 
items to semantically immediate ones. As demonstrated by (A scientific evaluation of the 
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misuse case diagrams visual syntax), one effective approach is to complement abstract 
shapes with color coding and, more importantly, iconic symbols. Apart from iconic symbols 
allowing colour to be exploited for redundant coding, icons are also instrumental in making 
the symbols more discriminable as well as reducing the learning curve. Currently, only one 
icon (closed lock) is included in the extended Misuse Case notation, and more should be 
introduced to transform the opaque symbols into semantically immediate ones.  
Apart from abstract geometric shapes (oval and rectangle), humanlike stick figure is also to 
be considered a part of notation. While this stick figure, denoting User/Misuser, could be 
characterized as semantically immediate in case of Use Case and non-extended Misuse Case 
notations, same could hardly be said for the ISSRM-extended notation. Thus, it is recom-
mended to refine the existing “black thoughts” depiction of Threat agent concept and make 
it more semantically transparent. Overall, it could be said that since the majority of existing 
icons are semantically opaque, it is recommended to complement existing symbols with 
semantically immediate icons to improve the semantic transparency of notation. Introduc-
tion of colour coding and iconic symbols is proposed as a means to increase semantic trans-
parency and visual popout.  
Principle of Complexity Management 
While complexity here sounds relatively vague, it could be further defined as number of 
elements on a diagram. Complexity impacts key metrics, which are perceptual limits and 
cognitive limits. While complexity is a diagram-level issue, possible improvements are to 
be performed on the notation level. It should also be mentioned that effective techniques 
include modularization and hierarchical organization (Moody, 2009a) 
Similar to non-extended Misuse Cases (Saleh & El-Attar, 2015), extended notation currently 
provides no complexity management mechanisms, and diagrams have to be shown as single 
monoliths. Since extended Misuse Cases represent single layer of abstraction, with no fur-
ther potential for decomposition and refinement, implementation of complexity manage-
ment technique is not an option. Furthermore, it should also be noted that proposed notation 
improvements should further improve the ability to discriminate between symbols.    
Principle of Cognitive Integration  
Cognitive integration could be applicable when system is represented by multiple diagrams. 
Since extended Misuse Case diagrams, similarly to non-extended (Saleh & El-Attar, 2015), 
offer single monolithic diagrams, this principle could not be applied for analysis.  
Principle of Visual Expressiveness 
Visual expressiveness could be defined as a amount of visual variables, utilized in a notation 
and measuring overall usage of design space (Moody, 2009a). Based on the visual expres-
siveness metrics, visual variables of the notation could be divided between two subsets, 
namely information-carrying variables and free variables.  
The Table 31 summarizes information on power (highest measurement level that could be 
encoded), capacity (number of possible values for each variable) and values as employed in 
extended Misuse Cases. Information regarding power and capacity of visual variables is 
adopted from (Moody, 2009a), while the overall representation style is taken from (Genon 
et al., 2010).  
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Table 31. Visual variables of extended Misuse Cases, partially adopted from (Moody, 
2009a) 
Visual Variable Power Capacity Extended Misuse Cases 
values 
Horizontal position (x) Interval 10-15 Enclosure 
Vertical position (y) Interval  10-15 Enclosure 
Size  Interval  20 Normal, large 
Colour Nominal 7-10 Black, light grey, grey, 
white 
Texture Nominal 2-5 Single solid 
Shape Nominal Unlimited Oval, rectangle, stickman 
figure  
Brightness  Ordinal 6-7 Not utilized 
Orientation Nominal 4 Not utilized 
 
As it could be understood from the Table 31, ISSRM-extended Misuse Case notation is 
characterized by visual expressiveness of 6, so that degree of visual freedom is 2. As noted 
by (Moody, 2009a), utilization of 6 visual variables is considered to be sufficient for the 
discrimination purposes. However, it should be mentioned that visual notation of extended 
Misuse Cases is far from being expressive due to the limited choice of options for the above 
mentioned visual variables. Colour and shape are among the underused, since only 3 colours 
and two possible shapes are employed throughout the notation. Thus, it is recommended to 
expand the colour range, at well as selection of shapes in order to make the notation more 
visually effective. However, it should be recollected that colour could be used only for re-
dundant coding.  
Two other variables – Size and Texture, are exploited but could be represented by only a 
restricted values, specifically single solid texture and normal/large sizes. This design choice 
renders symbols not expressive and thus, not distinguishable, as visual distance is ensured 
only by two variables (Colour and Shape), with Size and Texture being practically useless. 
So, it is suggested to exploit Size and Texture up to their potential, introducing various 
textures as well as sizes.  It should be noted that in regard to the Size, representation of 
Information System Asset offers an exception, as corresponding symbol differs in size from 
the all the other. However, since it’s used only for the depiction of sole concept and has 2 
options with capacity of 20, it’s hardly a positive example. 
Both horizontal and vertical positions could be utilized to depict intervals. However, similar 
to the situation with non-extended BPMN (Genon et al., 2010), both variables are employed 
only to denote enclosure (location of symbol inside of another one) and are not fully ex-
ploited.  
Finally, it should be said that Misuse Case notation makes no use of two remaining visual 
variables – Brightness and Orientation. While no specific details are provided, it should be 
noted that instead of potentially overloading available variables, it is possible to employ 
those currently not utilized for obtaining potential benefits from dual coding and increasing 
visual expressiveness.  
Principle of Dual Coding 
Dual coding theory states that text and graphics together transmit information better than 
either one of them by itself. There are several ways to encapsulate textual information, 
namely annotations and hybrid symbols. (Moody, 2009a). 
Current version of extended Misuse Case notation has four hybrid symbols, namely Security 
Requirement, Security Criterion, Impact and Vulnerability. In these symbols textual infor-
mation expands the abstract shapes and improves discriminability. Security requirement 
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symbol differs from all the rest, as it features not only text annotation, but also an icon. All 
the remaining notation items are not hybrid. While dual coding is a powerful approach, 
enabling increase in visual perceptibility, it could be said that four abovementioned symbols 
could not be discriminated easily as their visual appearance is quite similar and text anno-
tations do not provide significant visual popout. As proposed in the Chapter 0, existing ab-
stract shapes should be complimented by iconic symbols, and colour should be utilized for 
redundant coding. Thus, available hybrid symbols should be further refined and augmented 
by icons and colour coding.  
As for the rest of the symbols, currently not bearing textual information, it could be said that 
addition of icons and colour coding would make them sufficiently discriminable. Thus, 
transformation of non-hybrid symbols into hybrid ones is not justified.  
Principle of Graphic Economy  
As for the graphic complexity, it is overall characterized by a number of graphical symbols 
in the notation, also called size of visual vocabulary.  As denoted in Table 29, extended 
Secure Tropos notation utilizes 12 symbols. (Moody, 2009a) indicates that upper limit of 
graphic complexity could be defined at 6. To mitigate the negative impact on cognition, 
several guidelines are offered in a paper by (Moody, 2009a). They are:  to reduce semantic 
complexity, increase symbol deficit and increase visual expressiveness. Since symbol defi-
cit is already introduced, and semantic complexity is optimized, the most effective way to 
ensure manageable cognitive load is to increase visual effectiveness. As already mentioned, 
proposed alterations of existing notation, including the refinement of colours and introduc-
tion of semantically immediate icons to augment the abstract shapes, are expected to em-
brace visual popout and improve symbol discriminability.   
Principle of Cognitive Fit 
According to the principal of cognitive fit, different representations of information are ac-
ceptable for various assignments and audiences (Moody, 2009a). Regarding visual notation 
design, cognitive fit means that different audiences (especially experts and novices) and 
different representation mediums (colourized and black-and-white versions) require tailored 
visual dialects. As for the demands of various representation mediums, it could be said that 
current notation is  
well-rounded and could be used in both black-and-white and coloured versions. This is 
achieved by the utilization of grey-black colour palette, as well as hybrid symbols with tex-
tual descriptions. While selected palette has certain benefits, it is ineffective in terms of 
visual popout and visual distance. Thus, it is recommended to expand the choice of colour 
and extend the palette. It should be mentioned that proposed abolition of grey-black colour 
choice would not result in symbols being indiscriminable, since colour would be used only 
for redundant coding and sufficient visual distance would be enforced by iconic symbols. 
So, there is no need to introduce several dialects for various mediums. Considering notation 
complexity and accessibility to beginners, it could be said that ISSRM-extended Misuse 
Case notation originates from the Use Cases, which are characterized as being accessible to 
non-technical stakeholders (Saleh & El-Attar, 2015). While extended notation has an in-
creased visual vocabulary and is not accessible for novice users, proposed changes and im-
plementation of semantically immediate icons should ensure that symbols are visually ex-
pressive and learning curve is low. Thus, it is unjustified to develop separate dialects based 
on user’s knowledge level.  
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VIII. Analysis of Mal-activity Diagrams  
As with Misuse Cases, Mal-activity Diagrams also originate from a subset of UML (Activity 
Diagrams) and share many efficient as well as inefficient design choices with general UML 
notation. Since PoN analysis of UML was already performed in (Moody & van Hillegers-
berg, 2008) and is out of the cope for this paper. Subsequent subchapter focuses on the 
notational aspect of security-extended Mal-activity Diagrams, as presented in (Chowdhury 
et al., 2012).  
Principle of Semiotic Clarity 
Before performing the analysis, it’s crucial to define both symbol set and concept set, em-
ployed in extended Mal-activity Diagrams notation. Concept set could be defined as 13 
ISSRM concepts, outlined in the paper by Dubois et al. (2010). As for the symbol set, it 
could be characterized based on the paper by Chowdhury et al. (2012). However, it’s im-
portant to remember that symbols set could be divided into three unequal parts, which are 
unique symbols, combined or not represented ones. Out of three categories, only unique 
symbols should be referred to as symbol set. Obtained set of symbols for extended Mal-
activity Diagrams notation is present in Table 32.  
Table 32. ISSRM-extended symbol set of Mal-activity Diagrams 
ISSRM BPMN Symbol Category 
IS Asset 
 
Unique 
Security requirement 
 
Unique 
Threat agent 
 
Unique 
Control 
 
Unique 
Impact 
 
Unique 
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Attack method 
 
Combined 
Business Asset 
 
Combined 
Assets 
 
Combined 
Risk Combination of Event and Impact Combined 
Event Combination of Threat and Vulnerability Combined 
Threat Combination of Attack method and Threat 
Agent 
Combined 
Security criterion - Not represented 
Vulnerability - Not represented 
Risk treatment - Not represented 
 
Provided list of symbols could now be utilized as a basis for Semiotic Clarity analysis, which 
is to be performed with 4 metrics of symbol redundancy, symbol overload, symbol excess 
and symbol deficit in mind. As for the symbol redundancy, Assets and Attack Method are 
the cases, as single construct could be presented by several symbols (Matulevičius, 2017). 
Additionally, Assets are also an example of overload due to the fact that same combination 
of constructs could represent different ISSRM concepts (Matulevičius, 2017). Symbol def-
icit is evidential in the situation with Security criterion, Vulnerability and Risk treatment as 
none of those concepts has a symbolic representation. Furthermore, Risk, Event and Treat 
are also cases of symbol deficit, as they are represented by a combination of available sym-
bols rather than by dedicate ones. Finally, it should be noted that Assets and Security Re-
quirements both suffer from the symbol excess. This is caused by the nature of combined 
symbols, as individually diamond-shaped symbol has no semantic meaning and no ISSRM 
correspondence.  
Principle of Perceptual Discriminability  
Perceptual discriminability is defined as simplicity and the accuracy with which the graph-
ical symbols could be separated between each other (Moody, 2009a). Based on the overview 
of symbols, presented in Table 32, it could be seen that two visual variables, namely shape 
and brightness, are utilized across the notation. While two variables are not sufficient to 
discriminate between a range of symbols, distinction is further hampered by suboptimal 
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design choices, such as exploitation of only three shape types. It could be deduced that sym-
bols, chosen by Chowdhury et al. (2012), are derived from non-extended Mal-activity Dia-
grams notation, based on the original Activity Diagrams version. However, growth of con-
cept set made the notation complicated for perception, and opportunity to trace origins and 
draw from Use Case knowledge should not be prioritized over discriminability. Further-
more, novice users are expected to comprise a significant share of potential user audience. 
Since novices would have no prior experience with UML and, respectively, Activity Dia-
grams, strict resemblance to Activity Diagrams notation is not a benefit. As for the discrimi-
nability between symbols, it should be noted that its quite low and should be further im-
proved.  While symbol groups, represented by diamonds, rounded rectangles and rectangles 
could be relatively easily discriminated based on substantial differences in size, colour and 
shape, same could not be said about symbols inside groups. Differentiation between Infor-
mation System Asset, Threat Agent and Control is quite complicated, since visual represen-
tation of all this symbol is actually an identical rectangle-shaped figure, providing no visual 
differentiation markers. As for the group comprising Business Asset, Impact, Attack 
Method and Security Requirement, situation with discriminability is slightly better, with 
difference in brightness levels ensuring visual popout.  
While it should be acknowledged that chosen design approach allows abovementioned sym-
bols to be differentiated on different representation mediums (including black-and white 
copies), usage of colour is not recommended as a single discriminative variable. 
While notation authors clearly had black-and white printer friendliness in mind, obtained 
result is far from perfect. It should also be mentioned that in the case of abovementioned 
concepts, colour is employed as a single visual variable and only means of discrimination. 
According to the PoN principles (Moody, 2009a), this is not acceptable.  
Overall, it should be concluded that since symbols of the current symbol set could not be 
effectively distinguished, it is recommended to expand the range of employed visual varia-
bles (extra brightness levels, utilization of colours, additional shapes) as well as icons. It 
could be concluded that since symbols of the current symbol set could not be effectively 
distinguished.  
Principle of Semantic Transparency  
From the semantic transparency point of view, symbols could be characterized as either 
semantically immediate, semantically opaque or semantically perverse (Moody, 2009a). 
Transparency characteristics of extended Mal-activity Diagrams symbol set are covered in 
Table 33.  
Table 33. Semantic transparency of the extended Mal-activity Diagrams notation 
ISSRM BPMN Symbol Cate-
gory 
Semantic 
Transparency 
IS Asset 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
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Security requirement 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
Threat agent 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
Control 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
Impact 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
Business Asset 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
Assets 
 
Symbolic Opaque 
As could be seen from the table above, no semantically perverse symbols could be found. 
However, sole dependency on the symbolic elements means that current version of ISSRM-
extended notation is semantically opaque, with no symbols being immediate. While accord-
ing to (Moody, 2009a) opaque symbols are acceptable for the notation, one obvious way to 
improve the intuitiveness is to introduce semantically immediate, iconic-based ones. As 
shown in the (Saleh & El-Attar, 2015), one possible approach would be to introduce colour 
encoding and iconic symbols. In addition to iconic symbols taking main burden of sense-
bearing, leaving colour only for redundant coding purpose, icons would also be immensely 
helpful to increase discriminability and reduce the learning curve. While current notation 
employs only abstract geometric shapes, a number of icons should be introduced to facilitate 
the process of semantic immediateness transformation.  
Overall, it could be said that since current symbols are semantically opaque, it is recom-
mended to complement existing symbols with semantically immediate icons to improve the 
semantic transparency of notation. Introduction of colour coding and iconic symbols is pro-
posed as a means to increase semantic transparency and visual popout.  
Principle of Complexity Management 
While complexity could be used in quite a broad meaning, it could be further described as 
a number of elements on the diagram. Complexity could be measured by two key metrics, 
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which are perceptual limits and cognitive limits. While complexity is a diagram-level issue, 
possible modifications could be also performed on a notation level. It should be also noted 
that according to the paper by(Moody, 2009a), efficient techniques include modularization 
and hierarchical organization.  Similar to pre-ISSRM Mal-activity Diagrams, extended no-
tation offers no complexity management mechanisms, meaning that diagrams are to be rep-
resented as single monoliths. As extended Mal-activity Diagrams represent single layer of 
abstraction, no further potential for decomposition or refinement is present. Thus, imple-
mentation of complexity management instruments is not an option. Furthermore, it should 
also be noted that proposed notation alterations should further improve the ability to dis-
criminate between symbols, further reducing the need for decomposition.     
Principle of Cognitive Integration  
Cognitive integration could be applicable when system is represented by multiple diagrams. 
Since extended Mal-activity Diagrams, similarly to non-extended UML, offer single mon-
olithic diagrams, this principle could not be applied for analysis.  
Principle of Visual Expressiveness 
Visual expressiveness could be defined as a amount of visual variables, utilized in a notation 
and measuring overall usage of design space (Moody, 2009a). Based on the visual expres-
siveness metrics, visual variables of the notation could be divided between two subsets, 
namely information-carrying variables and free variables.  
The Table 34 summarizes information on power (highest measurement level that could be 
encoded), capacity (number of possible values for each variable) and values as employed in 
extended Mal-activity Diagrams. Information regarding power and capacity of visual vari-
ables is adopted from (Moody, 2009a), while the overall representation style is taken from 
(Genon et al., 2010).  
Table 34. Visual variables of extended Mal-activity Diagrams, adopted from (Moody, 
2009a) 
Visual Variable Power Capacity Mal-activity diagram val-
ues 
Horizontal position (x) Interval 10-15 Enclosure 
Vertical position (y) Interval  10-15 Enclosure 
Size  Interval  20 Normal,  large-scale 
Brightness  Ordinal 6-7 Light, medium, dark 
Texture Nominal 2-5 Single solid 
Shape Nominal Unlimited Diamond, rectangle, 
rounded rectangle   
Orientation Nominal 4 Not utilized 
Colour Nominal 7-10 Not utilized 
 
As it could be understood from the Table 34, ISSRM-extended Mal-activity Diagrams no-
tation is characterized by visual expressiveness of 6, so that degree of visual freedom is 2. 
As noted by (Moody, 2009a), utilization of 6 visual variables is considered to be sufficient 
for the discrimination purposes. However, it should be mentioned that visual notation of 
extended Mal-activity Diagrams is far from being expressive due to the limited choice of 
options for the above mentioned visual variables. Brightness and shape are among the un-
derused, since only 3 levels of brightness and three possible shapes are employed throughout 
the notation. Furthermore, despite being one of most effective visual variables colour is not 
exploited at all. Thus, in order to make the notation more visually effective it is recom-
mended to expand the selection of shapes as well as introduce extensive colour coding. 
However, it should be recollected that colour could be used only for redundant coding.  
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Two other variables – Size and Texture, are exploited but could be represented by only a 
restricted values, specifically single solid texture and normal/full scale sizes. This design 
choice renders symbols not expressive and thus, not distinguishable, as visual distance is 
ensured only by two variables (Brightness and Shape), with Size and Texture being reduced 
to second-tier roles. So, it is suggested to exploit Size and Texture up to their potential, 
introducing various textures as well as sizes.   
As for both horizontal and vertical positions could be utilized to depict intervals. However, 
similar to the situation with non-extended BPMN (Genon et al., 2010), both variables are 
employed only to denote enclosure (location of symbol inside of another one) and are not 
fully exploited.  
Principle of Dual Coding 
Dual coding theory states that text and graphics together transmit information better than 
either one of them by itself. There are several ways to encapsulate textual information, 
namely annotations and hybrid symbols. (Moody, 2009a). 
Currently, extended Mal-activity Diagrams notation has no hybrid symbols, reducing the 
notational intuitiveness and increasing steepness of learning curve. While dual coding is a 
powerful approach, enabling increase in visual perceptibility, it could be said that addition 
of colour coding and intuitive iconic symbols would increase the visual popout while at the 
same time reducing overall notation complexity. Thus, transformation of non-hybrid sym-
bols into hybrid ones is not justified, and it is recommended only to implement notation 
modifications, proposed in previous chapters.   
Principle of Graphic Economy  
As for the graphic complexity, it is overall characterized by a number of graphical symbols 
in the notation, also called size of visual vocabulary.  As denoted in Table 33, extended Mal-
activity Diagrams notation utilizes 7 symbols. (Moody, 2009a) indicates that upper limit of 
graphic complexity could be defined at 6. To mitigate the negative impact on cognition, 
several guidelines are offered in ((Moody, 2009a). They include reduction of semantic com-
plexity, increase of symbol deficit and increase of visual expressiveness. Since symbol def-
icit is already introduced, and semantic complexity is optimized, the most effective way to 
ensure manageable cognitive load is to increase visual effectiveness. As already mentioned, 
proposed alterations of existing notation, including the addition of colours and introducing 
semantically immediate icons to augment the abstract shapes, are expected to embrace vis-
ual popout and improve symbol discriminability.   
Principle of Cognitive Fit 
According to the principal of cognitive fit, different representations of information are ac-
ceptable for various assignments and audiences (Moody, 2009a). Regarding visual notation 
design, cognitive fit means that different audiences (especially experts and novices) and 
different representation mediums (colourized and black-and-white versions) require tailored 
visual dialects. As for the demands of various representation mediums, it could be said that 
current notation is well-rounded and could be used on various representation mediums. This 
is achieved primarily by the utilization of grey-black brightness levels. While selected pal-
ette has certain benefits, it is ineffective in terms of visual popout and visual distance. Thus, 
it is recommended to introduce the utilization of colour and extend the overall palette. It 
should be mentioned that proposed abolition of grey-black colour scheme would not result 
in symbols being indiscriminable, since colour would be used only for redundant coding 
and sufficient visual distance would be enforced by iconic symbols. So, there is no need to 
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introduce several dialects for various mediums. Considering notation complexity and acces-
sibility to beginners, it could be said that ISSRM-extended Mal-activity Diagrams notation 
originates from the Activity Diagrams, which on certain level are similar to widely accepted 
block diagrams. While extended notation has an increased visual vocabulary and is not ac-
cessible for novice users, proposed changes and implementation of semantically immediate 
icons should ensure that symbols are visually expressive and learning curve is low. Thus, it 
is unjustified to develop separate dialects based on user’s knowledge level.  
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IX. Questionnaire for Evaluation Survey 
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X. Evaluation Survey – Results Analysis 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Labels # Business Asset
1 27
2 12
3 8
4 7
NA 5
Total 59
Labels #  IS Asset
1 13
2 29
3 9
4 4
NA 4
Total 59
Labels # Criterion
1 38
2 13
3 4
NA 4
Total 59
Labels # Threat
1 13
2 4
3 29
4 9
NA 4
Total 59
Labels #  Vulnerability
1 22
2 16
3 13
NA 8
Total 59
Labels # Treat Agent
1 2
2 20
3 29
4 3
NA 5
Total 59
Labels # Attack Method
1 6
2 18
3 15
4 14
NA 6
Total 59
Labels # Impact
1 28
2 21
3 7
NA 3
Total 59
Labels # Security Event
1 16
2 14
3 20
NA 9
Total 59
Labels # Risk
1 19
2 16
3 19
NA 5
Total 59
Labels # Risk Treatment
1 14
2 17
3 25
NA 3
Total 59
Labels # Security Requirement
1 3
2 13
3 35
4 3
NA 5
Total 59
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Labels # Control
1 33
2 15
3 5
NA 6
Total 59
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XI. Evaluation Survey – Results of Model Matching 
 
Language Concept correct incor-
rect 
NA total hit 
rate 
semant. transp. coeffi-
cient 
BPMN Business Asset 11 40 8 59 18.64 0.05 
BPMN Information System As-
set 
27 25 7 59 45.76 0.37 
BPMN Security Criterion 17 33 9 59 28.81 0.17 
BPMN Vulnerability 17 32 10 59 28.81 0.17 
BPMN Attack method 23 28 8 59 38.98 0.29 
BPMN Threat Agent 27 27 5 59 45.76 0.37 
BPMN Security Requirement 16 35 8 59 27.12 0.15 
SecureTro-
pos 
Business Asset 25 27 7 59 42.37 0.34 
SecureTro-
pos 
Information System As-
set 
17 36 6 59 28.81 0.19 
SecureTro-
pos 
Security Criterion 11 39 9 59 18.64 0.07 
SecureTro-
pos 
Threat 12 39 8 59 20.34 0.09 
SecureTro-
pos 
Attack method 11 34 14 59 18.64 0.07 
SecureTro-
pos 
Vulnerability 18 32 9 59 30.51 0.21 
SecureTro-
pos 
Threat Agent 21 29 9 59 35.59 0.26 
SecureTro-
pos 
Security Requirement 13 38 8 59 22.03 0.11 
MisUse Business Asset 19 35 5 59 32.20 0.23 
MisUse Information System As-
set 
14 38 7 59 23.73 0.13 
MisUse Security Criterion 14 36 9 59 23.73 0.13 
MisUse Impact 15 36 8 59 25.42 0.15 
MisUse Attack method 15 34 10 59 25.42 0.15 
MisUse Vulnerability 17 34 8 59 28.81 0.19 
MisUse Threat Agent 26 26 7 59 44.07 0.36 
MisUse Security Requirement 17 33 9 59 28.81 0.19 
Mal-Activity Business Asset 12 37 10 59 20.34 0.07 
Mal-Activity Information System As-
set 
10 37 12 59 16.95 0.03 
Mal-Activity Impact 20 29 10 59 33.90 0.23 
Mal-Activity Attack method 21 29 9 59 35.59 0.25 
Mal-Activity Threat Agent 24 26 9 59 40.68 0.31 
Mal-Activity Security Requirement 15 32 12 59 25.42 0.13 
Mal-Activity Control 12 37 10 59 20.34 0.07 
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XII. Questionnaire for Symbolization Survey 
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XIII. Symbolization Survey – Obtained Symbols 
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XIV. Symbolization Survey – Symbol Analysis 
 
ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of stere-
otypy 
Justification Category 
Business As-
set 
 
 
27%  
3/11 
Vertical rectangle with distinct corner resem-
bles business document, with lines remind-
ing of lines of text.  
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Combination of vertical rectangles as a stack 
of business s documents.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Dollar sign is suggested as part of Business 
Asset symbol with the support of 4/11 
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Briefcase symbolize business and relevant 
assets as kept inside 
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Banknote is an obvious choice since it de-
picts revenue, obtained from assets.   
Prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Information 
System Asset 
 
 
36% 
4/11 
Distinct cylindrical shape is an established de-
piction of databases, crucial for business.  
Stereotype 
 
27% 
3/11 
Monitor as common representation of com-
puter.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Like Business Asset depiction, binary code as 
a visual representation of digital technologies  
Prototype  
 
NA As desktops are widely replaced by laptops, 
this symbol might be a more immediate repre-
sentation for business users 
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Combination of binary code as a distinctive 
mark of digital technology with roundel, cur-
rently used in SRM-extended BPMN 
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Security crite-
rion 
 
 
45% 
5/11 
Lock symbol indicates security needs as lock is 
a universal depiction of security – utmost need 
of assets.  
Stereotype 
 
18% 
2/11 
Similar to the previous one however letter “C” 
streamlines symbol recognition as it is the first 
letter of concept name.   
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Shield with tick resembles high-level security 
needs which imply that assets are intended to 
stay safe.   
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Since opened lock could be perceived as general 
depiction of breached security, security, lock is 
meant to serve as a visualization of risk im-
portance.  
Prototype 
 
 
NA Lock symbol, indicating security needs, is sur-
rounded by gears – symbol of settings.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Threat agent 
 
 
36% 
4/11 
Derived from Use Case actor with dark-
ened head depicting negative intentions.  
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Person, covering head with hood to re-
main untracked by security cameras, asso-
ciation with illegal activity.  Modified to 
ensure distinction with Threat.  
Refined prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Symbol of pirates, hackers are often de-
scribed as pirates of 21st century, reminds 
of illegal activity and danger.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Black hat as symbol of bad guy, denotes 
contrast between good and evil. Eye mask 
added to evoke the image of Zorro and as-
sociate with vigilantes, known among 
other things for illegal activities.  
Refined prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Guy Fawkes mask has gained widespread 
popularity after the “V means Vendetta” 
(2005) movie. Could be utilized to con-
ceal face/identity, is strongly associated 
with the Anonymous hacker network. 
Hood removed as insignificant element.  
Refined prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Attack 
method 
 
 
9% 
1/11 
Since bomb is a weapon, it could be di-
rectly used as attack method.   
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Keyboard key as obvious tool for execut-
ing a cyberattack, black colour and skull 
with crossbones added to indicate danger 
Refined prototype 
 
NA Complete keyboard as the method for 
cyberattack, skull and crossbones added 
to indicate negative intentions.   
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Envelope denotes accessibility over dis-
tance, that is a treat of cyberattacks, famil-
iar skull with crossbones added to indicate 
danger. Resulting symbol also bears re-
semblance to mail bombing.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Crosshairs as a common depiction of gun-
sight, depicts attack method as well.  
Refined prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Support Justification Category 
Threat 
 
 
18% 
2/11 
Exclamation mark as a symbol of upcoming 
danger. 
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Handshake as indication of no weapon being 
hidden, black hand conveys danger and leads 
to believe that harm is about to be done.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Follows the concept definition, hacker as 
threat utilizing computer as attack method. 
Prototype 
 
NA Similar to the previous prototype, skull with 
bones added to stress potential danger.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Follows the concept definition, humanlike 
figure with a bomb also resembles terrorist, 
and therefore threat.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Vulnerability 
 
 
45% 
5/11 
Exclamation mark as a symbol of potential 
weak spot. 
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Link indicates potential weak spot in the 
chain that could be broken, impacting the 
whole chain. Also provides direct association 
with weak link as symbol of vulnerability 
point.  
Refined prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Magnifying glass denotes search for potential 
vulnerabilities, added lock symbolizes secure 
state of the information systems.  
Refined prototype 
 
NA Key hole as potential weak spot of any lock, 
with lock here symbolizing secure state of the 
information systems.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
 
NA Vulnerability is a weak spot, which is about 
to be endangered as it appears in the cross-
hairs – immediate risk which should be miti-
gated.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Event 
 
 
18% 
2/11 
Lightning as a symbol of potential immedi-
ate threat, aimed at vulnerability. Also 
adopted in BPMN in similar capacity.  
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Clock as point of time when event has oc-
curred.   
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Bell as real-world implementation of event 
notification.  
Prototype 
 
NA Calendar depicts certain date when event is 
about to occur.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Combination of threat and vulnerability, key 
whole was already proposed as symbol for 
vulnerability opened lock is utilized for 
threat.     
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Impact 
 
 
18% 
2/11 
Question mark as a depiction of potential 
consequence, also implies that it is used to de-
note what could happen.   
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Explosion cloud depict direct consequences 
of the risk, caused by a threat that is repre-
sented as bomb, also has strong associative 
ties to the impact in general.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Negative consequences of harm done to In-
formation system assets, skull and bones 
show that laptop is infected and unusable.   
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Downward chart serves as a visualization of 
direct harm to business assets and dive in rev-
enue.   
Refined prototype 
 
NA With lock serving as a metaphor for secure 
system, unlocked state indicates that an oc-
currence of the breach.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Risk 
 
 
18% 
2/11 
Exclamation mark as a sign to stay away from 
the potential harm and exhibit caution.     
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
X mark indicates a concept of negation, trans-
mitting the message to keep distance from the 
risk.   
Prototype 
 
NA Radiation hazard symbol denotes potential 
threat and similarly to previous symbols, ad-
vices to keep away.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Hand symbol offers same reasoning and is a 
variation of X mark, conveying the message 
of cautiousness and attention.    
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Rain cloud indicates potential risk and offers 
direct relation to an umbrella as risk treatment 
symbol, ensuring consistency.   
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Degree of ste-
reotypy 
Justification Category 
Risk treat-
ment 
 
 
27% 
3/11 
Shield serves as universal indicator of pro-
tection, directly associated with protection 
from risks.      
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Umbrella depicts protection from ele-
ments, and could be expanded to mean 
protection from any kind of risks. Addi-
tionally, umbrella offers a direct corre-
spondence with a symbol of rain cloud, 
proposed for risk. 
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Injection needle offers association with 
treatment in general, corresponding to the 
meaning of “treatment” as medical care.   
Prototype 
 
NA Combination of gears is meant to visualize 
the outcomes of successful treatment, and 
depicts system components working 
seamlessly.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
NA Crossed tools symbol further expands the 
concept  of  treatment as medical care to 
treatment of the system components, as 
proposed tools could be used for mechan-
ical repairs.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Support Justification Category 
Security re-
quirement 
 
 
9% 
1/11 
Combination of shield and lock emphasise 
the secure state of the system which is in-
tended to be achieved through security re-
quirements.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Amalgamation of checklist icon and shield 
with lock inside is meant to be an immediate 
representation of security requirement, with 
shield depicting security and checklist – re-
spectively, requirements.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Simplified representation of requirement as 
checkbox that is intended to be ticked.  
Prototype 
 
NA Proposes symbol could be considered as a 
combination of icons depicting security 
(shield) and requirement (checkbox), provid-
ing direct semantical meaning.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
 
 
NA Lightning as a symbol of danger is contained 
within the shield – metaphor for secure state 
which should be achieved.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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ISSRM Con-
cept 
Sketch  Support Justification Category 
Control 
 
 
18% 
2/11 
Ticked shield is meant to depict a secure 
system, obtained after the implementation 
of controls.  
Stereotype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Proposed symbol is intended for drawing 
connections with the real world, since actual 
fence could be viewed as means to improve 
security and limit access to the specific area.  
Prototype 
 
9% 
1/11 
Magnifying glass is depicted in a role of a 
tool that could be used to inspect and reveal 
potential problems, thus improving secu-
rity.  
Prototype 
 
NA Fingerprint scanner was originally proposed 
for the security requirement. However, 
since it is a practical means to improve cy-
bersecurity, depiction of control seems to be 
a better option.   
Refined prototype 
 
NA Firewall is one of first things that is associ-
ated with practical implementation of cy-
bersecurity, and it is depicted here as 
globe(Internet) hiding behind the wall.  
Suggestion, based on 
prototype 
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XV. Questionnaire for Symbol Identification Survey 
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XVI. Symbol Identification Survey – Results Analysis 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
Labels # Business Asset
1 6
2 6
3 9
4 13
5 3
NA 2
Total 39
Labels # IS Asset
1 8
2 16
3 2
4 4
5 7
NA 2
Total 39
Labels # Security criterion
1 7
2 11
3 7
4 7
5 7
Total 39
Labels # Threat
1 16
2 16
3 4
5 2
NA 1
Total 39
Labels # Vulnerability
1 13
2 7
3 4
4 9
5 5
NA 1
Total 39
Labels # Threat agent
1 1
2 16
3 10
4 7
5 5
Total 39
Labels # Attack Method
1 6
2 6
3 3
4 20
5 3
NA 1
Total 39
Labels # Impact
2 10
3 9
4 11
5 8
NA 1
Total 39
Labels # Security event
1 2
2 1
3 7
4 14
5 14
NA 1
Total 39
Labels # Risk
1 19
2 9
3 1
4 1
5 6
NA 3
Total 39
Labels # Risk treatment
1 13
2 10
3 4
4 2
5 5
NA 5
Total 39
Labels # Security Requirement
1 2
2 5
3 10
4 2
5 16
NA 4
Total 39
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Labels # Control
1 12
2 4
3 7
4 8
5 3
NA 5
Total 39
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XVII. Questionnaire for Validation Survey 
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135 
 
  
 
 
 
 
136 
 
  
 
 
 
 
137 
 
  
 
138 
 
XVIII. Validation Survey – Results Analysis  
Expert users results 
 
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ001
AtMet 16
Labels 16
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ002
Crite 11
SeReq 5
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ003
BSA 15
ISA 1
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ004
Vulne 16
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ005
Crite 1
RiTre 15
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ006
BSA 1
ISA 14
(пусто)
Total 15
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ007
Contr 2
Crite 3
SeReq 11
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ008
Impac 16
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ009
Contr 14
RiTre 2
Total 16
COncepts # ideograDiagramSel_SQ010
ThAge 16
Total 16
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Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ001
Contr 1
SeReq 15
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ002
ThAge 16
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ003
AtMet 16
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ004
Impac 16
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ005
BSA 3
Contr 13
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ006
BSA 12
Contr 2
ISA 1
SeReq 1
Total 16
Concepts # malact DiagramSelect_SQ007
BSA 1
ISA 15
Total 16
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Labels # malact Basset
new 12
old 4
Total 16
Labels # malact Isasset
new 13
old 3
Total 16
Labels # malact Impact
new 15
old 1
Total 16
Labels # malact AttackMethod
new 12
old 4
Total 16
Labels # malact SecurityReq
new 16
Total 16
Labels # malact Control
new 15
old 1
Total 16
Labels # malact ThreatAgent
new 16
Total 16
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Concepts # misuseDiagramSelect_SQ001
BAS 15
ISA 1
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ002
ISA 1
ThAge 15
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ003
Crite 13
SeReq 3
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ004
Vulne 16
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ005
Crite 3
SeReq 13
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ006
Impac 16
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ007
AtMet 16
Total 16
Concepts # misuse DiagramSelect_SQ008
BAS 1
ISA 13
ThAge 1
(пусто)
Total 15
142 
 
 
 
 
  
Labels # misuse Basset
new 11
old 5
Total 16
Labels # misuse Isasset
new 14
old 2
Total 16
Labels # misuse Impact
new 16
Total 16
Labels # misuse Vulnerability
new 16
Total 16
Labels # misuse AttackMethod
new 10
old 6
Total 16
Labels # misuse SecurityReq
new 13
old 3
Total 16
Labels # misuse Criterion
new 13
old 3
Total 16
Labels # misuse ThreatAgent
new 13
old 3
Total 16
143 
 
 
 
  
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ001
BAS 1
ISA 15
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ002
Crite 13
SeReq 2
Threa 1
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ003
BAS 15
ISA 1
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ004
Crite 2
SeReq 14
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ005
ISA 1
Vulne 15
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ006
ThAge 16
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ007
AtMet 15
Threa 1
Total 16
Concepts # stDiagramSelect_SQ008
AtMet 1
Crite 1
Threa 14
Total 16
144 
 
 
 
  
Labels # seqtro Basset
new 15
old 1
Total 16
Labels # seqtro Isasset
new 16
Total 16
Labels # seqtro Threat
new 14
old 2
Total 16
Labels # seqtro Vulnerability
new 14
old 2
Total 16
Labels # seqtro AttackMethod
new 12
old 4
Total 16
Labels # seqtro SecurityReq
new 15
old 1
Total 16
Labels # seqtro Criterion
new 14
old 2
Total 16
Labels # seqtro ThreatAgent
new 14
old 2
Total 16
145 
 
 
 
  
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ001
BA 1
ISA 15
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ002
Crit 1
SeReq 15
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ003
BA 14
Crit 2
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ004
BA 1
Crit 10
ISA 1
SeReq 1
Vuln 3
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ005
ThAge 16
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ006
Crit 2
Vuln 14
Total 16
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect_SQ007
AtMet 16
Total 16
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Label # bpmn Basset
new 13
old 3
Total 16
Label # bpmn Isasset
new 14
old 2
Total 16
Label # bpmn Vulnerability
new 4
old 12
Total 16
Label # bpmn AttackMethod
new 8
old 8
Total 16
Label # bpmn SecurityReq
new 12
old 4
Total 16
Label # bpmn ThreatAgent
new 13
old 3
Total 16
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Novice user results 
 
 
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ001]
AtMet 18
BSA 3
NA 1
RiTre 1
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ002]
BSA 1
Contr 2
Crite 7
Impac 2
ISA 3
NA 1
RiTre 1
SeReq 5
Vulne 1
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ003]
AtMet 1
BSA 12
Crite 1
Impac 3
ISA 4
SeReq 1
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ004]
Crite 1
Impac 3
ISA 1
RiTre 1
Vulne 17
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ005]
AtMet 1
BSA 1
Contr 5
Crite 1
RiTre 11
SeReq 3
Vulne 1
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ006]
BSA 7
ISA 12
RiTre 2
Vulne 2
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ007]
Contr 3
Crite 4
SeReq 13
ThAge 3
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ008]
Contr 1
Crite 2
Impac 15
RiTre 3
Vulne 2
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ009]
BSA 1
Contr 11
Crite 5
NA 1
RiTre 4
SeReq 1
Total 23
Concepts # ideograDiagramSel[SQ010]
AtMet 1
Contr 2
Crite 1
Impac 1
NA 1
ThAge 17
Total 23
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Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ001]
BSA 3
ISA 2
SeReq 18
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ002]
BSA 2
Impac 1
ISA 2
ThAge 18
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ003]
AtMet 20
Impac 1
NA 1
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ004]
AtMet 1
Contr 2
Impac 18
SeReq 1
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ005]
AtMet 1
BSA 1
Contr 15
Impac 2
ISA 3
SeReq 1
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ006]
AtMet 1
BSA 9
Contr 5
ISA 5
SeReq 1
ThAge 2
Total 23
Concepts # maDiagramSelect[SQ007]
BSA 8
Contr 1
Impac 1
ISA 10
NA 1
SeReq 1
ThAge 1
Total 23
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Labels # maBasset[SQ001]
new 18
old 5
Total 23
Labels # maIsasset[SQ001]
new 18
old 5
Total 23
Labels # maImpact[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # maAttackMethod[SQ001]
new 17
old 6
Total 23
Labels # maSecurityReq[SQ001]
new 17
old 6
Total 23
Labels # maControl[SQ001]
new 18
old 5
Total 23
Labels # maThreatAgent[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
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Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ001]
BAS 10
Impac 4
ISA 7
NA 1
Vulne 1
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ002]
AtMet 1
Impac 3
ISA 1
ThAge 18
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ003]
BAS 1
Crite 11
Impac 1
ISA 3
SeReq 6
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ004]
BAS 1
Impac 1
ISA 1
NA 1
SeReq 1
Vulne 18
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ005]
AtMet 1
BAS 2
Crite 6
SeReq 13
Vulne 1
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ006]
AtMet 2
Crite 2
Impac 12
NA 1
SeReq 2
ThAge 1
Vulne 3
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ007]
AtMet 18
Crite 2
Impac 1
ThAge 2
Total 23
Concepts # mcDiagramSelect[SQ008]
BAS 8
Crite 2
ISA 10
NA 1
ThAge 2
Total 23
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Labels # mcBasset[SQ001]
NA 1
new 12
old 10
Total 23
Labels # mcIsasset[SQ001]
new 21
old 2
Total 23
Labels # mcImpact[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # mcVulnerability[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # mcAttackMethod[SQ001]
new 16
old 7
Total 23
Labels # mcSecurityReq[SQ001]
new 9
old 14
Total 23
Labels # mcCriterion[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # mcThreatAgent[SQ001]
new 16
old 7
Total 23
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Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ001]
AtMet 1
BAS 8
ISA 10
NA 3
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ002]
BAS 3
Crite 7
ISA 1
NA 1
SeReq 8
Threa 1
Vulne 2
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ003]
BAS 10
Crite 2
ISA 7
SeReq 1
Threa 1
Vulne 2
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ004]
Crite 7
ISA 2
NA 1
SeReq 10
ThAge 1
Threa 1
Vulne 1
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ005]
AtMet 1
BAS 1
Crite 3
ISA 1
NA 1
SeReq 2
ThAge 1
Threa 2
Vulne 11
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ006]
ISA 1
SeReq 1
ThAge 16
Threa 5
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ007]
AtMet 20
Crite 1
NA 1
ThAge 1
Total 23
Concepts # stDiagramSelect[SQ008]
Crite 1
NA 1
SeReq 1
ThAge 3
Threa 12
Vulne 5
Total 23
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Labels # stBasset[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # stIsasset[SQ001]
new 18
old 5
Total 23
Labels # stThreat[SQ001]
new 18
old 5
Total 23
Labels # stVulnerability[SQ001]
new 22
old 1
Total 23
Labels # stAttackMethod[SQ001]
new 20
old 3
Total 23
Labels # stSecurityReq[SQ001]
new 19
old 4
Total 23
Labels # stCriterion[SQ001]
new 20
old 3
Total 23
Labels # stThreatAgent[SQ001]
new 20
old 3
Total 23
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Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ001]
BA 8
ISA 10
SeReq 1
ThAge 1
Vuln 3
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ002]
AtMet 3
Crit 3
ISA 3
SeReq 14
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ003]
BA 8
Crit 3
ISA 7
Vuln 5
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ004]
AtMet 1
BA 4
Crit 9
ISA 1
NA 1
SeReq 3
Vuln 4
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ005]
AtMet 2
SeReq 1
ThAge 20
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ006]
BA 1
Crit 8
SeReq 3
ThAge 1
Vuln 10
Total 23
Concepts # bpmnDiagramSelect[SQ007]
AtMet 18
BA 1
ISA 1
SeReq 1
ThAge 1
Vuln 1
Total 23
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Labels # bpmnBasset[SQ001]
new 22
old 1
Total 23
Labels # bpmnIsasset[SQ001]
new 17
old 6
Total 23
Labels # bpmnVulnerability[SQ001]
new 15
old 8
Total 23
Labels # bpmnAttackMethod[SQ001]
NA 1
new 17
old 5
Total 23
Labels # bpmnSecurityReq[SQ001]
new 17
old 6
Total 23
Labels # bpmnThreatAgent[SQ001]
new 20
old 3
Total 23
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XIX. Validation Survey – Results of Model Matching 
Language Concept Icon-enriched notations 
Novice users Expert users 
correct in-
cor-
rect 
to-
tal 
hit 
rate 
semant. 
transp. 
coeffi-
cient 
cor-
rect 
in-
cor-
rect 
to-
tal 
hit 
rate 
semant. 
transp. coef-
ficient 
BPMN Business Asset 8 15 23 34.78 0.24 14 2 16 87.50 0.85 
BPMN Information 
System Asset 
10 13 23 43.48 0.34 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
BPMN Vulnerability 10 13 23 43.48 0.34 14 2 16 87.50 0.85 
BPMN Attack Method 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
BPMN Security Re-
quirement 
14 9 23 60.87 0.54 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
BPMN Threat Agent 20 3 23 86.96 0.85 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
BPMN Criterion 9 14 23 39.13 0.29 10 6 16 62.50 0.56 
Secure 
Tropos 
Business Asset 10 13 23 43.48 0.35 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Secure 
Tropos 
Information 
System Asset 
10 13 23 43.48 0.35 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Secure 
Tropos 
Threat 12 11 23 52.17 0.45 14 2 16 87.50 0.86 
Secure 
Tropos 
Vulnerability 11 12 23 47.83 0.40 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Secure 
Tropos 
Attack Method 20 3 23 86.96 0.85 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Secure 
Tropos 
Security Re-
quirement 
10 13 23 43.48 0.35 14 2 16 87.50 0.86 
Secure 
Tropos 
Criterion 7 16 23 30.43 0.20 13 3 16 81.25 0.79 
Secure 
Tropos 
Threat Agent 16 7 23 69.57 0.65 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Business Asset 9 14 23 39.13 0.29 12 4 16 75.00 0.71 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Information 
System Asset 
10 13 23 43.48 0.34 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Impact 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Attack Method 20 3 23 86.96 0.85 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Security Re-
quirement 
18 5 23 78.26 0.75 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Control 15 8 23 65.22 0.59 13 3 16 81.25 0.78 
Mal-activ-
ity Dia-
grams 
Threat Agent 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Misuse 
Cases 
Business Asset 10 13 23 43.48 0.35 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Misuse 
Cases 
Information 
System Asset 
10 13 23 43.48 0.35 13 3 16 81.25 0.79 
Misuse 
Cases 
Impact 12 11 23 52.17 0.45 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Misuse 
Cases 
Vulnerability 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Misuse 
Cases 
Attack Method 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Misuse 
Cases 
Security Re-
quirement 
13 10 23 56.52 0.50 13 3 16 81.25 0.79 
Misuse 
Cases 
Criterion 11 12 23 47.83 0.40 13 3 16 81.25 0.79 
Misuse 
Cases 
Threat Agent 18 5 23 78.26 0.75 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Ideogram Attack Method 18 5 23 78.26 0.76 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Ideogram Criterion 7 16 23 30.43 0.23 11 5 16 68.75 0.65 
Ideogram Business Asset 12 11 23 52.17 0.47 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
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Ideogram Vulnerability 17 6 23 73.91 0.71 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Ideogram Risk Treat-
ment 
11 12 23 47.83 0.42 15 1 16 93.75 0.93 
Ideogram Information 
System Asset 
12 11 23 52.17 0.47 14 2 16 87.50 0.86 
Ideogram Security Re-
quirement 
13 10 23 56.52 0.52 11 5 16 68.75 0.65 
Ideogram Impact 15 8 23 65.22 0.61 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
Ideogram Control 11 12 23 47.83 0.42 14 2 16 87.50 0.86 
Ideogram Threat Agent 17 6 23 73.91 0.71 16 0 16 100.00 1.00 
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XX. Icons Details 
Icon Name Author Source Link 
Checklist Aaron K. Kim The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/term/checklist/316296/ 
Shield  Marek Polakovic The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/term/shield/304274/ 
Shield To Uen The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/term/shield/445820/ 
Hoodie  Sergey Demushkin The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/term/hoodie/129183/ 
Skull Stanislav Levin The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/term/skull/217591/ 
Key in key-
hole 
flaticon Freepic.com https://www.freepik.com/free-
icon/key-in-key-
hole_729808.htm 
Hacker Peter van Driel Icon-finder.com https://www.icon-
finder.com/icons/1909691/crim
e_cyber_group_hacker_pro-
tect_security_skull_icon 
Skull and 
Crossbones 
Andrew Cameron The Noun Project https://thenounpro-
ject.com/search/?q=Skull%20an
d%20Crossbones&i=1962 
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